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Abstract 
 
KELLY ROSS: Marks and Traces: The Origins of Literary Detection in the Antebellum 
United States 
(Under the direction of Eliza Richards) 
 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, critics credited Edgar Allan Poe with inventing the 
detective story in his Dupin tales, thereby establishing a fable of individual origination that 
replicates Poe’s depiction of Dupin’s singular genius. Suppressing the social and political 
dimensions of the genre’s origins enabled later critics to think of detective fiction as a 
playground for the theoretical or purely literary imagination unconstrained by cultural and 
historical contexts. “Marks and Traces” pluralizes the origins of detective fiction by 
demonstrating that US literary detection in the 1840s and 50s developed from practices of 
surveillance and counter surveillance pervasive in the slave system of the antebellum Upper 
South. Analyzing an array of visual and textual evidence, I trace the transformation of these 
lived practices into the tropes of detective fiction. My historically grounded approach reveals 
an arena in which antebellum fictions play out a contest between dominant and subordinate 
detection.  
 Dominant detection, as exemplified by Poe’s Dupin, deflects attention from systemic 
inequalities by circumscribing investigation to the individual mastermind. Subordinate 
detection, in contrast, emphasizes the mutuality of surveillance and seeks to redress the 
national crime of slavery. Acknowledging that effective interpretative practices can be taught 
and shared, subordinate detection lays the groundwork for insurrections against the slave 
  iv 
system. The protagonist of Frederick Douglass’s The Heroic Slave, for instance, first refutes 
the white presumption of non-reciprocal surveillance and then retrains a white detective 
figure in the methods of subordinate detection; their cooperation begets a mutiny on board a 
slave ship. Another fictionalization of a historical slave mutiny, Herman Melville’s Benito 
Cereno, presents an implicit comparison between dominant and subordinate detection that 
obliges readers to practice subordinate detection to solve the embedded mystery. While Poe 
explores how detection underwrites mastery, Douglass and Melville embrace literary 
detection as a mode of imagining social change and disseminating strategies that can 
instigate that change. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1853, J.W. Gerard pleaded with the inhabitants of New York City to join him in a 
campaign to reform their fledgling municipal police department following London’s model, 
founded in 1830:  
they are a century ahead of us…in their admirable system of Municipal 
Police, which I have no doubt is the most perfect in the world….London 
is…the most orderly, and the best regulated city of any size in the world. The 
cause is the efficiency of its Police; not merely its physical power in detecting 
criminals after crime is committed, but its moral efficiency in preventing 
crime by the force of its character....With very little more expense than we 
now pay, New York may have as efficient a police as any city in Christendom. 
(5-8) 
 
Gerard’s polemic—which did indeed prompt reforms, most notably the adoption of a 
uniform for police officers—draws a distinction between preventing crime and apprehending 
criminals. Law enforcement had, up to the mid-nineteenth century, consisted mainly of the 
latter. Constables and marshals were responsible for bringing offenders to justice, but they 
performed their duties inconsistently and ineffectually. Reformers such as Gerard hoped that 
establishing a preventative police force (in Boston in 1837, New York in 1845, and, slowly 
over the next few decades, in other major US cities), “would replace the old reliance on 
severity of punishment with certainty of punishment” (Miller x). Before crime could be 
effectively prevented by a well-ordered, visible, pervasive police corps patrolling and 
surveilling a city, draconian sentences such as the death penalty for minor crimes such as 
stealing a handkerchief, were used to deter miscreants (Miller 6). The new system of policing 
did lead to sentencing reforms, but it also decreased “respectable” citizens’ tolerance for 
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disorderly conduct, since reporting such behavior no longer meant sentencing a fellow citizen 
to death. As preventative policing became the predominant system, detective policing was 
reserved for more serious crimes such as murder, and the detective police officer accordingly 
gained the elevated status associated with these high-profile crimes. 
The mid-1840s and 50s were the nascence of the police department as an institution 
in the major urban centers of the United States, and some rural and frontier areas would not 
have police institutions until the end of the century. In 1853, when Gerard wrote his 
pamphlet, the New York Municipal Police had existed for less than a decade. Before May 7, 
1844, when the Municipal Police Act was passed, policing in New York City was performed 
by two constables and a small number of Mayor’s Marshals, all of whom worked during the 
day. The constables were responsible for maintaining order, while the Marshals were charged 
with serving warrants and apprehending offenders—for a fee. After sunset, an amateur night 
watch patrolled the streets. As historian Augustine Costello explains, “the system of policing 
the city that had prevailed, with few changes and modifications, [w]as handed down from the 
Dutch to the English, and by these to the [New York city] government that supplanted them 
(102). The 1844 Municipal Police Act abolished the night-watch system and established a 
round-the-clock police force. 
This brief history of the New York Police Force—one of the earliest in the United 
States—reminds us that the state of law enforcement in the antebellum United States was 
amorphous and varied widely by region. Antebellum policing institutions, I argue, displayed 
two approaches: a sense of policing as a communal or collective venture, on the one hand, 
and as an individual or private venture, on the other. Within each of those two categories, I 
will trace the development of parallel institutions in the North and in the South, including the 
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night watch, thief-detecting societies, slave patrols, thief takers, and slave catchers. In the 
collective approach to policing, a group of non-professionals shared responsibility for 
guarding property and deterring crime. Each person sacrificed time, personal safety, and 
money for the welfare of a larger group. The individualistic approach to policing was 
exemplified by marshals, who were paid fees to deliver summonses, appear in court, and 
return stolen property. Marshals competed with one another for available fees and thus were 
unlikely to share information or cooperate. The division between collective and individual 
policing represents two approaches to information, with collectives sharing and circulating 
information to the extent that their technological capabilities allowed, and individuals 
restricting information for their own private gain in the form of rewards or fees. These two 
broad approaches to policing—communal and individualistic—overlap with the two modes 
of detection I will examine in this dissertation—subordinate and dominant detection. 
Subordinate detection emphasizes the mutuality of surveillance and seeks to redress the 
national crime of slavery. Acknowledging that effective interpretative practices can be taught 
and shared, subordinate detection lays the groundwork for insurrections against the slave 
system. Dominant detection, as exemplified by Poe’s Dupin, deflects attention from systemic 
inequalities by circumscribing investigation to the individual mastermind.  
Collective policing was performed by groups of volunteers or through mandated civil 
service. For example, the night watch, which existed in the north and the south, but was 
confined to urban areas, was a rotating group of ordinary citizens who would patrol a certain 
area from sundown to sunup. While night watchmen were compensated for their time, the 
remuneration was not enough to live off of and they held other jobs during the day (Costello 
102). Requirements for serving on the watch varied from town to town, but generally all 
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property owners were responsible for patrolling or providing a substitute. Night-watchmen 
would apprehend criminals if they caught them in the act of robbing someone, for example, 
but they would not pursue a criminal or conduct investigations to determine who had 
committed a crime: their duties ended with the sun rise. Until 1845, with the establishment of 
the New York Metropolitan Police, this was the apex of policing in the United States, but it 
was not a particularly effective system. Citizens complained that night watchmen more often 
slept than patrolled, as an 1838 drawing by David Claypoole Johnston demonstrates. In this 
scene—one of a set of illustrations for a book called Charcoal Sketches, or Scenes in the 
Metropolis (written by J. C. Neal and published in 1838)—a night watchman confronts a 
disheveled man loitering in a pump house. Although the watchman in the main frame is 
performing his duty, Johnston depicts little sleeping watchmen holding nightsticks in the 
corners.  
In the north, a supplementary system of communal policing developed: several towns 
established thief-detecting societies. These societies usually focused on detecting and 
apprehending horse thieves, although at least one society was dedicated to “The Protection of 
Fruit.” Ann-Marie Szymanski, a political scientist, has identified “hundreds of [these] local 
associations created during the nineteenth century to protect the private property of U.S. 
citizens,” including “at least seventy-two…in New England” (407). Unlike the night watch, 
these were voluntary associations, to which one subscribed, paying either annual dues of 
around one dollar or a pro-rated premium based on the extent of one’s estate. These societies 
emphasize their collective aspect in their names and their records: several of them included 
the word “mutual” in their title, they adopted a corporate structure, and the woodcut many 
used as a masthead shows four riders closing in on one thief. Each society elected a number 
  5 
of pursuers, treasurers, and directors; their constitutions explain the regulations for filing 
descriptions of one’s property, reporting theft, and reimbursing pursuers when they hunted 
down a thief. As a cooperative endeavor with regular meetings and a codified governing 
structure, they had both the ability and the incentive to distribute among their membership 
information, tips, and warnings.  
In the south, supplementary collective policing was performed by slave patrols. Like 
the thief-detecting societies of the north, patrollers pooled and circulated information to 
increase their efficacy (Hadden 85). An 1863 article in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 
“The Plantation Police,” describes the function of slave patrols and notes, “Some of the 
negroes submit reluctantly, and the colored man in the foreground is a specimen of this class. 
He seems to yield to the superior force of a tottering power, satisfied that his day is at hand” 
(251). Images of slave patrollers are rare; this illustration, published in a Northern newspaper 
in the midst of the Civil War, seems to allegorize the North’s anticipated victory over the 
slave South in its fanciful suggestion that an enslaved man in the South could, with impunity, 
treat a white patroller disdainfully. Despite its revisionist bent, it is instructive in its 
representation of a group of slave patrollers, white men on horses with dogs and rifles, who 
would have terrorized any African Americans they found traveling without a pass.  
Serving on a slave patrol, as on a night watch, was mandatory civil service for white 
male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five whether or not they owned slaves.1 
Patrolling in groups of three to ten men, from sundown to sunup, they covered a specific 
geographical area of about ten to fifteen square miles (Hadden 85). Also like night                                                         
1See Martin Greenburg and Sally Hadden for extensive treatments of the changes in 
legislation governing the conscription of slave patrollers in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
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watchmen, patrollers were compensated for their time, but they were not professional police; 
they served a set term and had other occupations or avocations. Obviously, however, unlike 
the night watch or the thief-detecting societies, their policing was racialized; they focused 
solely on surveilling African Americans. In the South, in addition to the constables and night 
watchmen, there was a special wing of law enforcement devoted to policing one specific 
subset of people. 
Furthermore, whereas thief-detecting societies were democratic associations—they 
elected officers, drew up constitutions, and either charged the same dues to everyone or used 
a sliding scale based on the value of the property that needed protection—slave patrols were 
anti-democratic. Patrollers were conscripted from all white male citizens, but many localities 
allowed men to hire a substitute or simply pay a fine for not fulfilling their patrol duty, so in 
practice the patrol tended to be made up of poor white men who could not afford to pay their 
way out. Martin Greenberg speculates that the resentment caused by these exemptions for the 
rich provoked patrollers’ tendency to abuse their power (65). Kenneth Stampp reports that 
complaints about patrollers beating and even killing slaves were common (215). The patrols 
provided an opportunity for socializing and networking among the white community, and 
patrollers were frequently drunk and boisterous (Hadden 85). Compared to the thief-detecting 
societies of the North, the southern slave patrols were a despotic form of collective policing 
that Sally Hadden argues would go underground after the Civil War and become the Ku Klux 
Klan. 
In contrast to these societies and patrols, there were also individuals who policed—
for profit. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, policing was performed by 
thief-takers on an ad hoc basis as well as by marshals. Thief-takers were essentially bounty 
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hunters, paid to capture and prosecute criminals. The most notorious English thief-taker, 
Jonathan Wild, was immortalized in Henry Fielding’s 1743 novel The Life and Death of 
Jonathan Wild, the Great. Wild indicates the problems with the thief-taking system of 
policing, which was based on financial reward for successful prosecution: Wild was both a 
master thief-taker and a master thief. The system encouraged corruption (since thieves often 
gave evidence against rivals in order to eliminate competition) and perjury (since the thief-
taker made money only if the suspect was convicted) (Ousby 11). Thief-takers and criminals 
“appeared more than a little similar: often drawn from the same sector of society, they both 
served motives of crude self-interest and could both show a chilling disregard for the 
elementary rules of ethical conduct” (Ousby 13). Poe’s Dupin evokes this historical 
connection between the mastermind and master criminal, which suggests that the profit-
motivated individualistic approach to policing is little different than crime itself. 
During the transition to an institutionalized police force in the late 1840s and 50s, a 
proto-police detective figure appeared frequently in fictional representations of Northern 
cities such as New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. This proto-detective was a hybrid of the 
thief-taker and the modern police officer. There was not a sharp distinction between 
preventive and detective police at the time: police did not wear uniforms in New York until 
the mid-1850s, so even patrolmen could slip into a crowd of people without alerting 
everyone to a police presence. Like the thief-taker, the proto-detective worked alone and 
blurred the boundaries between law enforcer and criminal, operating at the margins of 
legality. A city-mysteries novel by Justin Jones (under the pseudonym Harry Hazel), Big 
Dick, The King of the Negroes: or, Virtue and Vice Contrasted, published in 1846, depicts 
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this transitional period in Boston. Dick is a police officer, although his institutional 
association is tenuous. The narrator introduces us to Dick as  
a man of giant proportions, and his immense strength, together with a 
scientific knowledge of the Pugilistic art, made him a formidable terror to all 
evil doers. He once kept a Boxing School, but having been employed as a 
Police officer, and finding it more lucrative, he gave up his school, for duties 
more acceptable to the government of the town….It is true that his new 
occupation kept him busily at work, and he probably fought more battles, 
settled more disputes, quelled more riots, and arrested more rogues than any 
ten of his coadjutors. (8) 
 
In the opening scene, Dick finds an infant abandoned in the snow with a note clasped in its 
hands. Exclaiming, “This will give some clue to the matter” (21), Dick reads the note. He 
then uses the contents of the note in his interrogation of two suspects he has detained for a 
different crime and forces a confession out of one of them, which enables him to rescue a 
young woman named Lucy Gray that the two men had kidnapped and were planning to rape. 
Dick is essentially functioning as a police detective, tracing “clues” and interrogating 
suspects for leads.  
The novel then stages a transfer of power from the impotent watchman, Lucy’s father, 
representative of the old, flawed system of policing, to the superhuman police officer, Big 
Dick, representative of the new Metropolitan Police Force. Lucy’s father, Mr. Gray, was 
once a prosperous merchant but was reduced to bankruptcy by a corrupt business associate—
who is, coincidentally, the father of the man who kidnapped Lucy. Since his financial ruin, 
Mr. Gray “gained a livelihood for his family…in pursuing the arduous and unpleasant duties 
of a watchman of the town” (32). Despite his role as watchman, Mr. Gray cannot protect his 
daughter, but Dick can. Carrying the unconscious Lucy in his arms, Dick returns the 
kidnapped girl to her father. As the narrator affirmed in the initial description of Dick, 
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however, his police work is “lucrative”—Dick is in it for the money, and he sees nothing 
wrong with taking bribes or shaking down criminals. 
Finally, in the South, slave catchers, or slave takers, functioned as freelance 
detectives. An explosion of images of slave catchers followed the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, 
but slave catchers were a part of Southern antebellum life long before this controversial law 
was passed. They were usually depicted holding whips and handcuffs and trailing a pack of 
dogs—often identified as bloodhounds, which become a metonym for the detective. In 
“Conquering Prejudice to Save the Union,” a cartoon from 1851, for example, slave catchers 
are about to whip and handcuff a male fugitive while dogs with human faces pursue a female 
fugitive and her children. This antislavery cartoon personifies slave catchers’ ubiquitous 
bloodhounds to illustrate the way in which the Fugitive Slave Act transformed Northerners 
into slave catchers. 
Slave catchers made money by apprehending a runaway slave and turning him or her 
in to the county sheriff, who would reimburse the slave catcher for their mileage and give 
them a reward of about fifteen dollars. The sheriff then advertised the captured slave, giving 
as much detail as possible: name, physical appearance, clothes, and owner’s name (Franklin 
and Schweninger 151). Slave catchers could also be hired directly by owners whose slaves 
had run away. In this case, the slave catcher could earn ten to fifty dollars for apprehending a 
slave. John Hope Franklin explains that slave catchers were typically nonslaveholders, and 
“Although the slaves were worth many times the payment slave catchers received, it would 
have taken the pursuers much longer, even as skilled laborers, to earn more than they did for 
capturing fugitives” (156). While some expert slave catchers pursued fugitives as a fulltime 
job, many slave catchers also farmed or held other jobs, pursuing runaways to earn extra 
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income. Comparing slave patrols and slave catchers, Hadden notes that whereas slave 
patrollers “handled a variety of tasks, such as searching slave cabins for weapons and 
dispersing slave meetings,” “slave catchers were concerned only with capturing fugitive 
slaves” (80). This single-minded focus on one task is analogous to detectives’ exemption 
from the quotidian tasks of routine police work, marking both as experts with special 
knowledge. Like thief-takers, slave catchers were nonprofessionals, and since they were 
working for their personal material gain, they were disinclined to share information.   
As this brief history of the multiple forms of policing in the antebellum United States 
has suggested, until the 1850s, there was no such thing as a “detective”; rather, there were 
numerous situations in which people detected. Our modern concept of a professional police 
officer—let alone a police detective—would have been unrecognizable to an American in 
1841, when Edgar Allan Poe published “The Murders in the Rue Morgue.” When literary 
historians discuss Edgar Allan Poe’s Dupin tales, written in the early 1840s, as the first 
detective stories, therefore, they retrospectively apply a set of concepts that are anachronistic 
to the antebellum United States. I use the term “detection fiction”—emphasizing an action 
rather than a figure—to distinguish antebellum literature that depicts processes of detection 
from the genre of “detective fiction” that began to be codified at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  
Detective fiction has long been a fertile testing ground for innovative literary theory, 
from Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic readings in the 1950s to Franco Moretti’s more recent 
evolutionary trees. These approaches invariably accept the standard history of the genre, 
which identifies “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” as its unique originary moment. The 
truism that Poe “invented” detective fiction arises not from some self-evident feature of the 
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stories themselves (the word “detective” never appears in any of Poe’s stories), nor from Poe 
or his contemporaries. Rather, it gains currency at the turn of the twentieth century among 
detective fiction authors (most notably Arthur Conan Doyle). These writers, I argue, sought 
to establish credibility for their own stories by reading the conventions of late-nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth-century, primarily British, detective fiction back on to Poe’s tales. These 
genre-formation strategies stripped away the original sociopolitical context of Poe’s stories, 
rendering them an ideal locus for abstract theoretical work of the kind done by Lacan, 
Derrida, Moretti, and others. “Marks and Traces: The Origins of Literary Detection in the 
Antebellum United States” pluralizes the origins of detective fiction by demonstrating that 
US literary detection in the 1840s and 50s developed from practices of surveillance and 
counter surveillance pervasive in the slave system of the antebellum Upper South. I resituate 
Poe’s work within a field of detection fictions, all of which register the widespread cultural 
anxiety about violent slave rebellion in the 1840s and 50s. From the master class’s 
perspective, detection was necessary to prevent this threat to life and property, while from the 
enslaved perspective, detection laid the groundwork for cooperative resistance. Whereas 
detective fiction is usually thought of as a playground for the intellect, taking up the forgotten 
history of detective fiction reveals the life and death stakes of antebellum literary detection.  
The practices of mutual surveillance, theatricality, and deception, which Saidiya 
Hartman has called “the stagecraft of slavery,” point up a paradox in slavery’s logic. To 
justify enslaving human beings, the master class claimed that African Americans were 
innately inferior and thus incapable of deliberate strategies of deception and resistance, yet 
the resources they expended on surveilling the enslaved signified their awareness that 
African Americans could appear compliant while plotting insurrection. Instilling in enslaved 
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men and women the sense that they were always being watched was crucial to the success of 
the slave system. In contrast to this top-down surveillance aimed at maintaining white wealth 
and control, detection practiced by enslaved men and women, for whom criminality was the 
only socially recognized form of agency, was necessary for survival. Although the enslaved 
did not have access to institutional forms of surveillance such as slave patrols, they too were 
always watching their masters, reading their real intentions behind their masks and probing 
for weaknesses to exploit. Coordinated resistance such as insurrections depended on this 
detective work as well as on informal communication networks such as the grapevine 
telegraph. Antebellum detection fictions not only transformed these lived practices of 
surveillance and counter surveillance into literary tropes; they also evaluated the rhetorical 
strategies that underwrote or undermined mastery. Dominant detection, which aimed to 
preserve the social status quo, tried to suppress contradictory narratives and impose one 
authoritative solution; subordinate detection, on the other hand, sought to shatter the illusion 
of coherence produced by dominant groups’ master narratives. 
In each of my five chapters, I examine texts that are concerned with interpreting 
external signs to disclose interior states in order to prevent or foment rebellion against white 
oppressors. I begin my study with The Confessions of Nat Turner (1831), published a decade 
before Poe’s first Dupin tale, in order to show the competition between dominant and 
subordinate modes of detection from which Poe’s stories emerged. Thomas R. Gray’s 
purportedly nonfictional account of the Southampton, Virginia, slave rebellion preserves in 
its generic instability the conflict between these two separate modes, as Gray’s attempts to 
detect Turner’s motives are continually challenged by eruptions of Turner’s encrypted 
interpretive practice. Throughout the preface, Gray foregrounds Turner’s mental corruption, 
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indicating white readers’ pressing concern with accurately reading the thoughts of the 
African Americans who participated in the rebellion. By the end of the Confessions, 
however, Turner has possessed Gray’s mind to such a degree that Gray ventriloquizes 
Turner’s prophetic voice in his revision of the official trial transcript. 
In the next two chapters I discuss Poe’s labors of erasure in crafting a narrative 
solution to subordinate detection’s social threat. Although there has been a recent trend of 
critical attention to issues of race and gender particularly in “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue,” no one has insisted upon the logic of slavery as foundational for Poe’s literary 
detection, as opposed to Poe’s simply thematizing racial issues or alluding to historical 
events. I argue that the critical tendency to isolate the Dupin tales under the rubric of 
detective fiction has impeded our ability to see connections between those tales and his other 
writings, particularly The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, which has never been read as a 
fiction of detection, but whose concluding section explicitly links race and detection. The 
anxiety that Pym, a white individual, feels about his failure to interpret and control the 
behavior of a fictional dark-skinned race provokes the white superhuman figure who looms 
up out of the mist at the end of the novel. This mysterious figure anticipates Poe’s Dupin, 
who is elevated to the status of extraordinary genius on the basis of his ability to articulate 
and enforce a narrative “solution” over and against any alternate accounts of reality. 
While Poe was just as interested in the limitations of dominant detection as he was in 
the illusion of power it conferred, he shifted to allaying anxieties after readers responded 
unfavorably to Poe’s warning in Pym. In his Dupin tales he developed a comforting fiction of 
absolute control and self-justification, personified in an individual genius figure. Whereas the 
threat in Pym combines the exoticism of racial otherness with the power of the collective, 
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Poe isolates these elements in the first two Dupin tales, so that in “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue” Dupin has to contend only with an anthropomorphized racial other, and in “The 
Mystery of Marie Roget” he faces only the power of the collective. Each iteration of Poe’s 
literary engagement with detection amplifies the interiorization and dislocation from the 
social, finally producing his most acclaimed Dupin tale, “The Purloined Letter,” a story so 
insular that the criminal is a double of the detective. Yet the insularity of “The Purloined 
Letter” sardonically acknowledges the cost that such therapeutic fantasies of total control 
incur: the complete erasure of everything outside the individual’s own mind, resulting in the 
elimination of social context. 
Poe’s is not the only narrative solution to the conflict between dominant and 
subordinate detection, however. The stories I treat in the last two chapters offer solutions 
more sympathetic to subordinate modes of detection. Frederick Douglass’s only work of 
fiction, The Heroic Slave, structurally inverts Poe’s Dupinian mode, in which successful 
detection garners acclaim for a single practitioner. Douglass exposes the unacknowledged 
racialized power structure that sustains Poe’s mode of dominant detection and demonstrates 
that the white detective figure’s presumption of authority based on his singular, transcendent 
genius—the model that underpins analytical detective fiction—is in fact just a form of 
projection. Instead, Douglass argues that the political and social oppression of enslaved 
people has trained them in the skills necessary for successful detection, but that those skills 
are shared among communities and can be taught to others rather than conserved for use by a 
singular individual. Douglass’s cooperative, socially engaged mode of subordinate detection 
allows those practicing it to evade the surveillance of those practicing dominant detection, 
thereby creating a protected space for collective insurgent action. The protagonist of The 
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Heroic Slave first refutes the white presumption of non-reciprocal surveillance and then 
retrains a white detective figure in the methods of subordinate detection; their cooperation 
begets a mutiny on board a slave ship.  
 Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno, another fictionalization of a historical slave 
mutiny, presents an implicit comparison between dominant and subordinate detection that 
obliges readers to practice subordinate detection to solve the embedded mystery. Benito 
Cereno integrates the narrative strategy that Poe experimented with in Pym and the radical 
political possibilities elaborated in Douglass’s Heroic Slave. Like Poe, Melville exploits the 
gap between an inept detective, whose preconceptions obstruct his interpretation of a 
complex performance, and the more perspicuous reader to create a text that obliges the reader 
to dismantle the master narrative. In its demand for skepticism and its embrace of ambiguity, 
Melville’s novella is fundamentally opposed to the type of reading that Poe’s Dupin tales 
require of their readers. Whereas Dupin’s power stems from his ability to convince others 
that there is only one correct solution and that he has it, Melville asks his readers to evaluate 
the stakes of detection for themselves. While Poe explores how detection underwrites 
mastery, Douglass and Melville embrace literary detection as a mode of imagining social 
change and disseminating strategies that can instigate that change. 
Recent detective fiction criticism has embraced the diversity of the genre in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, attending to detective fiction by and about women, 
people of color, and other marginalized groups. Work by scholars including Maureen T. 
Reddy, Catherine Ross Nickerson, Susan Elizabeth Sweeney, and Frankie Y. Bailey has 
replaced the familiar trajectory from Poe to Doyle to Auster with a web of multiple, 
interconnected nodes. My work on subordinate detection resonates with many of these 
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critics’ insights. As valuable as this scholarship attending to issues of diversity is, its timeline 
skews toward contemporary texts, slighting the nineteenth century. This dissertation 
demonstrates that dominant and subordinate literary detection emerged contemporaneously 
in the antebellum United States and must be understood in relation to each other. 
Recognizing the contest between subordinate and dominant modes of detection in 
nineteenth-century fiction unsettles the inherited understanding of the detective fiction genre 
and is the first step in appreciating the range of possibility for detection fictions. Critics often 
assert that detective fiction is a conservative, self-enclosed genre detached from reality. I 
argue that this stance is self-fulfilling: critics have defined the genre in such a way as to 
exclude fiction that does not hide the evidence of its social engagement. It is no accident, 
then, that Dupin, Poe’s singular white, male mastermind, has been elevated as the first 
fictional detective, while competing modes of detection practiced by marginalized persons 
have been excluded from the genre. In those modes, presented by such authors as Douglass 
and Melville (and indeed Poe himself in certain stories), the life and death stakes of detection 
are central: subordinate modes demonstrate that successful detection can secure freedom and 
survival. Attending to alternative modes of detection proves that these fictions can critique 
dominant ways of knowing, imagine political and social change, and disseminate interpretive 
strategies that facilitate the cooperative action necessary to achieve this change, so that the 
story ends in a very different world than that in which it began.
  
 
Chapter 2: “The Seal was Removed from My Lips”: Reading Nat Turner’s Subordinate 
Detection in Thomas R. Gray’s The Confessions of Nat Turner 
 
In The Confessions of Nat Turner, Turner marks the beginning of the Southampton 
County, Virginia, slave rebellion as the moment when a “sign appear[ed] in the heavens, the 
seal was removed from my lips, and I communicated the great work laid out for me to do” 
(48). Turner’s statement about the rebellion delineates a movement from observation to 
interpretation to communication that also describes his work in shaping the text that would 
become the primary historical account of the rebellion. Turner observed the appearance of a 
sign—a solar eclipse—which he interpreted as a divine message, and which enabled him to 
“communicate” to others. Likewise, in the prison cell interview between Turner and Gray, 
Turner scrutinizes Gray, observing the signs that Turner then interprets to predict how Gray 
will frame Turner’s words. This observation and interpretation, I argue, constitutes Turner’s 
subordinate detection. Turner’s subordinate detection allows him to remove the “seal” of 
Gray’s legalistic and medical diagnostic framework and communicate through Gray’s text, 
albeit covertly.  
I contend that the Confessions demonstrates how Gray’s encounter with Turner foils 
Gray’s attempt to practice dominant detection. While Gray does not transform into a 
subordinate detective (as does Listwell in The Heroic Slave), he does transfer his own 
authorial agency to Turner at the climactic moment of the text. Gray begins composing the 
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text with the presumption of non-reciprocal detection, the illusion upon which dominant 
detection rests. Dominant detection assumes that a singular mastermind can access another 
person’s interiority (through investigations, surveillance, and direct interviews) without 
exposing his own interiority. This non-reciprocal mode of detection leaves the dominant 
detective figure unchanged: his interiority is untouched even as he penetrates the soul of 
another person to determine his motive. Although Gray tries to operate in this mode in his 
prefatory essay, his encounter with Turner changes him, and the “Confession” reveals an 
interchange between Turner and Gray.  
Turner’s subordinate detection, which enables him to scrutinize Gray while Gray is 
attempting to do the same to him, is unvoiced in the text; it must therefore be inferred from 
the textual effects that follow the jail cell interview. By surveilling Gray and the other white 
authorities who examine him, Turner detects the framework that Gray will try to impose on 
his text. Gray perceives Turner’s rhetorical threat—his declaration of extraordinary 
intelligence, which refutes proslavery claims about African American inferiority—and 
attempts to neutralize it by characterizing Turner as motivated by mental corruption 
stemming from dwelling too long on religious delusions. Recognizing that motive is crucial 
for Gray and for his white audience, Turner frames his motive as divine inspiration, 
emphasizing his brilliance and creativity. In so doing, Turner ushers into Gray’s text the 
productive confusion among the discourses of madness and genius. As Lynn Gamwell and 
Nancy Tomes discuss in their study, Madness in America, the Romantic association of 
creativity with madness had a pervasive influence on antebellum thought (90-92). This 
overlap fascinated early psychiatric doctors as well. Amariah Brigham, editor of the 
American Journal of Insanity, for example, wrote a series of articles in the first volume of the 
  19 
journal investigating “Insanity—Illustrated by Histories of Distinguished Men, and by the 
Writings of Poets and Novelists.” Brigham noted that “Insanity is a disease peculiarly 
incident to persons remarkable for talent or genius” (18). 
Because these discourses of madness and genius are deeply intertwined in antebellum 
imaginations, Turner’s and Gray’s accounts of Turner’s motive are complementary. Turner’s 
testimony doesn’t invalidate Gray’s explanation; rather, the two explanations co-mingle and 
infuse one other. This permeation dissolves Gray’s narrative containment strategy, making it 
impossible to distinguish between Gray’s voice and Turner’s. Gray’s loss of control over his 
text demonstrates the incredible rhetorical effort it takes to maintain dominant discourse. 
Since proslavery ideology is not logically sound, producing a text that supports it is 
rhetorically demanding, especially when one moves from the juridical register into genre 
with historical baggage: the confession. Ultimately, Turner exploits the break down in Gray’s 
authorial control to communicate covertly to an imagined audience, contemporary or future, 
that is more sympathetic to his anti-slavery message.  
Eric Sundquist argues that The Confessions of Nat Turner encapsulates “the entire 
phenomenology of slavery in which the dialectic of opposing wills was subject to continual 
borrowing and absorptions of power, alterations of ascendancy, and recognitions that the 
ontological planes of bondage and mastery could from time to time—in sudden flarings of 
resistance, escape, or deceit—become inverted” (40). The antagonistic co-authorship 
recorded in the Confessions is therefore an excellent location to study the power dynamics 
that characterize the antebellum slave system. Indeed, the unique circumstances surrounding 
the production of The Confessions—in which a white citizen of Southampton County, 
Virginia, purports to transcribe a condemned African American man’s deathbed account of 
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the slave rebellion he helped organize—render the text generically anomalous. It exemplifies 
Jonathan Culler’s observation that “our most crucial and tantalizing experiences of literature 
[are] located at the interstices of genres” (53). 
Because I will argue that The Confessions of Nat Turner (1831) preserves, in its 
structure, evidence of Turner’s effect on Gray, it is important first to clarify the text’s 
organization. The Confessions is divided into two sections: a prefatory essay titled “To the 
Public” and a narrative titled “Confession.”1 The essay’s author, Thomas Ruffin Gray, was a 
young Southampton County lawyer who had served as counsel for five of the enslaved 
defendants tried in connection with the Southampton, Virginia, rebellion. On the morning of 
August 22, 1831, Turner and six other men killed the family that enslaved Turner, and then 
moved on to other white households in the neighborhood, murdering all the inhabitants of 
each house. Numbers of rebels and victims vary widely, but there may have been about forty 
rebels at their strongest point, and they killed at least fifty-five whites. Another fifty-five 
African Americans were executed by the state for the murders, and untold hundreds were 
killed by vigilantes across the region.  
After Nat Turner was captured on October 30, 1831, Gray visited Turner in his jail 
cell and purportedly transcribed Turner’s confessions verbatim. This transcript, which Gray 
dates “Tuesday the 1st November,” constitutes the majority of the second section of the 
Confessions, written from Turner’s first-person perspective. Gray inserts a few brief 
explanatory comments and transcribes three of the questions he posed to Turner, but besides                                                         
1I will use The Confessions (italicized) to refer to the text as a whole, and the “Confession” to 
refer to the second section, which includes Turner’s first-person narrative, a first-person 
commentary by Gray, a fictionalized transcript of Turner’s sentencing, and lists of the white 
people killed and the African Americans brought to trial for the murders. 
  21 
these rare interjections, Gray’s voice is unmarked in Turner’s first-person narrative.2 
Following Turner’s narrative, Gray includes another essay in which he comments on 
Turner’s statements. Gray does not mark any typographic break between Turner’s first-
person narrative and Gray’s first-person commentary—Turner’s “I” in one paragraph gives 
way to Gray’s “I” in the next without warning or distinction. The preface was 
typographically sequestered with page breaks and a separate title, “To the Public,” all of 
which clearly marked Gray’s authorship. After Gray transcribes the “Confession,” however, 
this segregation disappears, and Turner’s voice bleeds into Gray’s, typographically indexing 
the interchange that has occurred between the two men. 
The preface (“To the Public”) and the “Confession” are each surrounded by legal 
documents that embed Gray’s and Turner’s words within the judicial and publishing systems 
of the mid-Atlantic US. The preface is preceded by the Washington, D.C. clerk of court’s 
certification that Gray deposited the book’s title in that office on November 10, 1831,3 and is 
succeeded by certifications from the six members of the Southampton Court who tried Nat 
                                                        
2Gray claims that he “commit[ted Turner’s] statements to writing, and publish[ed] them, with 
little or no variation, from his own words” (40). Critics disagree over the extent to which the 
voice in the “Confession” can be attributed to Turner. For instance, Anthony Kaye argues 
that the references to “blood” and exact counts of murder victims were likely Gray’s editorial 
interventions, though they are attributed to Turner (709). In a recent piece summarizing the 
debate, Kenneth S. Greenburg acknowledged the evidence that Gray probably altered some 
of Turner’s language, but concluded that the narrative is, on the whole, Turner’s story. 
Although Daniel S. Fabricant has argued that Gray is fully in control of the text and imposes 
his “white Southern racist” ideology onto Turner (335), I agree with William Andrews, who 
confers a greater degree of agency onto Turner and views the text as a “diametric 
collaboration” (72), not in the sense of an equal partnership, but in the sense that Turner was 
actively involved in shaping the meaning of the text.  
3Gray tried to publish the Confessions in Richmond, Virginia, but no press would print it, so 
he went north. After Gray secured the copyright in Washington, D.C., a Baltimore printer 
published 50,000 copies, which sold for 25 cents each (Parramore 73). 
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Turner and from the Southampton clerk of court. The Southampton court members certify 
Gray’s claim that Turner’s confession was “fully and voluntarily made” (38), affirming that, 
“the confessions of Nat, to Thomas R. Gray, was read to him in our presence, and that Nat 
acknowledged the same to be full, free, and voluntary; and…when called upon by the 
presiding Magistrate of the Court, to state if he had any thing to say, why sentence of death 
should not be passed upon him, replied he had nothing further than he had communicated to 
Mr. Gray” (42). The clerk of court, in turn, certifies that the six men who signed the 
statement above were in fact “acting Justices of the Peace” for Southampton County at 
Turner’s trial and “that full faith and credit are due, and ought to be given to their acts as 
Justices of the peace aforesaid” (43). Altogether, eight different legal seals are reproduced in 
the text before Turner’s “Confession,” and these actual seals are referenced a further five 
times in these prefatory documents, including on the very title page of the text. Turner’s 
declaration that the “seal was removed from my lips” thus becomes newly significant in this 
legalistic context. While it literally refers to Turner’s belief that God removed the seal and 
allowed Turner to discuss the rebellion, Turner’s statement also calls attention to the 
compounded legal seals that attempt to silence him. This doubly meaningful reference asks 
the reader to remove these juridical seals from Turner’s lips and allow him to speak.  
Following Turner’s narrative and Gray’s commentary in the “Confession,” the text 
concludes with a description of Turner’s sentencing that typographically resembles a legal 
writ or court docket, followed by lists of the “Persons Murdered in the Insurrection” and 
“Negroes Brought before the Court of Southampton, with their Owners’ Names, and 
Sentence.” Whereas the certifications at the beginning of the book include legal seals, “this 
final document lacks a [legal] seal” and “sharply differs from the official transcript,” as Mary 
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Kemp Davis and other scholars have pointed out (67). While Gray appropriates the power of 
a legal document through his formal and typographic arrangement, his trial transcript is in 
fact a fiction.   
These multiple layers of authentication oddly resemble the authenticating documents 
that preface slave narratives.4 Gray appeals to juridical authority to sanction his text as the 
ultimate account of the Southampton County rebellion, but in so doing he signals that his 
name alone was not enough to guarantee the verity of the text. This tactic places him in the 
same rhetorical position as formerly enslaved narrators, whose texts were prefaced by 
testimonials from white abolitionists assuring readers that the story was credible. As James 
Olney notes, “The conventions for slave narratives were so early and so firmly established 
that one can imagine a sort of master outline” that includes testimonials and “an 
appendix…composed of documentary material” (152)—conventions that Gray’s text also 
fulfills. While I would not want to ignore the radical differences between Gray’s and 
Turner’s social positions and claim an affinity between them, as Thomas C. Parramore 
implies when he suggests that Gray “may have identified with Turner’s sense of oppression” 
because Gray had been disinherited by his wealthy father (74-76), I do want to note that these 
authenticating documents are one of several ways in which generic conventions undermine 
Gray’s attempt to contain Turner’s rhetorical threat. Given that Gray’s purpose in publishing 
The Confessions is to reassure the public that Turner’s resistance to enslavement is                                                         
4Sundquist also compares these legal documents to “the authenticating frame material 
attached to slave narratives,” but he focuses on these documents’ effect on Turner, arguing 
that “the legalistic materials further the imprisonment of Turner and, although they finally do 
not undermine his account, at first glance lend greater weight to Gray’s judgmental language 
and to the economic relation he now bears to Turner as the legal ‘proprietor’ of his text” (45-
46). 
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anomalous, reminding readers of the conventions of a genre that celebrates African American 
resistance does not advance his aim. As opposed to interpretations such as Parramore’s, 
which draw on Gray’s biography to make psychoanalytic claims about his relationship to 
Turner, I emphasize the ways in which Gray’s narrative strategies of control fail under the 
pressure of generic expectations. 
The title provides another example of the way in which generic expectations 
destabilize Gray’s effort to contain Turner’s threat. Mark Simpson has noted that by titling 
his document The Confessions of Nat Turner, Gray creates a generic paradox, since 
according an enslaved person the ability to “confess” produces “an emphasis on declaration 
aimed at securing subjectivity and identity in an image of deep selfhood—characteristics of 
citizenship and social agency likewise out of bounds to the slave” (34). Simpson’s interest in 
the subversive political effects of the confession genre obscures another dimension of the 
genre: the use of the confession to declare genius, as in Rousseau’s “Confessions.” Gray’s 
locating the text within the confession genre undergirds Turner’s claim to exceptional 
individualism: not just divine inspiration, but creative inspiration in the modern sense of the 
word.  
 Gray’s preface defuses Turner’s alternate account of his mind by explaining in 
advance that what might sound like genius is actually insanity. Gray’s diagnosis positions 
Gray as a dominant detective figure who can access hidden truths by reading surface signs. 
The problem for Gray is that, rather than disabling Turner’s claim to genius, Gray’s diagnosis 
of insanity complements it. In the early antebellum period, these two discourses—that of 
genius and that of insanity—overlap to such a degree as to disrupt Gray’s controlling 
framework and deconstruct the text that is meant to reconcile the divergent, contradictory 
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strands of proslavery responses to the rebellion. By the end of The Confessions, as Gray 
responds to Turner’s narrative, his attempt to discount Turner’s explanatory framework 
collapses. Gray’s imagery in his commentary and the fictional trial summary reinforce 
Turner’s self-portrayal by echoing his prophetic language and invoking Romantic imagery of 
the mad genius. Turner anticipates Gray’s strategy of containing him narratively by 
diagnosing insanity and pitches his story accordingly. Turner’s subordinate detection, which 
enabled him to detect the narrative tactic Gray would employ, can be inferred from the way 
Turner frames his account of the rebellion and from his strategic scriptural citations. The 
Confessions records the effects of this clash between Turner’s subordinate and Gray’s 
dominant detection.  In the end, Gray cannot maintain the divide between his explanatory 
framework and Turner’s: Turner’s account infiltrates Gray’s. 
The Confessions is a particularly productive text in which to investigate the overlap of 
the discourses of genius and insanity because the critical history of the text has focused on a 
third term, religion, that inflects both discourses in the antebellum period. Most literary 
criticism of the Confessions has taken the religious elements of the text to be central. William 
Andrews, for example, argues that Gray attempts to contain and control Turner’s story by 
offering the trope of Satanic influence to counter Turner’s “image of himself as avenging 
‘prophet’” (73). By isolating religion, these accounts miss the way in which Gray and Turner 
each deploy religious tropes in the service of broader secular arguments, namely Gray’s 
claim that Turner is insane and Turner’s claim that he is brilliant. I contend that Gray’s 
strategy is both more sophisticated and more volatile than previous studies have recognized. 
While Andrews’s analysis is invaluable, his understanding of the text as fundamentally 
“divided against itself” (72) holds only for the prefatory essay and the part of the 
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“Confession” that is narrated in Turner’s voice. Ultimately, however, Turner’s portrait of 
himself as a genius leaps the divide Gray establishes in the preface. Critics who have studied 
the religious aspects of the text in isolation from the appeals to insanity and genius cannot 
adequately account for the collapse of Gray’s framework by the end of the text. Examining 
the interplay among these discourses in the text, on the other hand, reveals that Gray cannot 
suppress Turner’s claim to genius with a counterargument based on insanity because 
madness was strong evidence in favor of genius.  
****** 
Perhaps the central interpretive problem for scholars of The Confessions of Nat 
Turner has been the extent to which Turner’s voice can be heard in Gray’s text. Critics, 
understandably, have focused on Turner’s first-person narrative to answer this question. I 
want instead to begin with a close reading of Gray’s essay, “To the Public,” comparing it to 
an anonymous letter published in the Richmond Constitutional Whig on September 26, 1831.5 
Examining these texts in sequence—from the Constitutional Whig letter to the preface and 
finally to the “Confession”—establishes the shift in Gray’s view of Turner. Most 
importantly, my sequential approach will reveal how the experience of talking with Turner 
one-on-one disrupts Grays effort to control Turner’s narrative. David F. Allmendinger, Jr., 
along with an earlier historian of the Turner insurrection, Henry Irving Tragle, argue 
persuasively that Gray wrote the Constitutional Whig letter, which presents the narrative of 
the Southampton insurrection that Gray developed through an extensive investigation 
                                                        
5I am using the reprint of this letter that appears in Kenneth S. Greenburg’s edition of The 
Confessions of Nat Turner. All further references to this letter will be cited in the text. 
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conducted before he met Turner (Allmendinger 33, Tragle 408-9).6 This letter was written 
after most of the trials and executions had occurred, but before Turner was captured on 
October 30. Turner had been a fugitive for nearly a month at that point, and it seemed to 
many that he had escaped. According to Allmendinger, “had The Confessions of Nat Turner 
never appeared, [this] letter would have become the authoritative account” (32). If 
Allmendinger and Tragle are correct in identifying Gray as the author of the Constitutional 
Whig letter, then Gray’s essay reflects the assessment of Turner and the rebellion that Gray 
conceived before he met Turner. It is this assessment that Gray, operating in the mode of 
dominant detection, would attempt to impose on Turner. 
Allmendinger carefully documents the detective work that led up to Turner’s trial on 
November 5, 1831. From August through mid-autumn, three men—James Trezvant, William 
C. Parker, and Thomas R. Gray—“gather[ed] and interpret[ed] evidence,” interviewed 
witnesses, visited the sites of the murders, and examined the enslaved defendants 
(Allmendinger 25). All three were engaged in the trials of the accused insurrectionists: 
Trezvant was the presiding magistrate for most of the court sessions as well as Turner’s 
primary examiner; Parker was the defense attorney for Turner and thirteen other of the 
accused; and Gray defended five people.7 All of these men periodically wrote letters, usually                                                         
6Internal evidence indicates the letter was written by someone who “had examined 
witnesses” and who had ridden with the first party who “had volunteered to pursue the 
rebels,” both of which point to Gray. Furthermore, the letter writer mentions interviewing a 
white survivor, a 12-year-old girl, at Levi Waller’s farm the day after the rebellion; the only 
other author who refers to this survivor is Gray in The Confessions (Allmendinger 32).  
7Tragle states that Southampton “authorities desired to bring the accused to trial in strict 
accordance with the law of the State, and at least some precautions were taken to prevent any 
impression from arising that ‘drumhead justice’ was being applied….many in Virginia, 
officials as well as ordinary citizens, realized that the actions taken by the State after the 
Southampton Revolt had been quelled were, in a sense, a test of the philosophical 
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anonymously, to regional newspapers summarizing the results of the investigation. While the 
Southampton Court kept legal records of the inquiry in the form of evidence submission 
statements, depositions, and trial summaries,8 these letters publicized the men’s detection in 
an extra-juridical register. Even before Gray published the Confessions, then, these men were 
already fashioning their own narratives of the investigation. These men’s investigative work 
produced a great deal of evidence and testimony that enabled them to piece together the 
chronology, ascertain who was responsible for the deaths, describe the murder weapons and 
victims: in other words, to answer the what and how questions. They could not, however, 
answer the why question: the motive is the missing piece of these narratives.  
Detective fiction theorists concur that determining the criminal’s motive is a crucial 
feature of classical literary detection. Summarizing this convention, Philip Simpson remarks, 
“the attempt to solve murders in classic detective fiction usually compels the investigator to 
examine the motives and hence the psyches of potential suspects in order to uncover the 
culprit” (189). Heather Worthington links this emphasis on motive to changing views of 
criminality in the early-nineteenth century. Following Foucault, Worthington argues that 
“Rather than the overt statement of sovereign power embodied in the spectacle of execution,” 
nineteenth-century crime writing, influenced by penal reforms that aimed to recuperate the 
criminal, “focus[ed] on the individual;…motive and method are required to give meaning to                                                         
underpinnings of their whole system” (173). For more on the Virginia legislature’s response 
to the Southampton revolt, see “Inquisitions” in The Rebellious Slave by historian Scot 
French. 
8Greenburg notes, “Virginia Governor John Floyd was particularly concerned that the slave 
rebellion trials should be conducted in the fairest manner possible. In order to monitor the 
tribunal he directed the court to send him a verbatim transcript of each proceeding. 
Unfortunately, although the court complied with the Governor’s request for copies of its trial 
records, it created and supplied case summaries rather than verbatim transcripts” (91). 
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the criminal act” (19). In the context of the proto-psychological movement from body to 
mind, or from punishment to discipline in Foucault’s terms, solving a crime demanded not 
simply identifying the perpetrator, but explicating his or her reasons.  
Accounts of the rebellion published in its immediate aftermath suggest an array of 
motives, from madness to vengeance to a desire “to get to Norfolk, seize a ship and go to 
Africa” (Constitutional Whig, Aug. 29, 1831). Alternative explanations, such as William 
Lloyd Garrison’s, portrayed the rebellion as a long-anticipated strike against the ideology of 
the slave system—“The first flash of the lightning, which is to smite and consume, has been 
felt” (The Liberator, Sept. 3, 1831)—or emphasized the terror and confusion that the 
rebellion had caused among the white population. In melodramatic language, correspondents 
bewailed “the horrible ferocity of these monsters. They remind one of a parcel of blood-
thirsty wolves rushing down from the Alps” (The Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 30, 1831). This 
uncertainty exacerbated the fears of the white community of Virginia and other Southern 
states, who were terrified that the Southampton rebellion was just the beginning of violent 
resistance to slavery. Neither the punishment (juridical and vigilante) of African Americans 
suspected to be in league with Turner, nor the assurances of the investigators that the 
rebellion was local and not well planned assuaged these fears. While many commentators 
insisted that Turner was motivated by fanaticism, their speculations could not dispel the 
spectre of a politically motivated affront to the slave system. Contradictory explanations and 
rumors continued to circulate in the absence of an authoritative account that definitively 
established Turner’s motive.  
By the time Gray wrote the September 26 Constitutional Whig letter, it seemed that—
since Turner had apparently escaped—all the evidence was in. Gray explains that “it is only 
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since the affair appears to be settled, that I have thought seriously upon the subject.” In 
addition to providing a detailed account of events leading up to and including the 
insurrection, he hopes to “administer some comfort” to the white community, who feared that 
the Southampton rebellion was part of a “general insurrection” spread throughout Virginia 
and North Carolina. Gray argues against these worries, citing evidence that the rebellion was 
localized to Southampton and not planned far in advance. Gray offers his best assessment of 
the rebels’ motives, asserting that the “insurrection…was the work of fanaticism,” but he 
goes on to say that “Turner’s object was freedom and indiscriminate carnage his watchward 
[sic]” (81, 84). Gray favors fanaticism as a motive, but he does not completely rule out 
alternative motives including the desire for freedom or revenge. This uncertainty diminished 
the comfort that the Constitutional Whig letter could administer, and kept the affair unsettled 
in the public mind, even if it appeared settled from a juridical point of view. 
When Turner was captured, Gray seized the opportunity to ascertain Turner’s motive 
and satiate public curiosity, thereby making Gray’s version the authoritative account. The 
official trial summary does not supply this information, although it alludes to it: the court 
record states  
that he gave a long account of the motives which lead [sic] him finally to 
commence the bloody scenes which took place—that he pretended to have 
had intimations by signed omens from God that he should embark in the 
desperate attempt….and that he went on to detail a medley of incoherent and 
confused opinions about his communications with God…which he had been 
entertaining as far back as 1826. (qtd. in Tragle 222) 
 
The “long account of the motives” glossed over in the trial summary, Gray knew, is exactly 
what the public demanded. In his own essay, he states, “Public curiosity has been on the 
stretch to understand the origin and progress of this dreadful conspiracy, and the motives 
which influences [sic] its diabolical actors….The insurgent slaves had all been destroyed, 
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or…executed, (with the exception of the leader) without revealing any thing at all 
satisfactory, as to the motives which governed them” (40). Gray’s emphasis on the 
insurgents’ “motives” indicates that this is his audience’s primary concern: his readers 
wanted not simply another account of the “origin and progress,” but a “satisfactory” story 
that “revealed” something heretofore undiscovered. “Satisfaction,” not accuracy, is the 
criterion for a successful tale, a criterion Gray repeats in his closing sentence: “Believing the 
following narrative, by removing doubts and conjectures from the public mind which 
otherwise must have remained, would give general satisfaction, it is respectfully submitted to 
the public” (42). Gray’s story will solve the mystery, he promises. “Satisfaction,” with its 
bodily connotations of appetite, figures the public as consumers, not thinkers. Gray implies 
that his story, in contrast to the “thousand idle, exaggerated and mischievous reports” that 
preceded it, contains the previously hidden element that will satisfy the public (40). The 
difference between these earlier reports and Gray’s story, as Gray will go on to explain, is 
that Nat Turner has now been captured, and Gray has visited him to discover the motive that 
was missing.  
 Gray’s essay portrays the authorizing process that detective fiction depicts. In an 
essay on late-nineteenth-century female-authored detective fiction, Catherine Ross Nickerson 
distinguishes between the two narratives that comprise a detective story: “While the 
criminals want desperately to keep their story fragmented and illegible, the detective is 
working just as hard to put the pieces back together into a coherent narrative. The resolution 
of the narrative disarray that makes up the bulk of a detective novel comes at the point at 
which the detective can retell the tale of the crime; detective fiction is ultimately about how 
and why to tell a story” (30). From a fragmented field of “a thousand…reports,” Gray has 
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reassembled the pieces and believes he is ready to present a coherent narrative, which he 
expects to become the standard narrative of the event. Turner, however, is working to disrupt 
Gray’s attempt at a coherent narrative and to encrypt his own narrative within Gray’s. Unlike 
the typical criminal, whom Nickerson describes, Turner wants to communicate his story, but 
he must struggle against hegemonic forces that would appropriate his words. 
In order to assemble his coherent, “satisfactory” story, Gray needs to penetrate 
Turner’s interiority and discern his motive: his “true” motive, from Gray’s perspective, since 
Gray rejects Turner’s own stated motive. Turner’s own account of his motive emphasizes 
divine inspiration. In the “Confession,” Turner states that he received signs from God that he 
was intended to “slay my enemies with their own weapons” (48). According to Turner, then, 
the rebellion is God’s work, divinely motivated. Gray denies that Turner was instructed by 
God to lead the rebellion, since that would condemn the very people that Gray intends to 
comfort with his text. In an interesting slippage that attempts to erase the difference between 
the motive Gray advances for Turner’s actions and Turner’s avowed motive, Gray states, “If 
Nat’s statements can be relied on, the insurrection in this county was entirely local…It was 
not instigated by motives of revenge or sudden anger, but [sic] the results of long 
deliberation, and a settled purpose of mind. The offspring of gloomy fanaticism, acting upon 
materials but too well prepared for such impressions” [sic] (42). In these rather 
ungrammatical sentences, Gray defines Turner’s motive as “fanaticism” and attempts to 
authorize this interpretation by putting the words in Turner’s mouth. The clause, “If Nat’s 
statements can be relied on,” should apply only to the claim that the rebellion was local, 
which Turner does say. But Gray then places his own interpretation of the rebellion in the 
very next sentence, without a clear break and with a pronoun that refers to the subject of the 
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sentence that claims Turner’s own statements as proof. Gray thus grammatically manipulates 
the reader into connecting Gray’s interpretation to “Nat’s statements.” This conflation 
confers an unearned credibility on Gray’s assertion that the rebellion was “the offspring of 
gloomy fanaticism.” Here, and throughout his text, Gray’s authorial control breaks down: he 
cannot keep his words separated from Turner’s words. Gray’s text is riddled with incomplete 
sentences, unclear pronoun referents, dangling participles, and other grammatical indices of 
his muddled thinking: because the proslavery argument that Gray’s text advances is in itself 
specious (and because he is writing this document as quickly as possible in order to capitalize 
on public interest in Turner’s trial and execution), his language reflects the problem of trying 
to reconcile illogical premises. 
In summary, Gray states in the preface that public curiosity has been unsatiated while 
Turner was a fugitive because everyone wanted to understand Turner’s motive, yet he rejects 
the motive that Turner articulates and instead presents his own motive. But if Gray denies 
Turner’s stated motive, what makes his account any different from the other reports 
preceding Gray’s that also speculated on Turner’s motive; why, that is, should Gray’s 
speculation be accorded precedence? While Gray does not explicitly state this, his essay 
makes an implicit case for the predominance of his story by emphasizing that he has been in 
contact with Turner. Gray has sat with him in his cell and interviewed him: “I have had ready 
access to him” (40), Gray boasts. Thus, Gray implies, the difference between other reports 
and his account is this physical proximity, which has enabled Gray to access Turner’s hidden 
motive. Gray’s previous investigative work has prepared him to reconstruct the facts of the 
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rebellion, but this interview, during which Gray reads Turner’s interiority to reveal the true 
motive, allows him to tell why it happened.9  
 Gray sets up a scenario in which his proximity to Turner has allowed him to access 
Turner’s interiority and discover hidden information. While Gray effaces himself from 
Turner’s “Confession” for the most part, giving the reader the illusion that we are listening to 
Turner speak, we can infer from Gray’s preface the type of detection he undertook to retrieve 
this secret. He makes a distinction between surface and depth, noting, “It will thus appear, 
that whilst every thing upon the surface of society wore a calm and peaceful aspect, a gloomy 
fanatic was revolving in the recesses of his own dark, bewildered, and overwrought mind, 
schemes of indiscriminate massacre to the whites” (41). While the implication is that most 
people see only this peaceful surface, Gray in contrast has accessed the “recesses” of 
Turner’s mind, giving him privileged access to Turner’s interiority. His description of Turner 
focuses insistently on Turner’s mind: Gray presents himself as a psychoanalyst avant la 
lettre. Historian Carlo Ginzburg discusses the parallels between detection and 
psychoanalysis, comparing Freud’s and Sherlock Holmes’s methods. Explaining the 
“evidential paradigm” of detection, Ginzburg notes that “infinitesimal traces permit the 
comprehension of a deeper, otherwise unattainable reality: traces—more precisely,                                                         
9In spite of Gray’s claim that the interview has made the difference, Gray’s explanation of 
Turner’s motive in his “To the Public” essay is similar to that in the Constitutional Whig 
letter. In each, the writer claims that Turner was motivated by madness. The Whig letter calls 
the “insurrection…the work of fanaticism” and (displaying Gray’s predilection for 
incomplete sentences) asserts, “To an imagination like Nat’s worked upon for years, by 
pretended visions; with a mind satisfied of the possibility, of freeing himself and race [sic] 
from bondage; and this by supernatural means” (81). If Allmendinger and Tragle are right in 
asserting that Gray also wrote the Whig letter, then the similar language and assertions he 
makes in the essay suggest that he came to his interview with a preconception that Turner’s 
motive was fanaticism. 
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symptoms (in the case of Freud) [or] clues (in the case of Sherlock Holmes)” (101). In the 
preface, Gray claims the ability to comprehend the “deeper, otherwise unattainable reality” of 
Turner’s mind.  
 In the preface, Gray blends the profession of lawyer and doctor to produce a proto-
detective figure. In her study of nineteenth-century British detective fiction, Worthington has 
noted this methodological overlap between physicians and detectives: “the relationship 
between physician and patient constructs the patient as the object of the physician’s gaze and 
subject to the power inherent in that gaze….This model is equally applicable to the 
relationship between the detective and the criminal, where the techniques of observation or 
surveillance are central to the detective function” (49). In a comparable manner, Gray—in his 
interview with Turner—attempts to subject Turner to his disciplining gaze, diagnosing 
Turner as insane. He presents Turner’s confession as a psychiatric case study that can instruct 
readers in diagnosing derangement: this account “reads an awful, and it is hoped, a useful 
lesson, as to the operations of a mind like his, endeavoring to grapple with things beyond its 
reach. How it first became bewildered and confounded, and finally corrupted and led to the 
conception and perpetration of the most atrocious and heart-rending deeds” [sic] (41). The 
account of Turner’s motives that Gray develops in the preface tries to balance Turner’s 
reputation for intelligence with an allegation of religious fanaticism. Although Gray claims 
that Turner is a “gloomy fanatic,” his description of Turner does not echo the historical 
connotations of fanaticism such as frenzy and zeal. Instead, Gray’s description is more 
clinical, focusing on Turner’s mental “corruption” rather than suggesting demonic 
possession.  
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We can see the delicate balance Gray attempts to strike more clearly when we 
compare the preface to the earlier Constitutional Whig letter. In that letter, Gray also blames 
the rebellion on Turner’s fanaticism, but he portrays that fanaticism in a more traditional 
manner, emphasizing its explosive, instantaneous qualities. Gray does mention Turner’s 
“shrewdness” and admits that “Nat has for some time, thought closely on this subject” of 
prophecy, but Gray devotes much more space to denouncing religious enthusiasm. In a 
lengthy paragraph linking the rebellion to religious extremism, Gray condemns white 
“citizens [who] permit colored preachers to…harangu[e] vast crowds,” rebukes any minister 
who “fill[s his] discourses with a ranting cant,...goes into a pulpit, flies into a passion, [and] 
beats his fist,” and censures whites for their “zeal” and blacks for their “heated imaginations” 
(80). This criticism of religious frenzy is absent from the preface to the Confessions, replaced 
by more modern language that invokes insanity rather than possession. 
In the preface, Gray situates Turner within contemporary theories that posited 
overstraining one’s mind as a cause of insanity. Based on the work of forerunners such as 
Benjamin Rush and practitioners working within the increasing number of asylums in the 
United States, doctors in the early-nineteenth century rejected the older belief in Satanic 
possession as a cause of insanity, replacing it with the theory that the intense stressors of 
civilization caused insanity (Gamwell and Tomes 90). Antebellum psychiatric opinion cited 
the “violent” “labor of excogitation” (Brigham 17) as a cause of insanity that could be cured 
“by avoiding the exciting causes of the insanity,...by removing patients from home and from 
everything calculated to remind them of their past troubles or delusions” (Brigham 16). The 
“exciting” stresses of modern life could disturb peoples’ minds, leading them to dwell 
incessantly on delusions. The cure was to get them out of their rut, often by removing them 
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to a rural area where they could build up a new set of associations and thoughts. Gray’s 
assessment of Turner’s motives suggests that the latter’s delusions stemmed from dwelling 
on the same thoughts for too long: “[the insurrection] was not instigated by motives of 
revenge or sudden anger, but [sic] the results of long deliberation, and a settled purpose of 
mind” (42). We might now label this obsessive thinking; in nineteenth-century terminology it 
would be considered melancholia. Gray moves away from the language in the Constitutional 
Whig letter, which emphasized the older model of religious enthusiasm as a frenzied, 
spontaneous eruption, to the more modern language of insanity brought on by dwelling too 
long on delusions. Gray makes this shift, I argue, because the modern language of insanity 
fits with the content of Turner’s testimony better than did the older language of enthusiasm. 
Proslavery apologists seized on this modern theory of insanity as “proof” of the 
benefits of enslavement, which they claimed protected African Americans from insanity. In 
“Madness and Mastery in Melville’s Benito Cereno,” Benjamin Reiss notes, “the first 
asylums were set up [in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries] to reconstitute in 
their inmates an intimate and individuated—yet formally reproducible—sense of authority. 
The paradigm for this authority came in the shape of the…bourgeois family” (123). Asylums 
were portrayed as a paternalistic system that benevolently restrained those who lacked the 
innate capacity to control themselves. Proslavery advocated this same logic to depict the 
slave system as a paternalistic institution. The corollary to this view was the belief that 
insanity was nonexistent in “primitive” societies. One Northern writer reported that the 
“general opinion of writers, travelers, and physicians” is that insanity “is seldom found in a 
savage state while it is known to be more frequent in the civilized state” (Jarvis 349-350).10                                                         
10The view that slavery protected African Americans from insanity was still common enough 
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Proponents of this view cited abundant anecdotal evidence linking exposure to civilization 
with increased incidence of insanity among nonwhite races, especially African Americans 
and Native Americans, who were considered wholly unfit to handle the stress and challenge 
of civilization. The superintendent at the Asylum of the State of Louisiana at Jackson, for 
example, asserted that slaves’ “great exemption from insanity is due to their situation, the 
protection the law guarantees to them, the restraint of a mild state of servitude, the freedom 
from all anxiety respecting their present and future wants” (qtd. in Chaillé 108-109). On this 
view, ironically, “restraint” confers “freedom,” as those people who were seen as incapable 
of controlling themselves were “protected” by control imposed externally.  
This opinion received apparent empirical confirmation in the 1840 Census, which 
indicated that the rate of insanity among free African Americans increased as one moved 
north. The editor of the Southern Literary Messenger summarized the results of the census 
for his readers, underscoring the rather surprising rate of 1 insane person out of every 34 free 
African Americans in New Hampshire and Vermont, as opposed to 1 in 1,299 among African 
Americans in Virginia, from which the editor draws the conclusion, “It is a remarkable fact, 
that where slavery has been longest extinguished, the condition of the colored race is worse” 
(“Reflections” 344). The bogus 1840 census figures were challenged immediately by James 
McCune Smith, an African American physician in New York, and other antislavery doctors                                                         
in 1897 for T.O. Powell, M.D., Superintendent of the Georgia State Lunatic Asylum, to 
discuss it in his Presidential Address before the American Medico-Psychological 
Association, “A Sketch of Psychiatry in the Southern States.” “Even the existence of insanity 
in negro slaves has been questioned,” Powell notes, “Before the war there were, 
comparatively speaking, few negro lunatics. Following their sudden emancipation their 
number of insane began to multiply….[T]he negroes have become subject to the same 
penalties that other races have paid for liberty, license and intemperance. Among those 
penalties insanity is not the least” (29-30). 
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and politicians, yet the figures retained an intractable grip on the mainstream understanding 
of African American mental capacity, shaping the arguments of both proslavery apologists 
and many physicians in both the North and the South for some time. As medical historian 
Norman Dain has observed, “Using the census to support slavery provided an effective 
argument because it seemed to offer scientific proof of the inferiority of Negroes” (107).  
Yet this justification for slavery coexisted—if tenuously—with explanations that 
attributed rebellious behavior among enslaved persons to insanity, as the editor of the 
Richmond Compiler asserted in reference to the Southampton rebellion: “the wretches who 
have conceived of this thing are mad—infatuated—deceived by some artful knaves, or 
stimulated by their own miscalculating passions” (Richmond Compiler, Aug. 24, 1831). 
Proslavery apologists in the early antebellum period were placed in the rhetorically difficult 
position of explaining why, if slavery prevented insanity, certain enslaved African 
Americans’ minds—such as Turner’s—were not protected. The man who was blamed as 
“contriver and head” of the 1831 Southampton County rebellion was still enslaved, yet, as 
Kenneth S. Greenburg remarks, his behavior could not be safely accounted for as anything 
but insane: “the Confessions would never have been circulated had it overtly suggested that 
the rebellion had roots in the nature of slavery rather than in the madness of a single slave” 
(10). If Turner had been “normal,” then, the “mild restraint” imposed upon him by 
enslavement would have protected his mind from insanity, but Turner’s mind was corrupt. 
His mental abnormality led him to believe that he did not need to be controlled either 
physically or mentally by others.  
****** 
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In order for slaveowners to profit from the coerced labor of African Americans, they 
had to maintain their domination of African Americans without resorting to continuous 
physical force. Slaveowners, that is, needed to maintain psychological domination over 
enslaved men and women so that they could exploit their labor, since a shackled or maimed 
person cannot perform productive labor. This psychological domination depended on non-
reciprocal surveillance and detection. Slaveowners and their factors had to instill in African 
Americans the sense that they were always being watched, and they had to protect 
themselves from being scrutinized in return. As Foucault has shown in Discipline and 
Punish, this panoptic surveillance is an efficient means for smaller groups (elites) to police 
larger groups. Non-mutuality is crucial to surveillance in Bentham’s panopticon (the model 
on which Foucault bases his theory): because the watcher cannot be observed, the object of 
surveillance never knows exactly when he is being watched, and thus assumes that he is 
always being watched. In the slave system, this translates to the physical presence of 
overseers and other surveillant institutions such as slave patrols, as well as to the 
psychological register. Slaveowners attempted to read their captives’ real intentions even as 
they insisted that their slaves had no interiority—that their depths were perfectly congruous 
with their surfaces and thus were incapable of plotting covert resistance.  
In the Constitutional Whig letter, Gray exhibits this uneasy awareness that the 
psychological coercion of enslaved men and women depended on the master class’s 
performance of irresistible control and omniscience. He writes, “Without manifesting a fear 
of the blacks, by keeping a stationed armed force in any section of our country, let us adopt a 
more efficient plan, by keeping up for some time, a regular patrol, always under the 
command of a discreet person, who will not by indiscriminate punishment, goad these 
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miserable wretches into a state of desperation” (87). Gray’s desire to hide any evidence of 
“fear” and his emphasis on “discretion” acknowledges that the master class’s actions are 
being observed, and that the enslaved observers will use the information gained from their 
surveillance to challenge the weaknesses they discover. Although Gray characterizes African 
Americans as “miserable wretches,” a term that connotes a pitiful, pathetic state and thus 
suggests passivity, his full comment makes it clear that he fears the agency of these 
“wretches.” Gray reiterates this message in “To the Public,” stating that the text “is 
calculated also to demonstrate the policy of our laws in restraint of this class of our 
population, and to induce all those entrusted with their execution, as well as our citizens 
generally, to see that they are strictly and rigidly enforced” (41).  
Gray understands that establishing Turner’s motive is the key to quelling the rumors 
and fear-mongering accounts that have been circulating. Gray first attempts, in the 
Constitutional Whig letter, to establish Turner’s motive without Turner’s corroboration. In 
that letter Gray bases his assertions regarding Turner’s motive on his detective work: the 
interviews he conducted with survivors and rebels and the physical evidence he uncovered at 
the scenes of the murders. Prior to Turner’s capture, Gray had conducted an extensive 
investigation of the rebellion with the cooperation of Southampton county authorities, but 
acting as an independent operator. Based on this detective work, Gray had produced a 
narrative of the rebellion that defused the threat to the status quo in slaveholding Virginia. 
This account did not stem the tide of speculation about the rebellion, however; so Gray takes 
a second opportunity to establish Turner’s motive after Turner is captured. In the 
Confessions, as in the Constitutional Whig letter, Gray contends that Turner was motivated 
by fanaticism. In contrast to accounts that acknowledged the justification for the rebels’ 
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actions and stirred up terror among white Southerners, Gray’s account seeks to reassure the 
public that the rebellion was isolated and quickly defeated and that Turner was anomalous 
rather than indicative of a general mindset of revenge. Looking at the text in broad strokes, 
then, suggests that Turner’s presence and explanation does not matter: Gray went into his 
interview with Turner believing that Turner was motivated by fanaticism, and he leaves 
espousing the same claim. A closer reading, however, reveals that Gray’s language and 
imagery do change in significant ways, and these alterations record the contest between 
dominant and subordinate detection that occurred in Turner’s jail cell. 
Gray enters Turner’s cell as a dominant detective, expecting this interview to be a 
mere add-on to his earlier account. Gray positions himself to penetrate Turner’s exterior 
appearance and words and plumb his interiority for his true motive: fanaticism resulting from 
mental corruption. Gray’s language in the preface conveys this belief that Gray can extract 
Turner’s statement and insert it into his own pre-constructed account without its disturbing 
Gray’s authorial control over the text. Gray’s purpose in interviewing Turner, then, is not to 
discover the truth about the rebellion, but rather to bolster Gray’s own biased explanation of 
the rebellion by including something that no other account can: Turner’s own words. Gray 
states that “Since [Turner’s] confinement,…I have had ready access to [Turner]” (40), 
emphasizing the contrast between Turner’s imprisonment and Gray’s mobility as a parallel to 
the narrative containment that Gray expects to enforce. Gray cannot maintain this narrative 
containment even in the two-page preface, however, because self-contradictory claims 
undermine his effort to confine Turner’s words, cordoning them off from his own: “His own 
account of the conspiracy is submitted to the public, without comment. It reads an awful, and 
it is hoped, a useful lesson, as to the operations of a mind like his” (41). While Gray asserts 
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that he presents Turner’s account “without comment,” this assertion is falsified in the very 
next sentence: Gray immediately proceeds to comment on the “lesson” Turner’s account can 
teach readers. After an incomplete sentence that further explicates the nature of Turner’s 
mind, Gray states, “It is calculated also to demonstrate the policy of our laws in restraint of 
this class of our population” (41). The pronoun, it, logically refers to Turner’s “own account 
of the conspiracy” in the earlier sentence, yet the verb “calculated” indicates Gray’s 
intervention, as it does not make sense that Turner would “calculate” his account to 
“demonstrate the policy” of the Virginia slave code. Even on a syntactical level, Gray cannot 
adequately maintain the barrier between his dominant narrative and the implications 
introduced by Turner’s physical and textual presence.  
Whereas Gray’s mode of dominant detection presumes that he can scrutinize Turner 
without their interaction having any effect on him, there are indications in the text that Turner 
was reading Gray at the same time that Gray was reading Turner: that the detection was 
reciprocal. After Turner finishes his narrative, Gray questions him about the particulars, 
drawing on Gray’s own investigative work before Turner was captured. Gray asks whether 
Turner knew anything about a “concerted plan” in North Carolina occurring at the same time 
as the Southampton revolt. Turner “denied any knowledge of it,” Gray states, “and when I 
looked him in the face as though I would search his inmost thoughts, he replied, ‘I see sir, 
you doubt my word; but can you not think the same ideas, and strange appearances about this 
time in the heaven’s [sic] might prompt others, as well as myself, to this undertaking” (54). 
This is a moment of reciprocal detection, as Gray tries to read beyond Turner’s surface to 
access his interiority—his “inmost thoughts”—and Turner, gazing at Gray, infers Gray’s 
doubt. Turner seizes this opportunity to communicate something about the nature of his 
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rebellion. Gray is concerned to dispel the fear that Turner was actively conspiring with 
people in other areas of the region. Turner’s statement both facilitates and subverts Gray’s 
desire. On the one hand, Turner denies that there was a coordinated plot that extended 
beyond Southampton County, which ostensibly should quell white fears that African 
Americans have developed an underground network. On the other hand, Turner proposes that 
others might independently reach the same conclusions he has—in this context, that the sun 
spot was a sign from God to kill white people, but in a larger sense, that God has condemned 
the institution of slavery. Turner’s response exemplifies his ability simultaneously to affirm 
Gray’s agenda and to expose the ultimate, terrifying consequences of that agenda. 
As I have previously noted, it is impossible to determine whose words are whose in 
the “Confession.” Even setting aside the question of how much Gray rewrote Turner’s 
statements, the entire speech act is circumscribed in an oppressive structure that limits what 
and how Turner can speak. Whether or not Gray accurately transcribed what Turner said, 
Turner’s “confession” can never be “full and free” when he is making it to a white Southern 
man in a jail cell as he awaits his capital trial. Although we cannot know the extent to which 
the language of the “Confession” records Turner’s voice, I would argue that we can find 
traces of Turner’s communication at the structural level, rather than the sentence level. First, 
Turner insists on contextualizing the rebellion within the large scope of his life—he returns 
to “the days of my infancy, and even before I was born” (44). By framing the violence within 
this longer timescale and emphasizing his own biography, Turner refuses to let the meaning 
of the Southampton uprising be limited to the murders that occurred in August 1831. Since 
Turner was enslaved, bringing his life experience into the story contextualizes the crime for 
which he is being tried within the larger national crime of slavery. Second, in the 
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“Confession” Turner cites several Bible verses, which do not appear in any of the previous 
accounts of the rebellion such as the Constitutional Whig letter. As these allusions are new 
material, it seems likely that Turner made them. The Biblical passages that Turner cites 
provide evidence of his rhetorical mastery, since they allow him simultaneously to convey 
divergent messages to different audiences. Turner’s rhetorical mastery evidences his skillful 
subordinate detection, as he must read Gray’s intentions in order to select passages that are 
compatible with both the narrative Gray wishes to impose—a narrative that will comfort 
white readers—and a subversive narrative that will speak to sympathetic readers, 
contemporary and future. Gray and Turner both attempt to ventriloquize another’s words in 
order to advance their own agenda: in Gray’s case, he ventriloquizes Turner; in Turner’s 
case, he ventriloquizes Christ. While Gray cannot manage the rhetorical demands placed 
upon him by weaving together the different strands of this compositional challenge, Turner 
dexterously vocalizes his revolutionary message through another mouthpiece.  
I will first examine the way in which Turner frames the rebellion within the context of 
his life as an enslaved genius. As does Gray in the preface, Turner also concentrates on 
describing his mind in the first section of the “Confession,” but Turner characterizes himself 
as abnormally brilliant, rather than deranged. Turner’s implication that he is a genius is 
carefully calibrated not to invalidate Gray’s assertion that Turner is insane, but rather to 
trigger in his audience (first Gray and then the reader) the overlap between genius and 
madness in Romantic thought. Turner is not going to convince proslavery ideologues that he 
is a genius, since that would delegitimize their exploitation of African Americans, but by 
invoking the association of genius and madness Turner destabilizes Gray’s attempt at a 
controlling narrative. This destabilization gives Turner room to insinuate his own message to 
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sympathetic readers who are willing to read beyond Gray’s words. The “Confession” begins 
with Turner’s narration of “a circumstance...which made an indelible impression on my 
mind” (44). Turner’s description of his childhood catalogues numerous examples of his 
“singularity,” such as his “uncommon intelligence,” the “fertility of his imagination,” and his 
devotion to various scientific and manufacturing “experiments” (44-45). The cumulative 
effect, as these descriptions of Turner’s singular mind pile one on top of another, is to raise 
Turner into the realm of the extraordinary. As Turner matured, he explains, he combined his 
innate gifts with a sense of theatricality that further elevated him above ordinary people: 
“Having soon discovered [sic] to be great, I must appear so, and therefore studiously avoided 
mixing in society, and wrapped myself in mystery” (45). This example from his early life 
demonstrates that Turner understands the symbolic power of actions. Not only is Turner 
extraordinarily intelligent, but he is creative as well, staging scenes and producing dramatic 
effects that heighten his reputation for greatness.  
Turner’s narrative, in which a lengthy discussion focusing on his extraordinary 
mental ability precedes an account of the violence that Turner takes credit for instigating, 
constructs the rebellion itself as an act of genius. Gray’s voice barely intrudes into Turner’s 
narrative, allowing Turner to develop fully his conflicting account of his mind as exceptional. 
While numerous slave narratives, such as Frederick Douglass’s, rely on the trope of the 
person who is too special to remain enslaved, the crucial difference is that Turner does not 
choose the pragmatic route of using his gifts to escape. Instead, he undertakes a symbolic 
action, one that Sundquist characterizes as operating “beyond the limits of its hours of 
slaughter...of being extended into the domain of propaganda” (72). While the rebellion was a 
material intervention in the real world, its primary end was not material but rather symbolic. 
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It communicated African Americans’ rejection of paternalistic justifications for slavery as 
well as issuing a threat about the inevitable violent consequences of keeping a population 
captive. The rebellion makes it plain that Turner understands how to communicate 
symbolically. 
Turner continues to demonstrate a keen awareness of the symbolic power of actions 
in his arrangement of the rebellion. The day before the rebellion, he agrees with two other 
men that they will “prepare a dinner the next day for the men we expected, and 
then…concert a plan” (48). The next afternoon he allows the other men to arrive first and 
keeps them waiting for his appearance while they prepare the dinner. Gray asks Turner, 
“Why were you so backward in joining them,” to which Turner replies “The same reason that 
had caused me not to mix with them for years before” (48). This last supper displays 
Turner’s theatrical sense, as he recognizes that a dramatic delayed entrance will establish him 
as a leader in the eyes of the gathered men. Just as he did when he was younger, Turner 
avoids “mixing” with other men in order to enhance his appearance of “greatness.” Gray’s 
diction, and the fact that he had to ask Turner to explain this “backwardness,” indicates that 
Gray does not comprehend the value of staging a scene—Gray can think of it only in 
negative terms of belatedness. Turner, on the other hand, repeatedly exhibits his awareness 
that by orchestrating the conditions in which one appears one can manipulate others’ 
reactions: he recognizes, that is, that the medium affects the message. This stage-managerial 
capacity will become a crucial part of Dupin’s method, as when he dramatically reveals the 
formerly purloined letter to the astonishment of the narrator and the police prefect. 
 Turner explicitly discusses detection when he describes his situation in the weeks 
following the rebellion, before he was captured. Although he admits that his intelligence-
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gathering methods (concealment and eavesdropping) failed him after the rebellion, we can 
infer that he drew on these skills prior to the rebellion in order to plan and organize. On the 
Wednesday after the murders, Turner has lost contact with the other rebels and conceals 
himself in the woods at the spot where he and his co-conspirators had shared their last 
supper. “Discovering white men riding around the place as though they were looking for 
some one,” however, Turner retreats, fortifies himself with stolen provisions, and 
 scratched a hole under a pile of fence rails…where I concealed myself for six 
weeks, never leaving my hiding place but for a few minutes in the dead of 
night to get water…; thinking by this time I could venture out, I began to go 
about in the night and eaves drop [sic] the houses in the neighborhood; 
pursuing this course for about a fortnight and gathering little or no 
intelligence, afraid of speaking to any human being, and returning every 
morning to my cave before the dawn of day. (53) 
 
Turner may be exaggerating the failure of his detection here in order to protect those who 
must have helped conceal him and provided him with food to survive. These physical 
practices of eavesdropping and surveillance that Turner employed to plan and execute the 
rebellion, and then to evade capture for two months, would also have enabled him to detect 
Gray’s intentions for framing Turner’s narrative as a lesson in mental corruption. Turner then 
drew on the intelligence gained from his detection to fashion his own story to interfere with 
Gray’s attempts to control him narratively.  
Turner had a chance to detect a wider audience before Gray interviewed him, giving 
Turner a better sense of white opinion regarding him. Turner was interviewed on October 31 
for a few hours by James Trezvant and James W. Parker (both Southampton magistrates) 
“before an audience of curious whites and at least one free black prisoner. Nat may have 
welcomed this chance to rehearse and test his ideas in front of parts of his intended larger 
audience” (Parramore 72). Unlike Gray’s interview with Turner, this interview was not 
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transcribed, but some of the men who attended recorded their impressions of the event. 
Trezvant found Turner possessed “much shrewdness of intellect” (qtd. in Tragle 133), while 
Dr. Isaac Pipkin was frustrated with Turner’s ability “to mystify”: although “I examined him 
closely,” Pipkin complains, “I could not get him to explain in a manner at all satisfactory” 
(qtd. in Parramore 73). Echoing Trezvant’s language about Turner’s intelligence, the 
Confessions responds to Pipkin’s lament in its claim that it will satisfy public curiosity. 
Parramore maintains that Gray would have used his knowledge of Turner’s explanation from 
this first interview to “anticipate much of what Nat would say” when Gray interviewed him 
the following day. Andrews concurs, asserting,  
Gray knew that in Turner’s own deposition he would explain and justify his 
actions on the basis of scriptural precedent, divine revelation, and 
conscientious adherence to his perception of the will of God. Before Turner 
could occupy that sacred ground rhetorically, Gray tried to deny him a 
tropological avenue by introducing a countertrope [of Satanic influence] that 
would turn the reader’s thinking about the slave’s significance in a direction 
opposite from that in which Turner would try to take it. (74) 
 
Andrews cites Gray’s diction to support his claim that Gray cogently deploys the 
“countertrope” of Satanic influence to defuse Turner’s self-proclaimed messianic status: 
“Thus we find from the beginning the prejudicing metaphors of Satanic influence pervading 
Turner’s undertaking…. Turner lead[s] a ‘fiendish band’ for ‘hellish purposes’” (74), but 
these phrases refer to the rebels as a body, not to Turner as an individual. As I have already 
shown, when Gray describes Turner in the preface, he uses the more modern language of 
mental corruption, not the older language of Satanic possession. Gray does not apply Satanic 
language to Turner in the preface.11 The tension between the persistence of “hellish” imagery                                                         
11As I will explain below, Gray does suddenly revert to it in the last section of the 
“Confession,” when he describes Turner’s “fiend-like face when excited by enthusiasm” 
(54). In context, however, this quotation demonstrates the same textual instability that I note 
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in Gray’s description of the rebels and his more clinical description of Turner reveals another 
example of Gray’s less-than-complete control over his text. Gray may have intended to 
prevent Turner from “occupy[ing] sacred ground rhetorically,” but the Confessions 
demonstrates a gap between intention and execution. 
 Setting aside the limits of Gray’s execution, though, I want to emphasize that Turner 
was surveilling Gray just as Gray scoped out Turner. Parramore and Andrews are likely 
correct that Gray predicted much of Turner’s statement, but their analyses do not 
acknowledge the reciprocity of that detection. Turner, I would argue, anticipated the 
narrative controls that Gray, and white society in general, would try to place on his message. 
We see Turner’s proleptic capacity in his account of the rebellion; for example, he states, “as 
it ‘twas my object to carry terror and devastation wherever we went, I placed fifteen or 
twenty of the best armed and most to be relied on, in front, who generally approached the 
house as fast as their horses could run; this was for two purposes, to prevent their escape and 
strike terror to the inhabitants” (51). Turner anticipated the reaction of whites and managed 
appearances in order to maximize terror. This thread of anticipating the responses of others 
and arranging behavior and appearance accordingly runs through Turner’s “Confession,” as I 
have noted.    
Turner uses Biblical citations as a mouthpiece for subversive rhetoric because he has 
detected Gray’s intention to cast him as a fanatic, deranged by religious delusions. Given the 
religious theme of Gray’s explanatory narrative, Turner can predict that Gray will not filter 
out Turner’s Biblical citations, since they lend confirmation to Gray’s theory. Turner’s 
citation of passages from the gospel of Luke displays his capacity for subordinate detection                                                         
in the preface. 
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most clearly. Several critics including Sundquist and Andrews have argued that Turner is 
rhetorically more capable than Gray. Sundquist asserts, “Turner was far more than Gray’s 
equal, as a man certainly and also as an ‘author’” (39). Andrews concludes that because Gray 
opposes, rather than denies Turner’s significance, “This in itself constitutes a rhetorical 
victory for Turner” (76). Both Sundquist and Andrews, in their excellent readings, emphasize 
that Turner uses Christ’s words typologically, to figure himself as the second coming of 
Christ (just as the New Testament typologically fulfills the promise of the Old Testament). I 
agree that Turner is more adept than Gray, but I argue that Turner’s capability comes not just 
from his messianism. Turner’s claim to divine inspiration was familiar to the white men who 
interviewed him in the Jerusalem jail; a week after the rebellion newspapers were printing 
reports that “Nat, the ring-leader…declares to his comrades that he is commissioned by Jesus 
Christ, and proceeds under his inspired directions” (68). This analogy is not new to the 
Confessions. What is new, however, is Turner’s specific citation of the twelfth chapter of 
Luke, which he quotes three times in his “Confession.”  
Anticipating that his words will reach readers through the screen that Gray has set up, 
Turner cites a chapter of Luke that explicitly warns that appearances can deceive and harkens 
to the moment when God will strip away façades. Turner does not cite these incendiary 
passages; instead he quotes a passage from the same chapter that is a favorites of 
slaveowners—“For he who knoweth his Master’s will, and doeth it not, shall be beaten with 
many stripes, and thus have I chastened you” (46)—as well as another seemingly benign 
passage from the same chapter—“Seek ye the kingdom of Heaven and all things shall be 
added unto you” (45, 46)—which he repeats twice. Turner expects that these passages are 
safe enough to pass through the white filter, which adduces them as evidence of the claim 
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that Turner is a religious fanatic. His more sympathetic readers, however, can place these 
citations within their larger context: the twelfth chapter of Luke, which begins, “Beware ye 
of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy. For there is nothing covered, that shall not 
be revealed; neither hid, that shall not be known” (Luke 12.1-2). For those who are able to 
hear it, Turner’s “Confession” covertly alludes to a Biblical admonition about uncovering 
falsehoods to reveal the truth—the method of reading that Turner asks his readers to practice 
when approaching this mediated “Confession.”  
In this chapter of Luke, Christ goes on to counsel his disciples not to fear “them that 
kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do” (Luke 12.4). This verse is doubly 
significant, given that Turner is about to be executed for murder. It places his and the other 
rebels’ actions into a larger context of divine justice, since Christ explains that “kill[ing] the 
body” is trivial compared to God’s power to judge good and evil. Presumably, in the last 
judgment, the evil of the slave system and its perpetrators will far outweigh the Southampton 
murders. At the same time that it contextualizes the murders, it diminishes the power of the 
judicial system to punish Turner, since all it can do is “kill the body, and after that [it has] no 
more that [it] can do.” Earthly justice is meaningless in comparison to divine justice, which, 
Turner seems assured, will rule in his favor. Turner’s “not guilty” plea at his trial, and his 
refusal to comment on the judgment can be read as his faith in divine justice. 
Finally, although slaveowners cited the “Master’s will” passage as commanding 
obedience and thus justifying slavery, its full context emphasizes surveillance, not obedience. 
It warns that the lord “will come in a day when [the servant] looketh not for him, and at an 
hour when he is not aware, and will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion with 
the unbelievers” (Luke 12.46). This passage underscores the fact that God is always 
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watching. Other passages from this chapter, such as the familiar comparison of human beings 
to sparrows and to the hairs on a head (“Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings, and not 
one of them is forgotten before God? But even the very hairs of your head are all numbered. 
Fear not therefore: ye are of more value than many sparrows” (Luke 12.6-7), reinforce this 
message of constant surveillance. The repeated themes of the twelfth chapter of Luke—
deceptions revealed, divine justice, and unremitting surveillance—convey a veiled threat to 
the slave system. While the slave system depended on deception and surveillance to 
subjugate African Americans, Turner’s Biblical citations remind readers that the deception 
and surveillance is mutual—if not on earth, then certainly in heaven. 
 These passages communicate more than simply Turner’s belief that he is the second 
coming of Christ, which previously critics have noticed; they are a coded message that asks 
readers to refer to the entire chapter to find the key that will unlock Turner’s full meaning. 
The final verses of the chapter powerfully articulate this message:  
Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky and of the earth; but how is it 
that ye do not discern this time?...When thou goest with thine adversary to the 
magistrate, as thou art in the way, give diligence that thou mayest be delivered 
from him; lest he hale thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the 
officer, and the officer cast thee into prison. I tell thee, thou shalt not depart 
thence, till thou hast paid the very last mite. (Luke 56-59) 
 
Trusting that some of his readers would be able to find the key, Turner leads them to this 
scriptural commentary on his present situation—cast into prison, being cross-examined by 
magistrates about his rebellion, which was initiated by Turner’s interpretation of celestial 
signs. Christ in Luke’s gospel warns that the “hypocrites” must learn to detect the moral 
implications of their social system in the same way that they read the changes in their natural 
environment, and assures them that unless they reconcile with their adversaries they will pay 
the consequences. Turner’s “Confession” applies this scriptural warning to the hypocritical 
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Southerners who have cast Turner into prison without recognizing the full meaning of this 
epochal time. 
These examples of Turner’s subordinate detection, which enable him to communicate 
subversively through Gray’s text, affect Gray’s attempt to contain Turner within his 
controlling narrative. We can see the traces of the effect Turner has on Gray in the difference 
between Gray’s description of Turner in the Constitutional Whig letter and in the final pages 
of the Confessions, following the Turner’s first-person narrative. In the letter, Gray reports 
that “Nat in person, is not remarkable, his nose is flat, his stature rather small, and hair very 
thin, without any peculiarity of expression” (81). This description is, of course, based on 
testimony from witnesses Gray has interviewed—black rebels and white survivors. Gray’s 
description of Turner’s physical appearance in the final section of the Confessions is much 
more sympathetic: “He is below the ordinary stature, though strong and active, having the 
true negro face, every feature of which is strongly marked” (54). Gone is the bland, 
unremarkable “Nat”; in his place is a “strong,” “active,” “true negro.” The shift in Gray’s 
diction from his initial derisive portrait to this admiring depiction invites the reader, 
according to Sundquist, to “witness [Gray’s] momentary identification with Turner” (52). 
More importantly, I would argue, the revision exhibits the breaking down of Gray’s pre-
constructed story of Turner, so that Gray has to reimagine a new solution to this mystery. In 
this space of revision, Gray has to account for Turner and the effects Turner has had on Gray. 
Gray’s sense of Turner alters even between the preface and the conclusion of the 
Confessions. Gray’s comments at the conclusion of Turner’s narrative are drastically 
different in tone from the preface and in fact directly contradict certain statements Gray 
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makes in the preface.12 For example, in the preface, Gray describes Turner as having “begged 
that his life might be spared” when he was captured by Benjamin Phipps, depicting him as a 
pathetic coward. At the end of the “Confessions,” however, Gray appears to acknowledge his 
previous misreading when he states, “As to [Turner’s] being a coward, his reason as given 
for not resisting Mr. Phipps, shews the decision of his character” (54). The final pages of the 
Confession contain a more sympathetic portrait of Turner than either the Constitutional Whig 
letter or even the preface, suggesting that Gray has changed as a result of his encounter with 
Turner. Whereas he entered Turner’s cell expecting to extract concealed information without 
being surveilled in return, the alterations in his portrait of Turner indicate that Turner was 
capable of transforming Gray. Although the process of transformation is not delineated in the 
text, we can infer based on the traces of Turner’s performance that Turner scrutinized Gray in 
order to effectively deploy his rhetorical gifts. Gray cannot maintain the blankness and 
detachment that dominant detection presumes is possible: in Emmanuel Levinas’s terms, 
Gray’s “I loses its sovereign coincidence with itself, its identification, in which 
consciousness returned triumphally to itself and rested on itself” (353). Gray and Turner’s 
interchange demonstrates that detection is not unidirectional, but rather dynamically 
reciprocal. 
In the conclusion, Gray portrays Turner as a Romantic figure, signaling that Gray 
cannot resist the pressure placed on his explanatory framework by the overlapping discourses                                                         
12Another glaring example of self-contradiction in the text appears in the first lines of the 
“Confession,” which begins, “ I visited NAT on Tuesday the 1st November, when, without 
being questioned at all, he commenced his narrative in the following words” (45). Gray 
stresses Turner’s cooperation at the outset in order to deflect accusations of coercion, but he 
oversteps by saying that he did not need to “questio[n Turner] at all,” since the very next line, 
in Turner’s voice, states, “Sir, -- You have asked me to give a history of the motives which 
induced me to undertake the late insurrection, as you call it” (45). 
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of genius and madness. In a run-on sentence, Gray simultaneously depicts Turner as angel 
and devil, hero and villain. The conflicting images cancel each other out, leaving the reader 
with a sense that Gray ultimately has no idea what to make of Turner: “The calm, deliberate 
composure with which he spoke of his late deeds and intentions, the expression of his fiend-
like face when excited by enthusiasm, still bearing the stains of the blood of helpless 
innocence about him; clothed with rags and covered with chains; yet daring to raise his 
manacled hands to heaven, with a spirit soaring above the attributes of man; I looked on him 
and my blood curdled in my veins” (55). Whereas Gray in the preface had reserved Satanic 
diction such as “fiend” for the band of rebels, treating Turner as a special case, this 
distinction collapses in the final section, signifying Gray’s inability to maintain the 
framework he attempted to establish in the preface. This irresolvable image, ironically, is the 
most powerful in the text; Gray is paradoxically most memorable when he is least in control 
of his text. This image matches the emblem popularized by antislavery movements, first in 
England and later in the United States. Aside from the man’s race, it also resembles the 
popular romantic image of the maniac, illustrating the overlap among these discourses in the 
antebellum period. Gray’s reaction—“I looked on him and my blood curdled in my veins”—
reintroduces the possibility that whites should be fearful, the very possibility Gray has set out 
to suppress. Indeed, the intrusion of an antislavery image into the text indicates that Gray is 
unable to maintain a proslavery position and thus the phrase now carries a double valence, 
not only presaging the terror of future violence but also describing the physical sensation of 
guilt attendant upon his realization that enslavement has deprived this genius of liberty. 
 Under the pressure of the association Gray has made between Turner’s claim to 
genius and antislavery arguments, Gray’s stated purpose and ideology unravel in the final 
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paragraphs of the “Confessions” and he returns to the legal discourse with which he framed 
the text. As I have already noted, however, Gray’s depiction of the trial is fictional; he does 
not reproduce an official legal document as he does at the beginning of the text. In the 
official trial summary Turner’s sentencing is recorded in routine, bureaucratic language, 
which decrees that “he be taken hence to the Jail from whence he was taken therein, to 
remain until Friday the 11th day of November instant, on which day between the hours of ten 
oClock in the forenoon and four oClock in the afternoon he is to be taken by the Sheriff to 
the usual place of execution and then and there be hanged by the neck until he be dead” (qtd. 
in Tragle 223). The melodramatic language of Gray’s version of the sentencing, on the other 
hand, calls attention to itself as a work of the imagination:  
the poor misguided wretches who have gone before you....are not few in 
number—they were your bosom associates; and the blood of all cries aloud, 
and calls upon you, as the author of their misfortune. Yes! You forced them 
unprepared, from Time to Eternity....The judgment of the court is, that you 
be...hung by the neck until you are dead! dead! dead and may the Lord have 
mercy upon your soul. (56-57) 
 
Although Gray has the judge repeat Turner’s death sentence three times, this rhetorical 
overkill merely exposes the anxiety produced by Turner’s infiltration of Gray’s text. By 
rewriting the sentencing in this figurative, overemotional language, shot through with 
religious imagery and allusions, Gray participates in the type of discourse that he earlier 
denigrated in Turner: the inspired prophecy that coalesces the overlapping discourses of 
creativity and madness. In this final scene, Gray ventriloquizes Turner, ostensibly, to 
condemn Turner. Yet according to Gray’s position in the preface, this prophetic language is 
the language of madness. If Turner is insane for claiming divine inspiration, Gray opens 
himself up to the same charge by reproducing Turner’s prophetic language. Gray’s reference 
to Turner as an “author” at this critical moment, however, indicates that the logic operating in 
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the text is not the religious possession that Turner described, but literary inspiration. Turner, 
that is, has possessed Gray’s imagination. The way in which these three discourses—religion, 
genius, and insanity—blend into one another in the Confessions is a localized instance of the 
productive confusion among these fields in the antebellum United States. 
  
 
Chapter 3: Cooperation and the Failure of Detection in The Narrative of Arthur Gordon 
Pym 
  
 Despite the multitude of divisions that fracture the criticism of detective fiction, what 
holds them all together is an agreement upon the originary moment of the genre: Poe's 
publication of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” in 1841. As David Lehman states, “Critics 
who may disagree on everything else concur in regarding Poe as the most significant figure 
in the detective story’s history and development....From ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ 
alone one might deduce virtually all the primary rules of the genre and many of its secondary 
rituals” (xii).1 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, whose Sherlock Holmes is even more iconic than                                                         
1For example, Michael Holquist proclaims: “We may argue about the birth of tragedy, 
whence arose comedy, the antiquity of the lyric, or the rise of the novel. But about the first 
detective story there can be no such uncertainty. We know the precise time and place of its 
origin. It was in Graham's Magazine of April 1841...that 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' 
appeared” (156). Jonathan H. Grossman, in “Alibis” notes that the “change to the alibi's 
use began inevitably in the wake of detective stories (the first being Edgar Allan Poe's 
'The Murders in the Rue Morgue [1841]), and the roughly contemporary introduction of 
detectives, along with modem professional policing generally” (140). In a recent article, 
John T. Irwin narrowed the scope of the genre yet still credited the invention to Poe: “the 
plot-driven analytic detective story invented by Edgar Allan Poe in the Dupin tales” 
(“Being Boss” 217-218). Assessing the field of detective fiction theory, Heather 
Worthington remarks, “Somewhat simplistically, these essentials of crime fiction are 
generally attributed to or extrapolated from Poe's investigative creation, C. Auguste 
Dupin” (3). Worthington, on the other hand, contends that “the Dupin stories...did not 
exist in a vacuum, but are the survivors of a mass of literature that, in various shapes and 
forms, had concerned itself with crime” (1). See Worthington's The Rise of the Detective 
in Early Nineteenth-Century Popular Fiction, for a study of the history and development 
of criminal narratives. In her history of murder in the United States, Murder Most Foul, 
Karen Halttunnen also rejects Poe's status as “inventor,” giving precedence instead to 
popular murder mysteries: “Once we recognize that the cultural construction of murder-
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Poe's Dupin, awarded Poe the title “father of the detective tale” in 1901, noting, “On this 
narrow path the writer must walk, and he sees the footmarks of Poe always in front of him” 
(270). In conferring on Poe the patriarchal title of “father,” Doyle's acknowledgment of Poe's 
influence suggests that the detective story is another example of the way in which “Poe 
receives credit for fathering mass culture” (Richards 26). This origin story, which casts Poe 
as creating the sui generis “Murders in the Rue Morgue” out of thin air, still has critical 
currency, albeit in a subdued form in which a glancing reference to Poe’s inventing the 
detective story has become de rigueur for studies of the genre.  
 Yet Poe never used the word “detective”; in fact, according to the OED, the word first 
appeared in print in the Chambers Journal in 1843, two years after “Murders,” to refer to the 
“detective police,” and the term was not widely used until the 1850s, when Charles Dickens 
popularized it in his Household Words. Further, the sense that a body of fiction existed that 
could be identified as a distinct genre did not solidify until the late-nineteenth century. 
Howard Haycraft, whose early-twentieth century history of the detective story remains an 
influential study, claims that the “earliest critical discussion of the genre...appeared in the 
London Saturday Review for May 5, 1883” (1); this article makes no mention of Poe.2 Given 
Doyle's reputation as an eminent practitioner of the genre, his early-twentieth century 
                                                        
as-mystery preceded the ‘invention’ of detective fiction, the way is cleared to 
understanding detective fiction as a fantasized solution to the problem of moral 
uncertainty in the world of true crime” (131). 
2The author of the Saturday Review article singles out Charles Dickens as inventing the first 
detective with his Inspector Bucket in Bleak House. Describing the pertinent features of 
detective stories, the Saturday Review writer places particular emphasis on the use of 
disguise to capture criminals: speaking of Gaboriau's detective, M. Lecoq, the author 
notes, “his extraordinary power of disguising himself and altering his appearance is 
represented as conducing greatly to his success in catching criminals” (558). 
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acknowledgment of Poe as the “father” of the genre likely underpins the critical tradition of 
citing Poe. Indeed, a reviewer of the 1903 edition of Doyle's collected novels insinuates as 
much when he commends Doyle's generosity in crediting Poe, since “It is a fact that the great 
majority of Sherlock's admirers probably never heard of Poe; do not know that detective 
stories date from Dupin” (Quarterly Review 177). While this London reviewer's comments 
may have been less descriptive of the state of American familiarity with Poe, it is 
nevertheless remarkable that the purported “inventor” of detective fiction was so little 
regarded at the turn of the century. 
 Because Poe's credit for inventing the genre rested on Doyle's acknowledgment, 
critics have tended to overemphasize the similarities—and there are many—between the 
Dupin tales and the Holmes stories, drawing an artificially straightened line directly from 
“Murders” to A Study in Scarlet, Holmes's first appearance. Critics have seized on these 
similarities in order to erect the walls of the genre, excluding stories that do not have a 
detective, or whose detective does not have a slightly dull sidekick, and so on. While Poe's 
Dupin tales were well received at the time of their publication, they were not singled out as 
instigating a new genre, or even adding a new stock character—the detective—to literature. 
Instead, the stories were praised for their intriguing and highly satisfying depiction of the act 
of ratiocination, and Dupin was admired for his singularity. Poe highlighted Dupin's 
characteristics—his “peculiar analytic ability” and his “idiosyncrasies,” such as his 
predilection for isolation and darkness. Poe's contemporaries easily translated this 
characterization of Dupin into a more capacious term: genius. Further, critics often read 
Dupin's superior abilities as an analog of Poe's own. This trend can be traced to the earliest 
reviewers of Poe's tales, who conflated Dupin's ingenuity with Poe's, asserting that 
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“Murders” “strikingly develops the analytic talent of the gifted author” and “proves Mr. Poe 
to be a man of genius” (Poe Log 430).  
 The meaning of the term “genius” was in transition during the nineteenth century. 
Broadly speaking, we can trace a narrowing trajectory from the association of genius with 
collectivity, such as a nation or a race, to condensation of that collectivity into one 
representative person, who synecdochically stands in for the entire collectivity, to a non-
representative person, whose genius sets him apart from the normal or average person. 
According to Gustavus Stadler, in the early century “the concept [of genius] assumed a 
number of typical forms: that of the 'great' man whose life and words were seen to crystallize 
a nation or period of history; that of the innate, unlearned talents of an artist, performer, 
writer, or orator; that of the irreducible originality of an idea, work of art, or collective self-
conception; that of the irreducible essence of an idea, work of art, or collective self-
conception” (xiv). As this lengthy list suggests, “genius” encompassed a wide range of 
possibilities, from the “essence” of a “collective self-conception” who embodied a collective 
beyond the individual, to the atomization suggested by the “unlearned artist” or the 
“irreducibly origina[l] idea.” Over the course of the century, however, the latter meaning 
predominated: “the representative capacities of genius gradually shifted...toward an 
increasingly detailed, psychologized, and sexualized notion of the individual genius: the 
genius as pathological subject” (Stadler xv). In creating his detective Dupin, Poe proposes a 
model of genius that combines the diverging senses of the term by subsuming the earlier 
association of genius with collectivity into the ascending notion of the unique individual 
genius. The detective invades the minds of others and absorbs them into his own singular 
mind; he thus encloses a collectivity within his own mind. Unlike the “great man”—someone 
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like Frederick Douglass3—who represents and is identified with the multitudes he contains, 
however, the detective enforces a separation between his own superior mind and the minds of 
others. The relationship between the detective and the others is not one of representativeness, 
but rather of manipulation, rivalry, and power.  
 This model of genius coincides with a prevalent model of literary criticism, 
articulated most forcefully by Harold Bloom in The Anxiety of Influence. Eliza Richards 
traces this “fiction of cultural transmission” (22) to Emerson and summarizes its logic of 
production and reception, “in which the strong poets in each generation inherit and transmit 
the work of a culture in such a way that the collective imagination becomes the property of a 
representative individual, and the individual in turn becomes the property of the culture” 
(20). As Richards has shown in her study of Poe's poetry, Gender and the Poetics of 
Reception in Poe's Circle, Poe's ability to shape the terms of his reception has led to a critical 
tendency to reproduce Poe's version of his career and accomplishments and efface his 
“collaboration with his female contemporaries” (30); Poe's legacy is thus a prime example of 
the way in which “genius studies tend to bequeath collectively generated traits to superlative 
practitioners whose innovations depend on the work of their contemporaries as raw material” 
(22). It is no coincidence that the detective, who has been read as an “authorial figure” 
concerned with storytelling, fulfills a model of genius that has been taken as an accurate 
description of the “strong poet.” My argument goes beyond previous claims that Dupin is a 
stand-in or wish-fulfillment for Poe, however. Building on Richards's pathbreaking analysis 
of the way in which Poe's “absorption of the poetess” (30) assures his place in cultural                                                         
3Numerous scholars, including Stadler, have discussed Douglass's disenchantment with and 
attempts to reject the role of “genius” representing all African Americans. This fraught 
subject is beyond the scope of the current essay. 
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memory, I argue that Poe develops a model of the individual genius, at a time when the term 
“genius” was unstable, that shapes both his own writing practice and his representation of 
fictional characters. For Poe, the genius figure, as exemplified by Dupin, is one who can 
inhabit other minds while preventing access to his own.  
 Resituating the Dupin tales within the more historically apt category of genius, rather 
than retrospectively assigning them to the genre of detective fiction, allows us to see more 
clearly the way in which the act of detection is central to many of Poe's writings, and indeed 
was characteristic of the culture of the antebellum United States. Poe's interest in detection is 
clear in works that predate “Murders”; in The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (1838) Poe is 
already trying out various configurations of detection and concealment to create a brilliant 
inductive genius who can detect other minds while concealing his own. Before Poe created 
Dupin, who has been lionized as the epitome of the successful detective, he explores similar 
issues and works with a similar structure in Pym, in which he chronicles the misadventures of 
a detective figure who is almost universally acknowledged to be a failure. In Pym, however, 
the issues of power, which are increasingly effaced in each of the three Dupin tales, are on 
the surface of the text, suggesting that their marginalization in the Dupin tales was a choice, 
not an accident. Reading Pym alongside the Dupin tales illuminates the stakes of that choice 
by showing the consequences of a different approach.  
 Further, when we remove Poe's Dupin tales from their generic confinement, we are 
able to see detection as a mode or strategy. In contrast to the accolades critics heap on Poe 
for inventing the detective, this mode of detection emerges from outside of Poe's mind and 
permeates the culture of which Poe was a part. In order to understand the pervasiveness of 
detection, it is important to note the radical dissimilarity between our current system of 
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policing and the methods, or lack thereof, of law enforcement in the antebellum period. Prior 
to the establishment of urban police forces beginning in the mid-1840s—partially in response 
to the sensational murder case of Mary Cecilia Rogers, the basis for Poe's second Dupin 
tale—the United States, like England, relied on a decentralized system of “thief-taking” that 
provided financial rewards to any individual who caught and successfully prosecuted a 
criminal. Law enforcement under this system was sporadic, idiosyncratic, and essentially 
privatized, making every person a potential detective and dispersing detection throughout the 
populace, rather than consolidating it in one recognizable, authoritative figure.4  
 Equally important, though, is the culture of slavery, which fosters a hermeneutics of 
suspicion. As J. Gerald Kennedy argues, “In the South of the 1830s, these reciprocal 
strategies of deceit [between masters and slaves] produced a culture unusually rife with 
deception—a deception always charged by the palpable threat of brutality and death” 
(“Trust” 238).5 Using the vocabulary of theatre rather than deception, Saidiya Hartman also 
emphasizes the fabrications required to maintain the fiction that slavery was a form of 
benevolent paternalism: “The simulation of consent in the context of extreme domination 
was an orchestration intent upon making the captive body speak the master’s truth as well as                                                         
4See David R. Johnson, American Law Enforcement: A History. Johnson notes that the 
American system of law enforcement mimicked the English system through the mid-
nineteenth century, with the United States lagging a decade or so behind English reforms 
(22). Ian Ousby's Bloodhounds of Heaven: The Detective in English Fiction from Godwin 
to Doyle offers a readable history of English law enforcement in conjunction with its 
depiction in fiction.   
5In “'Trust No Man,'” Kennedy notes that despite the biographical similarities between Poe 
and Douglass—including, for example, their two-year residence in “the same Baltimore 
neighborhood, only a few blocks from each other” prior to Douglass's escape to the 
North—“there has been no previous comparative discussion” (225). Kennedy compares 
Douglass's Narrative to Poe's Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, however, not the detective 
stories. 
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disproving the suffering of the enslaved” (38). Against this performative simulation, which 
imposes “transparency and the degrading hypervisibility of the enslaved,” concealment 
provides a limited form of resistance for the enslaved person (Hartman 35-6). Kennedy, 
Hartman, and others describe a culture shot through with deception. Under such 
circumstances, the ability to detect was crucial for both slave owners, who were anxious to 
prevent slave rebellions and escapes, and the enslaved, whose survival often depended on 
surveilling the schemes of slave owners and overseers. The doubling and redoubling of the 
symbiotic relationship between detection and deception suggests the way in which the same 
acts transform with a shift in perspective: what looks like deceit to the slaveholder is survival 
to the enslaved.  
 Hartman has asserted the methodological necessity of giving “full weight” to the 
opacity of the minds of the enslaved, whose thoughts and feelings can never be fully 
recuperated from the songs or stories she studies given the conditions of coercion under 
which they were produced. Extending Hartman's insights to the literary mode of detection, I 
argue that this mental opacity is actually the obverse of the mind reading practiced by the 
detective. Mind reading and “mind hiding” are complementary abilities that confer power—
limited and fleeting though it may be in the case of an enslaved person encoding a message 
of resistance in a sorrow song. Poe's detective stories explore the mastery offered by these 
intertwined abilities, offering a model of genius based on the possession of both mind 
reading and mind hiding capacities.  
 
I. Successful Detection in Pym 
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 Before I turn to Pym, I want to sketch out a rough definition of the detective figure as 
he6 has been theorized in detective fiction criticism, so that I can then analyze the ways in 
which this definition does and does not apply to Pym. As I have already noted, this definition 
is anachronistically applied to Dupin; I am extending that anachronism for a moment in 
applying it to Pym as well. The similarities between our current notion of a literary detective 
and the patterns of detection that Pym follows in the Grampus section of the narrative 
highlight Poe's interest in the act of detection, and his efforts to consolidate a widespread 
cultural phenomenon into one individual genius figure. The fact that the modern definition of 
a literary detective fits a character that Poe created five years before he wrote the first Dupin 
tale illustrates both Poe's sustained interest in detection and his success at stamping his own 
notions of detection on future representations. Yet in the same novella that he traces the 
process of an individual learning to detect, he inverts that story to reveal that individual's 
undoing. In the next section of this chapter, I will turn to Poe's depiction of the failure of the 
individual to detect the plot of a collective in the Tsalalian section of the narrative. This 
concluding portion of Pym illuminates that which resists detection, which cannot be absorbed 
into the individual genius's mind and recuperated in his master narrative. 
 In Detection and Its Designs, Peter Thoms identifies the detective “as an authorial 
figure, attempting to uncover the story of the crime, and the ‘case’ becomes a story about 
making a story” (1). He expands on this point, noting that 
As a storyteller, [the detective] defines his superiority, conquering the 
ostensible criminal by absorbing him and his deviant plot within his 
own controlling story, defeating his rivals by presenting a convincing                                                         
6Since I focus on the Dupin tales, I will use the masculine pronoun throughout to refer to the 
detective, although there are examples of female detectives in classical detective fiction, 
such as Agatha Christie's Miss Marple.  
  68 
narrative of explanation, and even, at times, disempowering his fellow 
characters and figurative readers by subjecting them to artfully 
contrived moments of shock and sensational revelation. (3) 
 
This definition indicates one of the reasons that literary critics of varying stripes have mined 
the genre for objects of study. More than just an allegory of reading and writing, detective 
fiction tends to be self-reflexively overt about its status as a text, as well as its place within a 
specific genre. Thoms's emphasis on the power differential at play in the story belongs to a 
growing trend in detective fiction criticism that does not take the detective's mastery over the 
other characters (and the reader) for granted, but instead concentrates on the mechanisms by 
which the detective achieves this superiority, such as mystifications, elisions, and gaps in 
logic.7 More than just an investigator, uncovering what has already been accomplished, the 
literary detective is a creator, actively constructing a version of reality and employing 
techniques that enforce his particular version of reality. 
 One way in which the detective maintains his ascendancy over other characters in the 
text is his ability to invade their interiority and access their thoughts without their permission. 
Remarking on Dupin's physical mobility in “Murders,” as he gains entrance to the “locked 
room where the murders occur,” Shawn James Rosenheim observes, “Dupin's ability to enter 
and leave this space...is an attenuated form of his ability to read minds” (Cryptographic 67). 
While Dupin can inhabit multiple mental and physical spaces, the other characters are fixed 
in their roles. They cannot intrude upon Dupin's privacy, for, as the narrator reminds the 
                                                        
7This deconstructionist approach has roughly coincided with the fictional subgenre of 
metaphysical detective narratives, by such authors as Jorge Luis Borges and Umberto Eco, 
which delight in the paradoxes and absurdities that are glossed over in more traditional 
detective stories.  
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reader, “Our seclusion was perfect. We admitted no visitors” (“Murders” 337).8 Thoms 
argues that “Dupin avoids facing his own invasions of private spaces, intrusions that 
suggestively align the detective with not only the sailor, who violates the space of the 
orangutan, but also the supposed criminal, who invades the private space of the two women 
and murders them in their home” (53). While Thoms's insight helpfully underscores the 
fluidity with which Dupin can move among other minds and spaces, I would suggest that 
rather than “aligning” Dupin with the sailor and the criminal, which would locate them on a 
level plane, Dupin's multiple “invasions” are a sign of his ascendancy over the other 
characters. Furthermore, while other characters in the stories reproduce in physical space the 
intrusions Dupin performs, Dupin is the only person in the story who has the ability to move 
among other minds, the trait which makes detection possible. In Pym, Poe is working through 
the formal problems that this ability creates for narrative structure, as he tries to figure out 
how to write a story in which an individual can detect other minds while concealing his own. 
 The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym is, famously, a mess. Before he was fired from 
his editorship of the Southern Literary Messenger in January 1837, Poe wrote a portion of 
what would later become the Narrative for publication in the SLM. T.W. White, owner of the 
SLM, rather haphazardly divided this material into two installments and published them in 
the January and February 1837 issues of the SLM, under the title Arthur Gordon Pym, 
crediting Poe with their authorship in the table of contents. Poe presumably continued writing 
the narrative during his stay in New York in 1837, but because this is the period of Poe's life 
for which the record is least extant, there is no solid evidence for the compositional timeline                                                         
8In “Murders,” Dupin's narrator-companion is still allowed to cohabitate in Dupin's private 
space. In the latter portions of this chapter, I will discuss the gradual exclusion of even the 
narrator-companion from that private space, making Dupin's privacy impermeable. 
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of the Narrative. J. V. Ridgely's archival research has resulted in a persuasive speculative 
account of four independent stages of composition prior to the book's eventual publication by 
Harper & Brothers in July 1838.9 Written at different times and with little evidence of the 
meticulous line-by-line revisions Poe often made on his manuscripts, these sections are 
internally inconsistent10 and lack the connective tissue that would suture them into a 
teleological narrative.  
 Various critics of Pym have either offered readings that ingeniously subsume the 
disorder and incoherence of the text into some governing principle of coherence,11 or have 
dismissed the text, as Poe himself did, as “a very silly book” (qtd. in Quinn 298). My reading 
occupies a middle ground between these two positions. While I argue that reading Pym 
                                                        
9The four stages, Ridgely argues, are (1) the two installments published in the Southern 
Literary Messenger, (2) the “voyage narratives” from the fourth paragraph of chapter four 
to the end of chapter thirteen, (3) the “Morrell chapters” from chapter 13 to the end, with 
some exceptions, and (4) the “Stephens-Keith material” including the “first of two 2 
chapters numbered twenty-three in the first edition text, the final “Note,” and scattered 
passages in the Tsalal episode.” See Ridgely, “The Growth of the Text.” See also Quinn, 
chapters ten and eleven, for a brief history of Poe's dealings with White and, later, with 
Harpers. 
10Two oft-cited examples of these inconsistencies are the mysterious mid-text disappearance 
of Pym's dog, Tiger, and Pym's early implication that Augustus was still alive after the 
survivors of the Grampus were rescued by the Jane Guy, which is contradicted by 
Augustus death on the hulk of the Grampus.   
11The most successful readings tend to be either deconstructionist or psychoanalytic 
accounts. Several scholars, beginning with four French critics (Jean Ricardou, Maurice 
Mourier, Maurice Levy, and Claude Richard) have advanced readings of the novel based 
on the interpretive premise that the novel is a self-referential narrative. In Ricardou's 
famous phrase, Pym is about a “journey to the bottom of the page” (4), in which the 
black/white color symbolism represents the black ink's opposition to the whiteness of the 
page. J. Gerald Kennedy has argued for a psychological reading of the self-referentiality 
of the text in relation to Poe's dread of death. For a survey of this line of criticism, see 
chapter 6 of Ronald C. Harvey's The Critical History of Edgar Allan Poe's The Narrative 
of Arthur Gordon Pym: “A Dialogue with Unreason.”  
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against Poe's Dupin tales brings the mode of detection into focus and thereby illuminates 
aspects of the text that have previously been incoherent, I do not argue that the text as a 
whole can be synthesized into one seamless narrative. Rather, I propose that Poe, motivated 
by an interest in the culturally pervasive theme of detection, is experimenting formally with 
ways to tell a story about a particular type of detection, and that he works through three 
different ways of telling this story.   
 The Narrative essentially starts over three times. Setting aside for a moment the 
Preface, which was not included in the original SLM installments, the narrative proper begins 
with the original opening episode published in the January 1837 issue of the SLM, in which 
Pym and Augustus go out sailing at midnight, wreck their sailboat, and are rescued.12 The 
narrative begins again with the Grampus section, which I will discuss below; and starts over 
a third time with Pym's rescue by a “sealing and trading” (AGP 161) ship called the Jane 
Guy, which eventually lands on a South Pacific island peopled by a dark-skinned race of 
Tsalalians. These three more or less self-contained sections, which are held together by the 
recurring character named Arthur Gordon Pym who narrates each of them, correspond to the 
first three (of four) stages of composition that Ridgely has identified in the text, each of 
which was written at a different period from May 1836 to May 1837.  
 The fourth stage of composition includes the obfuscatory editorial apparatus that 
encircles the text, including the “Note” at the end, written by an unnamed editor who 
differentiates himself from both Mr. Poe and Mr. Pym and comments on the claims advanced                                                         
12Poe is also experimenting with representing the mode of detection in this first section of the 
Narrative, but instead of focusing on an individual or a group, he explores ways in which 
the intersubjective relationship between two people might enable detection. As this section 
is remarkably similar to the structure and methods of representation that he pursued in the 
Dupin tales, I discuss it alongside those stories in the next chapter. 
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in the latter sections of the Narrative. It may also have been in this fourth stage that Poe 
wrote the Preface, which is signed by A.G. Pym, and claims that, although portions of the 
Narrative were published “under the garb of fiction...[and with] the name of Mr. Poe affixed 
to the articles” (AGP 44) in the SLM, they were told to Mr. Poe by A.G. Pym, who has now 
written the remainder of his true autobiography himself and is publishing it to gratify the 
interests of the public. There are thus three separate “writers” identified in the Narrative—
Poe in the sections first published separately in the SLM, Pym in the Preface and the majority 
of the Narrative, and the unnamed editor in the Note—each asserting their authority and truth 
as higher than that of the one who came before him, so that Pym dismisses Poe, and the 
editor corrects Pym. The metafictionality of these layered authorial personas, as well as the 
incoherence of the narrative, has encouraged an enormous outpouring of inventive accounts 
by critics who delight in regulating Poe's confusion. 
 In this section I will concentrate on the portion of the Narrative in which Pym is on 
board the Grampus.13 This section begins with Augustus Barnard making arrangements to 
stow Pym in the hold of his father's ship, the Grampus. The plan is for Pym, whose family 
has forbidden him to go to sea, to hide until the ship is far enough away from shore that                                                         
13The Grampus section overlaps with the first two of the four stages of composition that J.V. 
Ridgely has identified in the text. The second installment published in the SLM includes 
Pym stowing away on the Grampus, being abandoned by Augustus and nearly starving to 
death, being saved at the last minute by Augustus, and finding out part of what had 
happened on deck while Pym was trapped in the hold. The second installment ends with 
Pym’s retelling Augustus's story of what had happened up to the point of the mutiny. The 
rest of the Grampus section corresponds to Ridgely's second stage, the voyage narratives, 
which includes the remainder of Pym's retelling of the mutiny; the countermutiny; the 
destruction of the ship in a storm; the aimless drifting of Pym, Augustus, Dirk Peters, and 
Richard Parker on the now-defunct ship in hopes of rescue; the cannibalism scene in 
which Augustus and Peters eat Parker while Pym faints; the death of Augustus; and, 
finally, Pym and Peters's nick-of-time rescue by the Jane Guy. 
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Captain Barnard will not be able to return Pym. The plan goes awry, however, as a mutiny on 
deck prevents Augustus from coming to get Pym, and Pym becomes trapped in his hiding 
place with dwindling supplies of food and water. Although Augustus is being held captive by 
the mutineers, he covertly attempts to warn Pym to stay put by sending a note attached to 
Pym's dog, Tiger, whom Augustus has brought on board as a surprise for Pym when he 
emerges from his box. When Augustus finally has a chance to slip away from his guards and 
rescue Pym, Augustus and Pym decide to keep Pym hidden from the mutineers with the 
hopes of retaking the ship. This countermutiny succeeds, but it is immediately followed by a 
violent storm that destroys the Grampus and turns it into an unsteerable hulk, on which Pym, 
Augustus, Dirk Peters, and Richard Parker drift aimlessly, trying desperately to find food, 
water, and rescue.  
 Critics have offered numerous explanations for the exaggerated emphasis on 
confinement in this section of Pym, reading the “box” in which Pym hides (AGP 61) as 
everything from womb to tomb. While these readings tend to focus on Pym's confinement, I 
want instead to refocus our attention on Pym's concealment. Pym is trying to avoid detection 
by the crew and most particularly by Captain Barnard. Hidden away in a box within the hold 
of the ship, accessible via a trap door cut into the floor of Augustus's room, Pym's secret 
compartment suggests the methods of concealment imagined by the Prefect of Police in “The 
Purloined Letter,” who brags: “to a properly trained police agent, such a thing as a secret 
drawer is impossible....There is a certain amount of bulk—of space—to be accounted for in 
every cabinet....Sometimes the top of a table, or other similarly arranged piece of furniture, is 
removed by the person wishing to conceal an article; then the leg is excavated, the article 
deposited within the cavity, and the top replaced” (“PL” 445). As the Grampus section 
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begins, then, Pym, like the article deposited in the secret cavity of the table leg, is the 
physical evidence of a crime concealed by Augustus. By the end of the section, however, 
Pym transforms from a piece of evidence into a detective figure. Even while Pym is hidden 
away from the other people on board the Grampus, though, his mind remains accessible to 
the reader. Pym narrates his process of reasoning in great detail, allowing the reader to 
witness his repeated failures before he eventually meets with success.14  
When Augustus does not appear at the expected time to disclose Pym to the crew, Poe 
explicitly figures Pym's reaction to this disturbing turn of events as a process of detection: 
Pym sifts through “clue[s]” (AGP 75) and tests out various interpretive frames until he finds 
one that works. At first, Pym does not want to reason through the possibilities for Augustus's 
absence. Instead he confesses that he was “bewildered, utterly lost in amazement” (AGP 66) 
and gives “way, unresistingly, to the most gloomy imaginings” (AGP 70). This language of 
helplessness and submission emphasizes Pym's lack of mastery over his own mind.  
As Pym realizes that the trapdoor that connects him to Augustus's cabin is blocked 
and thus he is all alone, however, Pym's diction shifts increasingly toward the language of 
detection. As in the Dupin tales, Poe emphasizes the metaphorical “light” of insight gained 
by ratiocinative detection by contrasting it with physical blindness and material darkness. In 
“The Purloined Letter,” for example, Dupin tells the Prefect of Police, “'If it is any point 
requiring reflection,' observed Dupin, as he forbore to enkindle the wick, 'we shall examine it 
to better purpose in the dark'” (“PL” 440). Similarly, Pym's blindness in the absolute 
darkness of the hold requires him to minutely examine everything by hand, but this tedious                                                         
14In a sense, Pym is the prototypical hard-boiled detective, like Sam Spade, whose first-
person narration reveals how much of the crime's solution depends upon luck rather than 
the detective's powers of analysis. 
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manual investigation facilitates his ratiocination. When his dog, Tiger—his only companion 
in the hold—begins acting strangely, Pym “could in no manner account for [Tiger's 
behavior]” but he nonetheless describes at length his attempt to investigate the problem: “As 
the dog seemed distressed, I concluded that he had received some injury; and, taking his 
paws in my hands, I examined them one by one, but found no sign of any hurt. I then 
supposed him hungry, and gave him a large piece of ham” (AGP 71). This sequence of 
tentative suppositions and investigation continues until Pym “perceive[s] a slight erection of 
the hair....Probing this with my finger, I discovered a string....Upon closer scrutiny, I came 
across a small slip of what had the feeling of letter paper” (AGP 71). With the exaggerated 
minutiae of Pym's narration and the accumulation of verbs indicating mental activity 
(“concluded,” “supposed,” “occurred,” “perceived,” etc.), Poe calls the reader's attention to 
the transformation occurring as Pym begins to figure himself as a detective. After finally 
finding a note tied around his dog's body, Pym tries to find his matches and candles so he can 
read it. When he locates their fragments in an empty barrel, he “concluded at once that 
[Tiger] had devoured the whole supply” (72). The firmness of Pym's diction, his decisive 
“concluded at once,” indicates the end of his speculations: he comes to a conclusion about 
Tiger's activity and moves on, wasting no further thought on the candles.  
 Pym's encounter with Augustus's note, a physical piece of writing, effects his 
transformation into a detective or “authorial figure” in Thoms's terms, underscoring the 
connection between reading print and reading minds. Pym's reading practice in this first 
encounter is disrupted and incomplete; its absurdity calls attention to itself as a literal act of 
reading and thus highlights other metaphorical readings that Pym subsequently performs. In 
failing to discover any writing on one side of the paper Pym angrily tears up the note and 
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throws it away; hours later, he realizes that there is another side to the note and has to go to 
extraordinary lengths to recover the torn pieces (giving Tiger a piece to sniff and then 
encouraging him to find the other pieces) and determine on which side he had already rubbed 
the phosphorous. The fatuity of a person’s not realizing that there are two sides to a piece of 
paper underscores the textuality of the note, reminding the reader that we are in “the 
dimension of language,” in Lacan's terms (35). Just as in “The Purloined Letter” the narrator 
leaves unclear the exact method by which the Minister is able to “turn the letter inside out,” a 
point on which the plot hinges,15 the ridiculous and unrealistic manipulability of Augustus's 
note underscores the textuality of the document, self-reflexively calling attention to the act of 
writing and the status of the Narrative as a text. Indeed, we later learn that the note has 
already been reversed, like the purloined letter, as Augustus wrote on the back of a letter he 
had in his pocket. Several critics have pointed out that Pym's first attempt to read Augustus's 
note with the phosphorous scraps should have been successful, since there was writing on 
both sides of the paper. Poe put this (possible) continuity error to use in “The Purloined 
Letter,” as the Minister's intentional eversion of the Queen's letter makes it invisible, whereas 
in Pym, the writing is invisible whether on purpose or by mistake. The similarity between the 
two incidents highlights Poe's recurring interest in texts and the act of writing, and links Pym 
to the authorial role of detective and to Dupin through his interaction with writing.  
 Up to this point, Pym has been detecting, in the general sense of investigating or 
uncovering. Following his efforts to read Augustus's note, however, Pym shifts from simply                                                         
15Irwin argues that “in reversing the outside/inside relationship between container and 
contained, Poe indicates that the way writing physically 'contains' thought is by hiding it 
on and not inside the written surface” (23), and asks, “where on a sheet of paper is that 
physical difference between an inside and an outside located?” (22). 
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detecting, or investigating, to producing a narrative account of his conclusions and offering it 
as the truth. This move from investigating to proclaiming marks an important shift that 
introduces the potential for an exercise of power on the part of the detective. Whereas a 
pragmatist might be satisfied with a workable interpretation of the clues, the detective-as-
author is concerned with “presenting a convincing narrative of explanation” (Thoms 3). The 
difference between these two approaches lies in the end goal: the pragmatist just wants to 
solve the mystery; the detective-as-author wants to control and wield the story of the 
mystery's solution. Pym's experience with Augustus's note, Augustus tied to Tiger in order to 
explain the situation on deck and to warn Pym to remain hidden for the time being, moves 
Pym from the first position to the second. After all his efforts, Pym is able to read only a 
seven-word fragment of the note, which leads him to “for[m] a thousand surmises as to [why 
Augustus wants him to remain hidden] but I could think of nothing affording a satisfactory 
solution of the mystery” (AGP 76). Here we have both the language of detection—mysteries 
and solutions—and an important addition that marks Pym's complete transformation into a 
storyteller. No longer interested in just any solution, Pym now demands a “satisfactory” 
solution: he wants a convincing story, one that will win out over competing narratives and 
ensure Pym's mastery over the situation.  
 The content of this “satisfactory solution” comes from Augustus, who finally rescues 
Pym from the brink of death from dehydration and explains what kept him from coming 
below decks sooner. By alerting the reader repeatedly to Pym's editorial practice, Poe 
indicates that Pym is learning to craft a story by absorbing another person's experience within 
his own narrative. Rather than directly reporting Augustus's version of the story, Pym 
acknowledges his editing and reworking of Augustus's story. After relating two chapters 
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worth of Augustus's story, for example, Pym tells the reader, “The leading particulars of this 
narration were all that Augustus communicated to me while we remained near the box. It was 
not until afterward that he entered fully into all the details” (97). Pym thus calls the reader's 
attention to the multiple tellings of the story and to his synthesis of those discrete tellings into 
one master narrative.  
 Furthermore, it is in this same chapter that Pym's narrative voice changes 
significantly, as his narrative register comes to sound much like Dupin's authoritative 
pronouncements in the Dupin tales. Despite Pym's promise in the Preface that there would be 
a noticeable stylistic difference between the section of the narrative written by Mr. Poe and 
printed in the SLM and the subsequent narrative written by Pym, there is, of course, no such 
stylistic divergence at that point. Rather, Pym's voice changes in chapter six, when Pym 
includes his disquisition on proper stowage. This first instance of his pedantic “expertise,” 
including a pseudo-scholarly footnote, initiates a change in tone that will escalate throughout 
the remainder of the narrative, with Pym becoming more authoritative even as he becomes 
less credible. For example, Pym digresses from Augustus's tale to inform the reader that 
“Latterly, I have had reason, both from my own experience and the assurance of others, to be 
acquainted with the strong soporific effects of the stench arising from old fish oil when 
closely confined” (AGP 82) and he goes on to explore this putative cause for his stupor in 
more detail. Pym is known for this bombastic style among fans and critics of the book alike, 
but few attend to the lack of this arrogance in the first section of the novel, the significance of 
the introduction of this style in chapter six, or the similarity of Pym's supercilious voice to 
Dupin's.  
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 Having assumed the vocabulary of detection and displayed his ability to reshape 
another person's story into a controlling narrative, Pym’s transformation into a detective 
figure is nearly complete. One of the detective's determining characteristics is his ability to 
read minds; the detective's superior powers of observation and analysis give him privileged 
access to the private thoughts of others. Thoms notes that “Dupin’s presumption of inhabiting 
the minds of other characters” appears in all three stories (45). After Augustus rescues Pym 
from the hold, Pym cooperates with Augustus and Dirk Peters to thwart the mutineers who 
seized control of the ship. The countermutiny episode displays Pym's mastery of a crucial 
aspect of detection: the ability to penetrate the minds of others. Unlike the previous example 
of Pym’s reworking Augustus's story of the mutiny, which Augustus willingly told to Pym, 
the detective invades the interiority of others without their consent in order to appropriate 
their thoughts and experiences for use in the detective's master narrative.  
 Pym's description of the countermutiny focuses on the minds of the mutineers, putting 
Pym in the position of the detective reading the minds of his criminal enemies. To overcome 
the stronger party of mutineers, Pym, Augustus, and Peters rely on the fact that the mutineers 
still do not know that Pym is on board the ship. These three countermutineers disguise Pym 
as the corpse of Rogers, a mutineer who had recently been killed, and attack while the 
mutineers are paralyzed by the shock of seeing this animated corpse. In an attenuated 
description of the mutineers' thought processes as they try and fail to find a naturalistic 
explanation for this “shocking appearance,” Pym explains “that in the minds of the mutineers 
there was not even the shadow of a basis upon which to rest a doubt that the apparition of 
Rogers was indeed a revivification of his disgusting corpse....they must have thought 
themselves enabled to survey [all other possibilities] at a glance” (AGP 116). The string of 
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prepositional phrases betrays the clumsiness of Pym's attempt to claim intimate, unauthorized 
knowledge of another person's thoughts, as this convoluted, formal syntax does not seem 
likely to be an accurate representation of the thoughts of men when confronted with the 
hideously grotesque spectacle of a bloodied, bloated corpse. Nevertheless, the scene marks 
an accession of confidence in projecting his account of the thoughts of others.  
 To underscore the importance of this development in Pym's character, I want to 
compare this scene to an earlier instance of Pym’s inhabiting the minds of others. The 
difference between these two episodes hinges on Pym's method of reading minds: in the 
earlier episode, involving Pym's wreck of his sailboat, the Ariel, he enters so radically into 
the perspective of another that he evacuates his own subjectivity, whereas in the latter 
instance, the countermutiny on board the Grampus, Pym's subjectivity remains front and 
center as the screen through which the story is told. In the first installment of Pym published 
in the SLM, Augustus convinces Pym to join him on a midnight sailing “frolic” (AGP 48). 
Left on his own to sail the Ariel when Augustus faints, Pym loses control of the sailboat and 
resigns himself to “whatever might happen” (AGP 51).  In this scene Poe experiments with 
the best way to achieve an essential element of detective fiction: building and maintaining 
suspense. Despite his grasp of the rhetorical structure, this first mind-reading attempt of 
Pym's reveals the difficulty of crafting a narrative in which the detective is a voyeur who still 
retains control over the story. Unlike the successful detective, Pym is unable to assert this as 
his story; he evacuates his own subjectivity completely in his storytelling and allows the 
other's perspective to “absor[b] him” rather than “absorbing [the other]...within his own 
controlling story” (Thoms 3).  
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 Poe creates suspense in the Ariel scene with a narrative structure that is strikingly 
similar to the formula that would become established in detective fiction, as Pym tells the 
story up to the moment of crisis, when he heard a scream “as if from the throats of a thousand 
demons....my heart ceased utterly to beat, and...I tumbled headlong and insensible upon the 
body of my fallen companion” (AGP 51). The next sentence begins “I found myself, upon 
reviving, in the cabin of a large whaling ship” (AGP 51), the calm, concrete diction 
contrasting markedly with the melodramatic, fantastic language of the previous sentence. 
Pym thus creates in the space between these two events the mystery that needs to be solved. 
Pym himself uses this phrase—“The mystery of our being in existence was now soon 
explained” (AGP 51)—but, significantly, elides the matter of who is telling the story with his 
use of passive voice. 
 Pym narrates the story of the rescue, thus solving the mystery, but he tells it from the 
point of view of the sailors on board the Penguin who rescue him and Augustus. The much-
larger Penguin, it turns out, has “run down” the Ariel (AGP 53), destroying the smaller 
sailboat. In telling the story of the rescue, Pym fully inhabits the perspective of the sailors, 
disassociating himself completely from his own subjectivity. After the sailors conduct a 
lengthy search of the wreckage, Pym states, “The body of a man was seen to be affixed in the 
most singular manner to the smooth and shining bottom (the Penguin was coppered and 
copper-fastened), and beating violently against it with every movement of the hull. After 
several ineffectual efforts...I was finally disengaged from my perilous situation and taken on 
board—for the body proved to be my own” (AGP 53). Pym allows the sailors' perspective to 
control the story of the rescue, describing in great detail a view that would be impossible for 
him to have seen: his own body nailed to the bottom of the boat, as it was seen by the sailors. 
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This estrangement from his own perspective is startling, not just in its presumption of 
entering into the mind of another person, but in its suggestion that Pym can view his own 
nearly-lifeless body through the eyes of the sailor, essentially seeing what he will look like 
when he dies.16 Like the “authorial” detective, Pym is “presenting a convincing narrative of 
explanation” (Thoms 3) to account for the moment of “mystery” and suspense that he 
generated with the gap between his fainting and awakening on board the Penguin. In this 
section of Pym, the first that Poe composed, Poe has collapsed several formal elements that 
he separates out in the latter sections, as well as in the Dupin tales: in this episode, Pym is the 
source of the mystery (how did Pym survive?) and the solution to that mystery. Further, this 
first instance of Pym’s appearing to be a corpse is a precursor to his impersonation of a 
corpse in order to overpower the mutineers during the countermutiny on the Grampus. Poe's 
repetitive combination of simulated death with the attempt to penetrate other minds suggests 
that he is working through the narrative structure required to get illicit knowledge of other 
minds into an individual's mind without exposing that individual's mind. In the Ariel episode, 
Pym penetrates another mind, but cannot return to his own mind to incorporate the illicitly 
gained mental property into his narrative. In the Grampus episode, on the other hand, Pym 
maintains control over both the performance of death and the narration of the story, so that he 
successfully absorbs the thoughts of others into his own mind without evacuating his own 
subjectivity. 
 Poe rewrites the Ariel scene in which Pym imagines events that he could not possibly 
have witnessed, as he did when he described seeing his own body “affixed” to the bottom of                                                         
16This motif of viewing one's own dead body is repeated when Pym disguises himself as a 
corpse during the countermutiny. 
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the Penguin. Crucially, however, in this later episode on the Grampus, Pym shifts from 
narrating the event from the perspective of another, who actually did witness it, to 
incorporating another person's memory into his own first-person narration, thus appropriating 
another person's experience. Describing his plan to disguise himself as a corpse for the 
countermutiny, Pym tells the reader that “Rogers had died about eleven in the forenoon, in 
violent convulsions; and the corpse presented in a few minutes after death one of the most 
horrid spectacles I ever remember to have seen” (AGP 111). As Kennedy explains, “the 
gruesome details obscure the fact that Pym could have observed neither the 'violent 
convulsions' of Rogers nor the 'horrid and loathesome appearance of his body a few minutes 
after death...his eyewitness report of the man's death throes amounts to a 'quiz' of the reader; 
Pym was hiding below decks when Rogers died” (Death 160). According to Kennedy, the 
most logical explanation for this “eyewitness” account is that Pym has heard the details of 
the scene from a person—probably Dirk Peters—who was present for Rogers's death. While 
Kennedy interprets this narrative anomaly as a “'quiz' of the reader,” I want to suggest that, 
when read in light of the Dupin tales, it prefigures an important ability that Poe confers on his 
genius figures, the ability to intrude into spaces—mental and physical—to which the figure 
should not legitimately have access. Poe leaves unexplained Pym's seamless appropriation of 
Peters' (or another sailor's) experience of viewing Rogers' corpse. Rather than assuming that 
Pym heard the gruesome description, we can interpret this as a moment of mind-reading on 
Pym's part, as he has invaded another person's mind and effaced the traces of this act of 
mental theft, making it appear to all but the most meticulous readers that the experience was 
his own. At this point in the narrative, the countermutiny scene, Pym most resembles the 
model of genius that Poe develops more fully in Dupin: he claims credit for masterminding a 
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clever ruse, defeats his enemies, and absorbs their thoughts and memories into his own 
subjectivity.  
 The countermutiny marks a high point for Pym, as the plan succeeds. Although this 
success depends upon a cooperative effort, Pym is careful to note that it is his plan. As the 
three countermutineers discuss their options, Pym rejects the suggestions of the other two 
men (not content simply to reject them in advance, Pym again returns to these suggestions as 
they are about to attack the enemy and reminds the reader why the other plans would not 
have worked) and promotes his own plan. In a tone of false modesty belied by the vigor of 
his efforts to dismiss any other suggestions, Pym claims full credit for the successful scheme: 
“By good fortune I at length hit upon the idea of working upon the superstitious terrors and 
guilty conscience of the mate” (110). By elevating himself as the mastermind and obscuring 
the teamwork required to overcome a group that outnumbers them two to one, Pym enacts 
the model of individual genius that subsumes collective efforts into a solitary figure.  
 If Pym began the Grampus section concealed like the evidence of Augustus's crime, 
the plan he concocts following his transformation into a detective figure, able to detect and 
exploit the fears of the mutineers, inverts this initial role. Pym succeeds in defeating his 
enemies by disguising himself as the evidence of the mate's crime, a ghastly corpse. This 
inversion parallels the two methods of hiding the purloined letter: as I noted, Augustus's 
concealment of Pym in the hold matches up with the Prefect's limited imagination of physical 
hiding places, while Pym's theatrical disguise corresponds to Minister's D's diabolically 
creative camouflage of the letter as trash. Poe does not end the novel on this note of success, 
however; instead, the climax of the novel, which is structurally related to this earlier episode, 
chronicles Pym's utter failure as a detective.  
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II. The Failure of Detection in Pym: Cooperation vs. Greed 
Unlike his successful reading of the mutineers, Pym fails in writing a script for the 
Tsalalians, the fictional race of dark-skinned people he encounters near the Antarctic. Poe 
structures the episode of Pym's failure to detect the plot of a collective as an almost exact 
inverse of his success in the countermutiny. Many scholars have noted that the Tsalalian 
massacre and the countermutiny are linked: Harold Beaver notes, for example, that the 
“initial treachery (of mutiny and revenge on the Grampus) is mirrored by treachery and 
revenge on Tsalal; murderous Seymour, the black cook, by unscrupulous Too-wit, the black 
chief” (29). This parallel “treachery” holds, however, only if we view events from Pym's 
perspective, something Poe encourages us not to do by embedding a counternarrative of clues 
within Pym's first-person narration. Rather than viewing the scenes as parallel, I want to 
suggest that the latter episode inverts the former, and that this inversion hinges on the 
question of motivation.  
 Many critics, focusing on the geographic and racial similarities, read the Tsalal 
episode as a fictional analog of the threat of slave rebellion in the southern United States.17 
While compelling, these allegorical readings are often limited to arguments over whether or 
not Poe was a racist. The true significance of the episode, however, lies in its demonstration 
of Poe's recognition of the power of collective action, particularly when it is motivated by 
survival, to defeat a stronger enemy who is motivated by greed. In figuring a successful 
group as dark-skinned, Poe explicitly acknowledges an example of a real-world threat posed                                                         
17See John Carlos Rowe's essay, “Poe, Antebellum Slavery, and Modern Criticism,” for the 
strongest articulation of this position, as well as for an overview of previous criticism on 
the subject. 
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by collectives, especially by those united around such a strong motive as survival, as were 
enslaved African Americans in the southern United States. While Poe's portrayal of the 
Tsalalians is racist, it is not dismissive. The Tsalalians pose a powerful threat that the white 
detective figure barely escapes. The racialized threat Poe embeds within the Tsalal episode 
demonstrates his ambivalence toward the efficacy of the collective. On the one hand, 
cooperative intersubjectivity is a powerful mode of problem solving that can accomplish 
things that the individual cannot. On the other hand, its very power is a threat to the 
individual, and it evokes the spectre of slave revolt that terrified Southerners well after the 
Southampton rebellion of 1831.   
 In the section leading up to the countermutiny, the mutineers have split into rival 
factions, whose goals can be summed up as greed vs. survival. The first faction, led by the 
first mate, wants to embark on a “piratical cruise,” while the other, led by Dirk Peters, wants 
to head for the South Seas islands to lead a life of ease and pleasure among the beautiful and 
peaceful natives (AGP 93). At first the mutineers are divided between “profit and pleasure” 
(AGP 93), but as the mate's faction grows stronger, his group begins to kill off members of 
the other faction, and thus the second faction is no longer motivated by a desire for pleasure 
but by a will to survive. When Augustus and Pym join with Peters to overthrow the mate's 
faction, therefore, they defeat a group allied around a common desire for ill-gotten gains.  
 Understanding the motivations of the two groups is important in reading the 
countermutiny as detective Pym's first case. The countermutineers are outmatched by their 
enemies in regard to weaponry and must develop a ruse to make up for their weak position. 
Pym obsessively details the number and type of weapons the mutineers possess, while 
lamenting that he and Augustus “could find nothing more fit for our purpose than two pump 
  87 
handles” (AGP 112). Pym successfully detects the mutineers' weak spot—their “superstitious 
terrors”—and develops a ruse—disguising himself as a corpse—to vanquish this self-serving 
group. Readers of detective fiction, particularly “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” and “The 
Purloined Letter,” will recognize this structure: detect the enemy's plot, hatch a plan, and trap 
the enemy with a clever disguise.18 In the countermutiny scene a weaker group, motivated by 
survival, cooperates to trick and thereby defeat a stronger group, motivated by greed. Pym, as 
part of this successful group, both fits the definition of the detective figure and enacts the 
structure of the detective tale. 
 By the time Pym arrives on Tsalal, he resembles the authorial detective figure that 
Thoms outlines. That is, Pym is less concerned with finding a viable interpretive frame than 
he is with imposing his own “controlling stories” (Thoms 3) onto events. Pym has reached 
his conclusion about the Tsalalians before he interacts with them for the first time: his shift in 
language as the first canoe approaches the Jane Guy reveals his thought process. When he 
spies the canoes setting off from the shore, still some distance away, he notes that they were 
“filled with men”; when the canoes are close enough to hail he demotes them to “strangers,” 
and after they “commenced a loud jabbering...for at least half an hour, during which we had a 
good opportunity of observing their appearance,” Pym settles on his final term, to which he 
sticks for the remainder of the narrative: these “jet black” men are henceforth “savages” 
(AGP 189).19 As Dana Nelson argues, Pym “must know the Tsalalians to know how the white                                                         
18In “Murders,” for example, Dupin deduces that the murderer was an orangutan that escaped 
from a sailor who is remaining hidden so as not to be linked to the murders. After 
detecting the sailor's plot, Dupin concocts a ruse to draw the sailor to his apartment: he 
places advertisements in the newspaper pretending to have captured the orangutan; 
instead, he captures the sailor. 
19As Kennedy points out, “Pym designates the natives, the true denizens of the region, as 
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colonizer differs, and he must know these things before he sets eyes on the Tsalalians, in 
order to assume the superior right of colonizer—a right assumed from the moment he began 
his journey. He must construct a fiction about knowing that inevitably discloses its actual 
failure to know” (99). Once Pym has established this governing narrative that the Tsalalians 
are “savages,” he fits all further evidence into it. Most readers of Pym note the willful 
“blindness” and “obtuseness” (Irwin 184; Kennedy, “Trust” 252) that Pym exhibits in his 
encounters with the Tsalalians.  
 Nelson and other critics discuss this proleptic knowing in relation to colonization, but 
it characterizes Poe's detective fiction as well. Dupin is not a forensic detective; he solves all 
of his cases in the privacy of his apartment based on testimony (by the police Prefect), textual 
evidence (the newspaper accounts, for example), and his powers of analysis. His visits to the 
L'Espanayes' and Minister D's apartments, in their respective stories, serve merely to confirm 
his “suspicion which [gives] direction to all farther progresses in the investigation of the 
mystery” (“Murders” 357). That is, he has constructed a “fiction” (in Nelson's terms) prior to 
encountering the physical evidence of the crime. As I have argued, this is part of Poe's 
conception of detection. Yet while Poe makes the facts of the case match up with Dupin's 
proleptic fiction, Pym's fiction turns out to be utterly incorrect. 
The countermutiny and the Tsalal episode are structurally similar, yet radically 
different in their outcome for Pym. The crucial difference is that Pym has switched sides and 
thus provides an inverted perspective on the events on Tsalal. On Tsalal, it is Pym and the 
crew of the Jane Guy with whom he has affiliated himself who are motivated by greed. 
Further, when Pym lands on Tsalal he has the weapons. Several scholars have pointed out the                                                         
'strangers' in this encounter; he has no sense of being the foreign intruder” (Abyss 58). 
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hypocrisy of the interactions between the Jane Guy's crew and the Tsalalians. These 
interactions always occur with the former heavily armed despite their assurances of faith and 
friendship; as Dana Nelson notes, “The 'appearance' is 'faith'; the operative dynamic is force” 
(98). Thus, while Pym—and critics like Thompson or Harold Beaver who view the scene 
from Pym's perspective—wants to portray himself as the innocent victim, the structure of the 
episode indicates that Pym is in the position formerly occupied by the piratical mutineers, 
whose murderous behavior makes them a much better example of savagery than the 
Tsalalians. The Tsalalians' cooperation, on the other hand, based as it is upon a desire for the 
preservation and survival of their civilization, resists detection, just as Pym's faction in the 
countermutiny evaded the detection of the mate's party. The reciprocity of these two scenes 
highlights the way in which the detective can quickly become the detected, as Pym fails to 
detect and hence nearly becomes the victim of the Tsalalians' superior detection. Pym tries to 
read the Tsalalians as analogues of the mate's faction, ascribing to the Tsalalians the same 
brutal and profit-seeking motives that characterized the mutineers, but he has the wrong plot 
this time. 
 Pym attempts to inscribe the Tsalalians' conduct into a script of economic motivation 
when the Tsalalians take control of the Jane Guy. Pym insists that the Tsalalians are 
interested in the ship for “plunder” and “spoils” (AGP 215, 216), even though his description 
of the scene clearly indicates that this was not their purpose. The Tsalalians destroy the ship 
immediately upon taking control, turning the Jane into “a pitiable scene indeed of 
havoc....The decks were split open and ripped up; the cordage, sails, and everything movable 
on deck demolished as if by magic” (AGP 216). Pym turns to the language of magic to 
describe an incomprehensible scene: the Tsalalians destroying valuable property. After 
  90 
towing the ship to shore, the Tsalalians, having “already made a complete wreck of the 
vessel,...prepar[ed] to set her on fire” (AGP 217). The only things that Pym actually sees the 
Tsalalians trying to salvage from the ship are the “bolts and other copper and ironwork” 
(AGP 217); that is, metal that would be useful in building or for tools, not delicacies or 
commodities. While Pym attributes the Tsalalians' actions to greed, assuming that they are 
after “booty” (AGP 218), their concern is to destroy the ship that has threatened their society.  
 Pym's fiction of the Tsalalians' savagery attempts to write them not only as 
avaricious, but as selfish rather than cooperative. Pym repeatedly figures the Tsalalians as a 
mass of unconnected, self-serving individuals, even though there are numerous indications 
that undermine this portrayal and suggest instead that the Tsalalians are a coordinated 
collective. When the Tsalalians conquer the remaining six sailors on board the Jane Guy, 
Pym reports, “in less time that I have taken to tell it, and as if by magic, the Jane saw herself 
surrounded by an immense multitude of desperadoes evidently bent on capturing her at all 
hazards” (AGP 214). Pym reduces the Tsalalians' careful planning to “magic,” denying them 
the language of ratiocination that he used to characterize his own plan for the countermutiny. 
The narrator of the Dupin tales belittles those who turn to magic and miracle to explain 
things they cannot comprehend: “of course it is not surprising that the affair was regarded as 
little less than miraculous, or that the Chevalier's analytical abilities acquired for him the 
credit of intuition” (“Mysteries” 379). The narrator's condescension implies that supernatural 
explanations are a substitute for thought and understanding. Pym's reaction to the Tsalalians 
exemplifies the response scorned by the narrator of the Dupin tales. Despite the cooperation 
obviously required for the Tsalalians to coordinate an attack on the heavily armed Jane, Pym 
cannot acknowledge the collaborative effort. Instead, he figures the Tsalalians as 
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“desperadoes,” a word that denotes, according to the OED, “a desperate or reckless man; one 
ready for any deed of lawlessness or violence.” The reckless criminality implied by Pym's 
striking term severs the links of the Tsalalians' coordinated, premeditated network, dividing 
them into desperate individuals motivated by selfishness and greed.  
 It is precisely because the Tsalalians cooperate in a conspiracy that clearly required 
extensive advance planning, communication, and secrecy20 but was not motivated by greed, 
that Pym cannot detect their plot. The Tsalalians accomplish an act of genius, but this genius 
is cooperative and protective rather than individual and selfish. The Tsalalian model of 
genius is incompatible with the individual model exemplified by Dupin and, in his own 
estimation at least, Pym. Pym tries to enforce the individual, selfish model onto the 
Tsalalians in his reading of their actions, figuring their conquest of the Jane as a piratical 
maneuver, but the evidence he presents belies his interpretation. Even his assumption that 
Too-wit is the “chief” of the Tsalalians, a fact that the Tsalalians themselves never confirm, 
is part of his attempt to assign credit to an individual rather than to a network, which the 
“systematic manner” he first notices among the Tsalalians suggests is a more apt 
representation of their society. Too-wit's name warns against this view, however, as it can be 
read as a homophone for two wit: not one individual mind, but a collaboration. Despite the 
dissonant elements that contradict his story, Pym continues to try to impose his fiction onto 
the Tsalalians even after it becomes obvious that it is not adequate.                                                          
20The Tsalalians are able to engineer a massive landslide, encompassing about 100 yards and 
“more than a million tons of earth and stone that had been artificially tumbled within” 
(AGP 211). Although Pym claims that the “means by which the vast mass had been 
precipitated were not more simple than evident” (AGP 211), the description he gives 
reveals both that extensive work and preparations were necessary, as well as a high degree 
of precision in the teamwork required to set off the landslide. 
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 Outmatched by the Jane Guy's arsenal, the Tsalalians work together covertly to 
thwart the Jane's crew, not for economic gain but to preserve their autonomy as a society. 
Poe indicates that Pym suspects this cooperative plot, but dismisses his intuition because it 
does not fit into the narrative he has imposed on the Tsalalians. Pym's misgivings are raised 
by the Tsalalians' cooperation on his first visit to the village, when he reports that the 
procession “was momentarily strengthened by smaller detachments, of from two to six or 
seven, which joined us, as if by accident, at different turns in the road. There appeared so 
much of system in this that I could not help feeling distrust” (AGP 195). He repeats this 
concern with “system” among the Tsalalians later in the chapter, remarking, “we saw nothing 
in the demeanor of the natives calculated to create suspicion, with the single exception of the 
systematic manner in which their party was strengthened during our route from the schooner 
to the village” (AGP 200). Pym's nervousness about this “systematic manner” betrays a fear 
of conspiracy, supporting the link that many scholars note between the Tsalalian massacre 
and the Nat Turner slave rebellion. Yet he dismisses his suspicions, particularly after he sees 
the crudeness of the Tsalalians' village, evidently reassured that people who lived in such 
simple huts could not contrive a plot clever enough to defeat the civilized crew of the Jane.  
 While Pym fails to detect the Tsalalians' massacre plot, Poe depicts the Tsalalians as 
successful detectives who follow the same structure of detection as Pym does in the 
countermutiny. Even before the Tsalalians' massacre proves almost entirely successful, Poe 
indicates that the Tsalalians have detected the plot of the Jane Guy's crew to exploit the 
islands and islanders. Although Pym refers to the Tsalalian language as “jabbering,” the two 
groups seem to have little trouble communicating even upon their first meeting, particularly 
with the help of gestures. When Too-wit indicates that he wants the crew “to bring our boats 
  93 
alongside of him,” however, Pym notes, “This hint we pretended not to understand” because 
they did not want to do what Too-wit was asking them, fearing for their safety (AGP 190). 
Soon thereafter, the crew receives the same treatment from the Tsalalians, as the crew 
“endeavored to ascertain if they had among them any articles which might be turned to 
account in the way of traffic, but found great difficulty in being comprehended” (AGP 192). 
These two moments of incommunication occurring within two pages of one another and 
contrasted with the overall ease of communication between the two groups suggest strongly 
that the Tsalalians are also “pretend[ing] not to understand” the crew's hints. Although Pym 
does not recognize this possibility, ascribing the Tsalalians' incomprehension to their 
ignorance, it is significant that communication fails when the message portends commercial 
exploitation. 
 Having quickly detected the Jane Guy's plot to exploit and devastate their civilization, 
the Tsalalians initiate a ruse to screen their own investigations. Pantomiming “amazement 
exceed[ing] all bounds,” twenty Tsalalians “ramble[d] over every part of the 
deck...examining every article with great inquisitiveness” (AGP 190). Nelson argues that the 
Tsalalians' behavior on board the Jane can be read as an elaborately theatrical show of 
ignorance, designed to distract the crew while the Tsalalians examine their weapons and 
supplies to determine what they are up against (99-100).21 The Tsalalians' ability to convince 
the crew that they had not “the least suspicion of [the arms'] actual use, but rather took them 
for idols” allows them to be “suffered to handle and examine them at leisure” (AGP 191). As 
Saidiya Hartman has shown in a different context, theatricality and obfuscation were                                                         
21See also Nelson's discussion of the Jane Guy's cargo of cheap trinkets and tools, which 
indicates that “'trade' is a euphemism for the Jane Guy's real mission, which might more 
accurately be described as conquest” (95). 
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inextricably linked to the institution of slavery. Thus the connection between the dark-
skinned Tsalalians and African slaves in the antebellum South that numerous critics have 
established suggests that the Tsalalians' display of ignorance is another form of what 
Hartman calls “puttin' on ole massa'” in its “simulation of compliance for covert aims” (8). 
The Tsalalians' actions are similar to Dupin's when he goes to the Minister's apartment to 
search for the purloined letter: “I complained of my weak eyes and lamented the necessity of 
the [green] spectacles, under cover of which I cautiously and thoroughly surveyed the 
apartment, while seemingly intent only upon the conversation of my host” (“Purloined” 458). 
These ruses allow the detectives to scope out their enemy without alerting them that they are 
under surveillance. 
 The Tsalalians' interpolation of their own plot into Pym's story marks Pym's failure as 
a detective figure, since, as Thoms notes, the detective's success depends upon his 
“conquering the ostensible criminal by absorbing him and his deviant plot within his own 
controlling story” (3). Like Pym's plan to overcome the mutineers, the Tsalalians put into 
action their “deeply laid plan” (AGP 205) to defeat their stronger enemies, luring most of the 
sailors into a gorge rigged to collapse on them. Turning their weaker position into a 
stratagem, the Tsalalians make a show of being unarmed, even commenting, “Matee non we 
pa pa si,” which Pym translates as “there was no need of arms where all were brothers” 
(AGP 205). Most critics gloss this as an ironic comment underscoring the hypocrisy of the 
Jane Guy's crew, who claimed friendship but are “armed to the teeth” (AGP 205). A better 
reading, I argue, refers to the Tsalalians themselves. Their “brotherhood,” or coalition, 
renders traditional “arms” unnecessary, as they have devised a superweapon that depends on 
a precisely orchestrated cooperative effort for its deployment. Poe foregrounds the tension 
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between appearance and reality, suspicion and blindness, in the lead-up to the massacre, 
reminding the reader of the identical language used before and during the countermutiny—
although, of course, Pym was the one manipulating appearances in that earlier episode. While 
Pym never makes the connection between the countermutiny and the Tsalalian massacre, 
Poe's repetition of the language and structure—detect the plot, hatch a plan, create a ruse—
encourages the reader to do so.  
 Not only can the Tsalalians detect the exploitative plot of the Jane Guy, but Poe 
ensures that the reader can as well. Throughout the narrative, Poe plants extensive clues that 
undermine Pym's story. Unlike the minor inconsistencies I discussed earlier, which suggested 
that Poe was not fully in control of his text,22 these passages are extensive and detailed, 
indicating that Poe has included them specifically to contradict Pym's master narrative. The 
most prominent example is Pym's incomprehension when the Tsalalians refuse “to approach 
several very harmless objects—such as the schooner's sails, an egg, an open book, or a pan of 
flour” (AGP 192). The reader, of course, helped along perhaps by several additional 
examples of Tsalalians exhibiting disgust or fear of white objects, recognizes the link among 
these “harmless objects” that Pym cannot. Critics tend to emphasize this moment as an 
example of Pym's outrageous blindness, but this Pymcentric reading downplays the 
significance of the episode: the reader's ascension over Pym in interpreting a set of clues.  
 This new development emerges when we contrast this episode with earlier episodes in 
which Poe also provides clues to a mystery, but not enough information to solve it. The odd 
behavior of the ship that looked from a distance to be manned and coming to rescue the                                                         
22This lack of control over his text is not surprising given the trying conditions of production 
under which Poe was working. See J. V. Ridgely, “The Growth of the Text” for an account 
of the fragmented composition of Pym. 
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survivors on the hulk of the Grampus, for example, presents another mystery for both Pym 
and the reader to interpret. In that example, however, Poe does not give adequate information 
for Pym or the reader to deduce that the ship is a Dutch brig filled with corpses, which, like 
puppets, are tangled up in the rigging and are “animated” by the motions of the birds feeding 
on them. Unlike the earlier episodes, in which Pym and the reader are equally mystified, on 
Tsalal, Poe has provided sufficient evidence for the reader to interpret, essentially turning 
over the role of the detective to the reader in order to highlight Pym's failure. 
 Poe also provides clues that prepare the reader to suspect Pym's attempt at a 
controlling story. In contrast to the “eternal friendship and good will” (AGP 198) espoused 
by Captain Guy, Poe's earlier depiction of colonial exploitation suggests the Captain's true 
motives. The lengthy description of the Tristan d'Acunha islands, where the Jane Guy lands 
for a week before discovering Tsalal, indicates the results of white settlement: one captain 
gathers 5600 sealskins and “says that he would have no difficulty loading a large ship with 
oil in three weeks. Upon his arrival he found no quadrupeds...the island now abounds with all 
our most valuable domestic animals, which have been introduced by subsequent 
navigators....[Another captain] planted onions, potatoes, cabbages, and a great many other 
vegetables, an abundance of all which are now to be met with” (AGP 172). This account of 
ecological havoc, replacing native species with foreign ones for the convenience of Euro-
American sailors and overharvesting the natural resources, prefigures what will happen on 
Tsalal if the exploitative schemes of the Jane Guy's captain are brought to fruition. Having 
seen the aftermath of another Europeanized island, the reader is inclined to distrust Pym's 
insistence that the Tsalalians were “fully delighted in the exchange” with the Jane Guy (AGP 
201). 
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 One final clue has, I think, been misread in Pym criticism. Poe includes a description 
of the penguin and albatross rookery on Desolation Island is often read as an example of 
cooperation that contrasts with and “reflects negatively on Pym's ethnocentric attitudes” 
(Nelson 100). John T. Irwin has also emphasized the importance of this “quincuncial 
network” as an emblem for human intelligence (177). Harold Beaver calls the “schematic 
chess-board of the penguin and albatross rookery...an exact image of that rational-seeming, 
checkered civilization which this chartless voyage is intent on subverting” (21). Most critics 
argue that the final line of the rookery description—“nothing can be more astonishing than 
the spirit of reflection evinced by these feathered beings, and nothing surely can be better 
calculated to elicit reflection in every well-regulated human intellect” (AGP 169)—is 
intended as “an ironic comment on the lack of reflection that Pym consistently demonstrates 
when faced with traces of intelligent design in the desolate regions near the Poles” (Irwin 
185). What these readings miss in emphasizing the altruism in the rookery in ironic contrast 
to Pym's situation is the contingency of this cooperative spirit. When it benefits the birds to 
cooperate and build a nesting ground that they could not have accomplished on their own, 
they work together. Once the rookery is constructed, however, the birds must remain 
constantly on guard against “the thievish propensities prevalent in the rookery, the 
inhabitants making no scruple to purloin each other's eggs at every good opportunity” (AGP 
169). Pym's remark about the rookery eliciting reflection comes after this exposure of 
thievery, suggesting that the “well-regulated human intellect” would be wise to remain 
skeptical about seemingly altruistic behavior, which lasts only as long as it is mutually 
beneficial.  
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 The rookery description resonates with the account of the facilities the Jane's crew 
builds to cure a valuable commodity, biche de mer, which was abundant in the reefs 
surrounding Tsalal. Pym describes the preparations of the curing houses, which are built on 
“a large flat space near the eastern shore of the bay” (AGP 204), just as the rookery is 
constructed on “a level piece of ground...situated as near the sea as possible, being still 
beyond its reach” (AGP 167). The crew needs the Tsalalians' help to collect and cure the 
biche de mer, so the captain negotiates with Too-wit to give the Tsalalians “a stipulated 
quantity of blue beads, knives, red cloth, and so forth” (AGP 202) in exchange for a 
predetermined measure of biche de mer. The Tsalalians have already shown “contempt” for 
the beads, however, indicating that the seeming cooperation between the crew and the 
Tsalalians in this venture is an illusion, and the Tsalalians are agreeing to these exploitative 
terms merely to placate and distract the attention of the crew while the Tsalalians are at work 
getting their own scheme in readiness. Although Pym does not recognize that the 
contingency of cooperation works both ways, the Tsalalians do; they are aware of the 
“thievish propensities prevalent” in this unequal exchange covered over by a facade of 
cooperation.  
 The rookery serves to undermine Pym's controlling story, but not in the way most 
critics propose. Rather than serving as a example of cooperation in contrast to the Jane Guy's 
greed, the rookery scene prepares the reader to recognize that the positions a person or a 
group occupies are not fixed but are contingent on their relationship with other people. In 
Pym's story of the Tsalalian episode, he tries to portray himself as occupying the same 
position that he did in the countermutiny, and to impose a script onto the Tsalalians that 
forces them into the position of the mutineers. But the clues Poe has included in the narrative 
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indicate that Pym's position has changed. Like the cooperative spirit of the rookery, detection 
and criminality depend upon positionality; the terms acquire different valences depending on 
the perspective from which one views them. Pym fails to detect the Tsalalians' plot to 
massacre the Jane's crew because the fiction that he has constructed about the Tsalalians 
cannot account for cooperation that is not based solely on greed. This unselfish cooperation, 
which puts the good of the collective above the gains of the individual, threatens the 
individual genius figure, who cannot absorb this network into his own mind and appropriate 
it as his own. 
 The reading of Pym as a detective bildungsroman that I have just traced out begs the 
question: why does Poe go through all the trouble to depict Pym's learning process and 
success at detecting the mutineers' plot, only to thwart Pym and portray him as “a caricature 
of the American fool” (Kennedy, Abyss 149)? I argue that the inclusion of both successful 
and failed detection in Pym illustrates Poe's ambivalence toward the power of the collective. 
Poe's emphasis on the ability of the collective to accomplish what the individual cannot in the 
Tsalal episode characterizes the situation of slave rebellions in the southern United States, 
but it also characterizes Poe's own sense of his pathetic position in regard to the powerful 
northern magazine editors and publishers, into whose ranks Poe tried to break throughout his 
career. Teresa Goddu has called for “a reading of Pym as an allegory of the publishing 
conditions Poe operated within” (17). This reading, she asserts, depends upon linking Pym 
“to the economics of slavery that the text lays bare through its critique of 
maritime/mercantile culture and by exploring Poe’s appropriation of the slave narrative’s 
conventions. Slavery—both as economic system and cultural convention—is integrally 
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related, Poe’s text suggests, to the structure of the emerging literary marketplace and its 
fictional reproductions” (17).23  
Taking my cue from Goddu, I want to suggest that the Tsalal episode illustrates Poe's 
ambivalence toward the power of the collective as a mode of problem-solving. Poe was not 
sympathetic to the situation of African Americans and, as numerous critics have pointed out, 
his writings display racist attitudes—whether “average,” as Terence Whalen would have it, 
or above average, as others such as John Carlos Rowe would insist. Nevertheless, as Goddu 
hints, Poe's melodramatic sense of his own tribulations may have encouraged him to view his 
position as a capital-less, constantly struggling writer hiring out his labor just to make 
enough money to survive as a metaphorical form of “enslavement” to the owners and 
powerful editors of various literary magazines. Despite the obvious and enormous differences 
between his situation and that of an enslaved African American, Poe's metaphorical 
identification between their positions informs his depiction of the power of a slave rebellion 
and generates his ambivalence about the power of the collective.  
 Poe wrote Pym immediately before and after his tumultuous separation from the 
Southern Literary Messenger, where, during his two-year tenure as editor, he had increased 
the circulation of the magazine from 500 to 3500 copies and established its national 
reputation, only to be fired by the owner, T. W. White, on the grounds of Poe's personal 
conduct and White's desire to exercise authority over his magazine (Quinn 259, 262). 
Terence Whalen points out that, with the Tsalalians as with the rebels who participated in the 
1831 Southampton County revolt, “what was really terrifying was not the violence of the                                                         
23Similarly, in “Amorous Bondage,” Dayan has argued for “a rereading of Poe that depends 
absolutely on what has so often been cut out of his work: the institution of slavery” (111). 
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insurrection but the fact that slaves had organized themselves in secret” (180). This 
acknowledgment of the power of a secret coalition echoes an 1844 letter Poe wrote to James 
Russell Lowell, one of Poe's many unsuccessful attempts to establish an elite literary 
magazine. Decrying the “dreadful” condition of literature in the United States, Poe asked 
Lowell why they could not found a “Monthly Journal”:  
Such a journal might, perhaps, be set on foot by a coalition, and, thus set on 
foot, with proper understanding, would be irresistible. Suppose, for example, 
that the elite of our men of letters should combine secretly....The articles to 
be supplied by the members solely, and upon a concerted plan of action. A 
nominal editor to be elected from among the number. How could such a 
journal fail?...If we do not defend ourselves by some such coalition, we shall 
be devoured, without mercy, by the Godeys, the Snowdens, et id genus 
omne. (qtd. in Quinn 390). 
 
Poe's description of the “irresistible” power of a secret coalition, working together in a 
“concerted plan of action” to defeat a powerful enemy, aligns him with the Tsalalians. His 
cannibalistic metaphor for the elite literary magazines who “devou[r]” hapless authors 
figures the literary marketplace as the sort of exotic land one might encounter in a travel 
narrative. The resonance between the Tsalalian episode and this letter illustrates that Poe 
recognized the power of the collective to accomplish what an individual could not.  
 Yet Poe's other letters regarding his proposed magazine reveal a deep longing to be 
one of that “genus”; to make his name equivalent or superior to Godey and Snowden. In his 
1840 prospectus for the Penn Magazine, for example, Poe explains that he had to leave the 
Southern Literary Messenger editorship because  
I found difficulty in stamping upon its pages that individuality which 
I believe essential to the full success of all similar publications. In 
regard to their permanent influence, it appears to me that a 
continuous, definite character, and a marked certainty of purpose, are 
desiderata of vital importance, and only attainable where one mind 
alone has the general direction of the undertaking. (qtd. in Quinn 306) 
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Listing the benefits of “one mind”—stability, certainty, and continuity—Poe implicitly 
denigrates the product of multiple minds as erratic, unsure, and disjunctive. Indeed, even in 
Poe's “coalition” proposition, he does not neglect to suggest that they elect a “nominal 
editor,” thus mitigating the cooperative interchange among multiple minds to some degree. 
Poe understood all too well the power of a collective—especially a secret coalition—but he 
swayed back and forth between viewing it as a threat to the individual and wishing to reap its 
benefits. The letters and prospectuses detailing his continual attempts to found his own 
magazine document the pathos inherent in this ambivalence. Desiring the authority and fame 
that would come from having his name on the masthead of a premier journal, yet utterly 
unable to accomplish this feat without assistance, Poe turned to literature to work through 
this ambivalence. In an article on slavery and authority in Pym, Shaindy Rudoff suggests that 
“Poe uses the literary text to step outside of his own personal politics; to formulate a 
commentary on the nature of ideology...; to explore in fiction what he would not register in 
his personal politics” (72).24 I want to affirm Rudoff's reading of the literary text not as a 
mirror or register of an author's personal politics, but as a space for thought, analysis, and 
discovery, a place to work through problems that are insoluble in life.25 Poe, I argue, 
experiments in his fiction with alternative and partial resolutions to this ambivalence over the 
                                                        
24In “Melville's Ethnic Conscriptions,” Tim Marr also examines a similar proposition in 
relation to Melville's racial ideology. 
25I am also indebted to Eliza Richards's analysis of “the ways that literary creation occurs in 
transactions among writers, some of whom claim the exchange as a characteristic of their 
consciousnesses, and some of whose accomplishments are subsumed into the profiles of 
their more acquisitive, and therefore more memorable, peers” (22). These ways of viewing 
literature as transactional or counterfactual offer a more useful way to talk about literary 
creation than older paradigms focusing either on the masterpieces of the major author or 
the purely social construction of a text. 
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collective as threatening or beneficial. Furthermore, he is aware, even if his critics sometimes 
are not, that since these resolutions are imaginary, they can never be fully satisfying. 
 While Poe elaborates this tension between a fantasized resolution and the sense of its 
inadequacy in the Dupin tales, we can observe it in the ending of Pym as well. Although Pym 
dramatizes the defeat of an individual by a collective, it does not end with Pym's death. 
Rather, Poe writes an ending that prefigures the Dupin tales. Pym, with his companion Dirk 
Peters, and Nu-Nu, a Tsalalian Pym and Peters kidnapped in their escape, flees the site of his 
failure and drifts southward to encounter the memorable “shrouded human figure, very far 
larger in its proportions than any dweller among men. And the hue of the skin of the figure 
was of the perfect whiteness of the snow” (AGP 239). Critics have offered a multitude of 
readings of this infamous ending, arguing, for example, that the white figure is a sign of 
racial purity, a reflection of Pym himself, or a personification of the blank page. I want 
instead to emphasize that Pym ends with an appropriate emblem of the individual genius: a 
solitary human figure, elevated above the realm of average men.  
 Like Dupin restricting access to his interiority, this figure is shrouded, protected from 
view. When Dupin is engaged in analysis, the narrator notes, “His manner...was frigid and 
abstract; his eyes were vacant in expression” (“Murders” 338).26 By immobilizing his face 
and glazing his eyes, Dupin guards the typical points of access to one's interiority. The 
narrator's repetition of this description, in “Murders” and in the other Dupin tales, suggests 
that he is piqued by Dupin's ability to close off access to his mind, including that which 
might be granted via his countenance, particularly since Dupin has demonstrated his ability                                                         
26The narrator repeats this description almost word for word later in the story: “I have already 
spoken of his abstract manner at such times....His eyes, vacant in expression, regarded 
only the wall” (“Murders” 355).
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to enter the narrator's mind at will. Similarly, the white figure in Pym is impenetrable and 
unreadable; so much so that its appearance abruptly truncates the narrative, cutting off the 
story before the expected denouement. Daniel Hoffman observes, the “series...of 'of' phrases 
[in the final sentence], is the perfect syntactical epitome of the action, an endlessly regressive 
series of phrases disappearing into each other until there is nothing left to say or see but 
Nothing” (269). The “Nothingness” that Hoffman describes in these phrases correlates to 
Dupin's immobile abstraction; the “of” phrases present an impenetrable surface of whiteness 
just as the narrator of the Dupin tales cannot penetrate Dupin's glazed eyes and paralyzed 
countenance. Pym rushes toward the embrace of this genius figure, who is perhaps large 
enough to absorb the threatening cooperation among minds that proved too much for Pym. 
 As I will discuss in regard to the Dupin tales, this ending rewrites the reality of defeat 
with a fantasy of triumph. Nu-Nu, the evidence of Pym's failure, cannot survive in this 
fantasy and dies just as the figure appears. Following this suggestive ending, Poe appends a 
“Note,” purportedly written by the editor of the text. The tone and content of this note are 
Dupinian: a self-appointed expert identifies and belittles the false reasoning of previous 
commentators (including “Mr. Poe” himself) and provides an accurate analysis. Giving a 
pseudo-learned disquisition on ancient and modern languages, the author of the “Note” 
deciphers the “indentures” (AGP 241) Pym and Peters found in the Tsalalian caves.27 Pym's 
passage into the fantastic embrace of a white superhuman figure transforms the text into a 
linguistic puzzle that allows the note's author to display his erudition and analytic mastery in 
generating a solution. Yet this ending is incommensurate with the threat posed by the                                                         
27For a fascinating study of Poe's linguistic sleight of hand in Pym, and in the “Note” in 
particular, see Shaindy Rudoff, “Written in Stone: Slavery and Authority in The Narrative 
of Arthur Gordon Pym.” 
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Tsalalians within the text, and even more, with the heterogeneity of the world outside the 
text. If the ending is a gesture of triumph via analysis, it is ultimately an empty gesture. As in 
the Dupin tales, the individual never confronts the threatening collective directly; instead, he 
retreats to the fantasy of a linguistic realm. 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: The Development of a Singular Mastermind in the Dupin Tales 
 
When discussing the Dupin tales, critics typically emphasize the distance between Dupin 
and the narrator in terms of talent and intellect, with the brilliant Dupin solving cases while the 
dim-witted narrator looks on admiringly. Yet scholars who have focused on sexuality in the 
Dupin tales have offered a different picture of Dupin and the narrator. Noting the overt desire in 
the narrator’s initial description of Dupin in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” several critics 
have argued that Dupin and the narrator are lovers. Because Dupin is financially dependent on 
the narrator, Leo Lemay and Paul Woolf suggest that the narrator is a sexual tourist and Dupin is 
a “kept man” (Woolf 14), while Graham Robb emphasizes Dupin and the narrator’s stable 
domesticity, calling Dupin “that rarest of birds in 19th-century literature: a happy homosexual” 
(259). In contrast to the familiar depiction of the narrator as a dull sidekick, these readings 
emphasize the narrator’s prominence as a character and his partnership with Dupin.  
I argue that these contrasting portraits of the narrator and Dupin—one depicting their 
relationship as rigidly hierarchical and the other characterizing their relationship as relatively 
egalitarian—arises from a divergence between the stories on which these scholars choose to 
focus. Most critics take the final Dupin tale, “The Purloined Letter,” as their model and assume it 
reflects the structure and characterization of the first two stories as well. On the other hand, 
Lemay, Woolf, Robb, and other scholars interested in the tales’ representation of homosocial or 
same-sex desire look to the first tale, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” and specifically to the 
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passages near the beginning of the story concerning the juicy details of the two men’s life 
together. The claim that Dupin and the narrator are lovers would be far more tenuous, if not 
implausible, if one were to exclude “Murders” and consider only “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” 
and “The Purloined Letter.”   
These conflicting readings indicate that the Dupin tales are not homogenous; rather, Poe 
makes significant changes in his depictions of Dupin and the narrator’s relationship from “The 
Murders in the Rue Morgue,” published in 1841, to “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” published 
serially from 1842-1843, and finally to “The Purloined Letter,” published in 1844. We can see 
these changes even more clearly if we extend this continuum back to The Narrative of Arthur 
Gordon Pym. In the sections of Pym that were published independently in the Southern Literary 
Messenger and that begin the novel, Poe depicts an intensely intimate, unequal relationship 
between a uniquely talented figure and his adoring companion. This relationship should sound 
familiar to readers of classical detective fiction, as it also characterizes the unnamed narrator and 
Dupin, and it has been adopted by many subsequent detective storywriters. Poe sensed that this 
intimate, homosocial relationship could provide a fruitful structure for an exploration of 
intersubjectivity. The detective/ sidekick relationship that allows Poe to conceal Dupin's 
reasoning process in the Dupin tales has its roots in the relationship between Augustus and Pym. 
From Pym to “The Purloined Letter,” Poe circumscribes the sidekick’s role, denies any 
hint of collaboration between the two men, and emphasizes Dupin’s ascendency over the 
narrator. These changes affect not only the stories’ content, as Poe redefines his characters and 
weakens their intimate relationships, but also their structure. As Dupin and the narrator’s 
relationship shifts away from the state of “communion” figured in Pym and “Murders,” Dupin 
correspondingly becomes more opaque to the narrator and, hence, to the reader. This transition 
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from a more communal form to a more individualistic form, and from transparency to opacity, 
contributes to the illusion of Dupin’s total control: because Dupin’s mind and actions are 
concealed from the narrator in “The Purloined Letter,” there is no one to contradict Dupin’s 
account. On the other hand, neither is there anyone to verify it. Whereas in the first tale, the 
narrator could to some degree evaluate and corroborate Dupin’s solution because he was privy to 
the same evidence, in the final tale, Dupin’s performance relies purely on the force of his rhetoric 
alone: the narrator must take Dupin’s word for it. In “The Purloined Letter,” Poe models a 
strategy of manufacturing consent. In this system, which exemplifies dominant detection, truth 
and accuracy—a logical relationship between the facts and the solution—are beside the point; 
what matters is the power to produce or coerce confidence in one’s account of reality.  
Poe moves from exploring in Pym alternate possibilities for representing detection, such 
as the power of cooperation in detecting and defeating a common enemy—what I have called 
subordinate detection—to lionizing in “The Purloined Letter” an individual whose power rests 
upon his ability to hermetically seal his mind off from intrusion by others—what I have called 
dominant detection. Dupin’s genius enacts what Gustavus Stadler calls “a fantasy of 
transcendence” (xvi), elevating him to a godlike position of omniscience, free from the 
limitations of sociohistorical circumstances. As Michael Warner has shown, the imaginative 
freedom to transcend political, economic, and historical factors in the US depends on white 
privilege: the “principle of negativity” that underwrites participation in the public sphere is 
“available only to those participants whose social role allows such self-negation (that is, to 
persons defined by whiteness, maleness, and capital)” (42). This is a crucial, but often 
unrecognized precondition to the typical account of Dupin's power. Dupin and the narrator’s 
remarks about Dupin’s extraordinary ability consistently internalize detection, displacing the 
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action—and thus the interest—of the story from any specific sociohistorical context onto 
individual psychology. The tales thereby efface the process by which white privilege enables the 
construction of a particular form of genius: a psychological genius that reinforces its credibility 
and power via its ability to convince others that it is correct and in control. 
In the Dupin tales, Poe structures the narrative so as to make detection the static property 
of one white man who claims privileged access to the interiority of others. Poe internalizes 
figures of external surveillance, such as peeping through windows, in describing Dupin’s ability. 
Most readers accept Dupin's boast that “most men, in respect to himself, wore windows in their 
bosoms” (“Murders” 338) as a pithy statement of his unique gift for mind-reading, which allows 
him to solve crimes by penetrating the exterior coverings of others and accessing their interiority. 
What goes unsaid in this formulation, however, is the opacity of the detective's mind. The 
“windows” that Dupin scorns are also the portals that allow for intersubjectivity and collective 
action based on mutual exchange—the hallmarks of subordinate detection. Just as important as 
Dupin’s ability to peer into the windows in other men's bosoms is his ability to shutter his own—
otherwise everyone would be a detective. The foundation of Poe's tales of detection, then, is a 
special kind of mind, one that remains individuated and impermeable while simultaneously 
penetrating the minds of others. In figuring this particular type of genius, Poe transforms the 
nineteenth-century interest in intersubjectivity, as it was variously theorized in the doctrines of 
metempsychosis, mesmerism, and animal magnetism, from a fluid interchange into a 
unidirectional mind-reading that consolidates a power differential between the reader and the 
read. Not only does Dupin penetrate other minds, but by severing the links of exchange between 
other minds, he reduces every other mind to an individuated, isolated mind like his own, except 
inferior.  
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The chronological progression from Pym to the Dupin tales appears to delineate a 
development in Poe's ability to depict a dominant detective, with Poe more explicitly examining 
the failure of dominant detection in Pym and showcasing a successful dominant detective in the 
third Dupin tale. The irony of “The Purloined Letter” undermines this teleology, however. In the 
final Dupin tale, although Dupin detects the Minister D's disguised letter, Poe indicates that the 
Minister is Dupin's doppelganger. This complete identification between the detective and the 
criminal contradicts Dupin and the narrator's insistence that Dupin's success comes from an 
extraordinary ability to adapt his thinking to that of his opponent, neither over- nor 
underestimating the opponent. When contrasted with the failure of Pym and the problematic 
assays in the first two Dupin tales—in which Pym or Dupin were trying to detect and master 
“others” who differed in race, class, gender, and even species from the detective—Dupin's 
success in “Purloined Letter” indicates that by closing himself off from the advantages of 
cooperation and intersubjectivity, Dupin as the isolated individual genius can detect only 
himself. Throughout both Pym and the Dupin tales, Poe suggests an inverse relationship between 
the personal profit and acclaim one gains from operating individually and suppressing the 
cooperation of others, and one's scope and imaginative power, so that, finally, having nothing to 
draw on but one's own mind, one becomes solipsistically limited to writing about detecting 
oneself.  
Yet “The Purloined Letter” is one of Poe's most well-known and critically lauded stories. 
It is much more frequently anthologized than either “Murders” or Pym, and it is accepted as a 
text worthy of the attention of high theorists such as Derrida.1 According to John Carlos Rowe,                                                         
1The Norton, Heath, and Prentice Hall all anthologize “The Purloined Letter,” leaving 
“Murders” and Pym out of their selections. The differential critical treatment of the stories is 
exemplified in The Purloined Poe, an entire volume of criticism on “The Purloined Letter,” 
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“it is as if Poe works [in “The Purloined Letter”]…to make the intrusions of material history as 
insignificant as possible, serving the barest of technical functions to permit us to imagine what is 
otherwise unimaginable, unpresentable” (123). This quality of being “Out of SPACE, Out of 
TIME,” renders “The Purloined Letter” particularly well suited to psychoanalytic and 
deconstructionist criticism that reads it as a myth or an allegory of signification. By the time Poe 
writes this third Dupin tale, which he called “perhaps the best of my tales of ratiocination” (qtd. 
in Mabbott, 3), he has learned to suppress even the veiled allusions to the slave system that erupt 
in the middle of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” so that Dupin’s interpretation seems 
universal and archetypal rather than historically contingent. Reading the Dupin tales in 
conjunction with Pym allows us to see this as a continuing process of experimentation in which 
Poe is engaging, rather than a set form that he “invented” and delivered whole in “Murders.” Poe 
uses two interrelated strategies to create a space for a dominant detective figure to thrive in the 
tales. First, he modifies the narrator’s function to increasingly screen Dupin's mind from the 
reader. Second, he excludes sociohistorical context, either pushing it to the margins or 
acknowledging it only to deconstruct it within the text.  
 
I. The Sidekick 
                                                        
which reproduces a critical conversation beginning with Lacan's seminar. The “Preface” 
indicates that the editors imagine the volume as a case study, or even tutorial, in the practice 
of literary criticism, as the book gives scholars “a structured exercise in the elaboration of 
textual interpretation” as well as “a special experience of language....'an experience we 
undergo with language'” (Muller and Richardson viii). The global reach of this critical 
conversation, according to the editors of The Purloined Poe, removes this story from its local 
context in antebellum United States literary studies and makes it meaningful to the discipline 
at large.  
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 In labeling “Murders” as the origin of the detective story, critics assume that Poe did not 
require the trial and error stage of working through generic problems. A crucial problem in 
writing a detective story is keeping the attention on a person who is essentially a vicarious 
protagonist, someone who reads or hears about dramatic action that occurs elsewhere. While the 
continued popularity of the Dupin tales suggests that Poe figured out a satisfying solution to this 
formal problem, it is inaccurate to claim that his model of the detective emerged fully formed in 
“Murders in the Rue Morgue.” Instead, as I have shown, Poe worked through concerns with 
detection and the detective figure four years earlier in Pym. He continued to engage with these 
problems in each of the Dupin tales.  
 As I have noted, Thoms identifies the detective “as an authorial figure” (1) and “a 
storyteller” (3). In his seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” however, Jacques Lacan points out 
that Poe's detective stories are not told but retold, “retransmitted” in Lacan's terms (35): the 
events are told to Dupin and the narrator by the Prefect of Police and then told to the reader by 
the narrator. Lacan's reading of “The Purloined Letter” has fertilized numerous studies that 
investigate the psychoanalytic implications of the allegorical relationship between detecting and 
writing,2 but I want to remain focused on the formal technique that garners Poe acclaim for 
“inventing” a mass cultural phenomenon. While we should treat with skepticism attributions of                                                         
2Jacques Derrida, of course, claims that Lacan does not grasp the complexity of the relationship 
between narration and content, arguing that what Lacan's “Seminar treats is only the content 
of this story, what is justifiably called its history, what is recounted in the account, the internal 
and narrated face of the narration. Not the narration itself” (179). John T. Irwin spends some 
time analyzing the dynamics of one-up-manship at work in the debate between Lacan and 
Derrida, who are both superseded by Barbara Johnson, who “doubles Derrida's own insights 
back upon themselves to make them problematic” (Mystery 6). Irwin concludes that Poe's 
original story and all three of these critics are participating in a three/four oscillation that 
characterizes detective fiction itself: “the very method by which one outwits one's opponent is 
the same method that will be used against oneself by the next player in the game, the next 
interpreter in the series, in order to leave the preceding interpreter one down” (Mystery 7).  
 113 
mass cultural forms to a single person, what I find most interesting about the origin story of 
detective fiction is that Poe's claim to the title of inventor rests on a narrative innovation.  
 Numerous scholars note that what sets Poe's detective stories apart from the mass of 
murder mysteries, police memoirs, and crime fiction in general that preceded his Dupin tales is 
his introduction of a “less discerning narrator-companion” (Kennedy, Poe 117) who marvels as 
the detective solves the case. According to these scholars, that is, Poe did not invent the 
detective; he invented the detective's sidekick. This innovation corroborates Thoms's claim 
regarding the genre's overt metafictional concern with storytelling, as the sidekick is the first-
person narrator who reports the detective's success to the public. Rather than the sole authorial 
detective that Thoms describes, however, we have at least two storytellers in Poe's detective 
tales: the detective himself and the narrator-companion. The narrative solution that decouples the 
detective's “controlling story,” his solution to the crime, from the story of the detective’s solving 
the crime serves a basic emplotment function. Without the intermediary narrator, it would be 
extremely difficult to preserve suspense until the detective reveals the startling solution, as 
Cawelti explains: “by narrating the story from a point of view that sees the detective’s actions 
but does not participate in his perceptions or process of reasoning, the writer can more easily 
misdirect the reader’s attention and thereby keep him from prematurely solving the crime” (83).3  
 From our retrospective position, tracing a trajectory from the unnamed narrator in the 
Dupin tales to the more developed but equally befuddled Dr. Watson in Doyle's Holmes stories, 
this narrative convention might seem patently obvious, but the essential problem that Poe's 
narrator-companion solves is worth spelling out. As Cawelti notes, the intermediary narrator aids                                                         
3Cf. Patrick Quinn's observation that “whenever a master analyst dominates the narrative, Poe 
employs a narrator who stands off and observes; but when the story relates the ‘twisted fears 
and agonies’ of an obsessive personality, ‘no intermediary is brought into play’” (226-27). 
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the author in “misdirect[ing] the reader's attention,” yet the narrator's mental inferiority to the 
detective ensures that “the admiration and astonishment [that the narrator feels is] transmitted 
directly and suggestively to the readers of the narrative” (Matthews 89). This narrative structure, 
that is, shifts the reader's attention away from the detective's mental processes, his “process of 
reasoning,” without removing it from the detective entirely. Rather, the reader's attention is 
transferred to the detective's success, which generates the narrator's “admiration and 
astonishment,” and to the way in which the detective is viewed as a genius by another person. 
This movement obscures the detective's mind while keeping him the center of attention.  
 Restated in these terms, the narrative convention that handily addresses the problem of 
suspense points up a strange anomaly in detective fiction. Curiously, in a genre strongly 
associated with the mind and thought—“ratiocination,” in Poe's preferred term—the detective's 
mind remains obscured. With this intermediary narrator, Poe, and the authors who followed him 
in adopting this convention, creates a power imbalance between the detective, whose mind is 
immune from penetration and who reveals only as much of his thought processes as he sees fit, 
and the other characters in the story, all of whose minds are subject to penetration by the 
detective. One of the determining characteristics of the detective is this ability to read minds; the 
detective's superior powers of observation and analysis give him privileged access to the private 
thoughts of others. Thoms notes that “Dupin’s presumption of inhabiting the minds of other 
characters” appears in all three stories (45). In “Murders,” for example, he inhabits the mind of 
the sailor who owned the killer orangutan, offering the narrator a lengthy account of the sailor's 
thought process, beginning, “He will reason thus: 'I am innocent, I am poor; my Ourang-Outang 
is of great value...why should I lose it through idle apprehensions of danger” (“Murders” 369). 
Dupin arrogates the sailor's “I,” reporting his thoughts in the first-person voice and thus claiming 
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to be able to read the sailor's mind. As if to underscore the radical nature of Dupin's absorption of 
the sailor's thoughts, the narrator also reports information gained from the sailor but, unlike 
Dupin, uses the third-person pronoun “he” throughout and calls attention to his paraphrase of the 
sailor's account with the prefatory remark, “What he stated was, in substance, this” (372).4 
Grammatically, Dupin transforms another person's experience into his own and deploys this 
subsumed experience in his narrative, denying the sailor his own voice (a move that the 
narrator's paraphrased summary reinforces, through its more conventional grammar).  
 The detective's “sidekick,” then, serves several functions: not only does he preserve 
suspense, but he enables the detective's mind to remain opaque and thus allows the detective to 
engage in unilateral mind reading, a practice that provides the detective with the raw materials 
that he will transform into his narrated solution to the crime. Critics who celebrate Poe's creation 
of a narrator-companion have emphasized the suspense function without acknowledging the 
equally important mind-hiding function. Furthermore, they have tended to take the narrator of 
“The Purloined Letter” as their model. For a more accurate sense of the relationship between 
homosocial pairs and mental opacity in Poe’s writing, we must return to The Narrative of Arthur 
Gordon Pym, one of Poe’s earliest experiments with representing detection. The prototypical 
detective/sidekick relationship between C. Auguste Dupin and his companion in “Murders” 
reproduces several characteristics of the relationship between Augustus and Pym (the 
resemblance between the two experts' names is yet another nod to their shared status).5 There is                                                         
4Dupin also introduces his report of the sailor's thoughts by stating: “He will reason thus:” (369). 
While Dupin thus differentiates between his own reasoning and that of the sailor's, his future 
tense (“will reason”), indicating that Dupin knows what the sailor will think before he even 
thinks it, and his use of direct quotation is quite different from the narrator's past tense 
summary of what the sailor said.  
5Harold Beaver posits that for Poe, “'Augustus,' the very name, evokes a classic sense of order, 
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one major difference between the two pairs, however: Augustus’s mind remains permeable to 
Pym. Poe begins to close off the detective figure’s mind in “Murders,” and he enhances this non-
reciprocity in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” making it complete in “Purloined Letter.” In this 
section, I will first compare the homosocial pairs in Pym and “Murders”; I will then trace the 
changes Poe makes in the narrator and Dupin’s relationship over the course of the three Dupin 
tales.    
Both Pym and Dupin's companion emphasize the intimate isolation of their relationship 
to Augustus and Dupin, respectively. In the first paragraph of the Narrative, after a brief mention 
of his father and maternal grandfather, Pym lingers on his friend, Augustus Barnard, two years 
Pym's senior and clearly the recipient of Pym's hero-worship: “I became intimate with the son of 
Mr. Barnard....I used frequently to go home with him, and remain all day, and sometimes all 
night. We occupied the same bed, and he would be sure to keep me awake until almost light, 
telling me stories of the natives of the Island of Tinian, and other places he had visited in his 
travels” (47). Similarly, Dupin’s companion discloses his infatuation with Dupin early in 
“Murders,” describing their nocturnal habits: “We existed within ourselves alone,” counterfeiting 
the darkness of night by closing “all the massy shutters of our old building during the day” 
(“Murders” 337-8). While Dupin's companion makes more explicit the romantic note latent in 
Pym's description, both narrators establish their enthusiastic admiration for their more 
knowledgeable companions. Furthermore, both Pym and Dupin’s companion emphasize their 
willingness to follow their leaders, regardless of their strange behavior. Pym agrees to go sailing 
at midnight with Augustus, feeling “a thrill of the greatest excitement and pleasure, and 
[thinking] his mad idea one of the most delightful and most reasonable things in the world....I                                                         
an imperial control” (26), an observation that would also apply to C. Auguste Dupin. 
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sprang out of bed...in a kind of ecstasy” (AGP 48). Dupin's companion happily “giv[es him]self 
up to [Dupin's] wild whims with a perfect abandon” even when he knows that a decision is “a 
freak of fancy in my friend” (“Murders” 338, 337). The orgasmic language of “ecstasy” and 
“perfect abandon” inflects these passages with a tone of erotic submission, suggesting that the 
intimacy in which the narrators delight is predicated on willing submission to a dominant leader.  
 Poe underscores the inequality in these relationships by exposing the financial 
arrangements of the two pairs. In both stories, Poe takes care to note that the narrator of 
“Murders” and Pym provide financially for their companions, tarnishing the motivations of 
Augustus and Dupin by suggesting that they tolerate their companions' presence because they 
receive an economic benefit. Pym reveals that he is bankrolling their adventures in a seemingly 
irrelevant detail about the sailboat he owns, which was “worth about seventy-five dollars” (AGP 
47). This needlessly specific reference is clarified later when Pym confesses that “At this period I 
knew little about the management of a boat” (AGP 49), indicating that he spent seventy-five 
dollars to ensure Augustus's company. Likewise, Dupin's companion, whose “worldly 
circumstances were somewhat less embarrassed than [Dupin's],...was permitted to be at the 
expense of renting, and furnishing...a time-eaten and grotesque mansion” (“Murders” 337). The 
narrator's mildly ironic tone reveals his anxiety about the basis of his friendship with Dupin: is 
he allowed to intrude upon Dupin's autonomy simply because Dupin “permit[s]” him to pay his 
bills? 
 Despite these similarities between the two pairs, the narrator and Dupin differ from Pym 
and Augustus in one crucial way: Pym, the sidekick, can penetrate Augustus's mind. Conversely, 
in the detective tales, the narrator cannot enter into Dupin’s mind. Rather than the intersubjective 
relationship between Augustus and Pym, the narrator of the Dupin tales continually foregrounds 
 118 
his lack of access to Dupin's mind. This divergence between the otherwise remarkably similar 
pairs of men reveals the importance of protecting one's own mind from penetration: Poe is 
realizing that this is what sets the dominant detective apart. Although Pym clearly indicates the 
inequality in his relationship with Augustus, revealing himself as the adoring sidekick to 
Augustus's expert leadership, Pym nevertheless speculates that as a result of spending so much 
time together “Augustus thoroughly entered into my state of mind. It is probable, indeed, that our 
intimate communion had resulted in a partial interchange of character” so that he and Augustus 
share a “melancholy” temperament and a “gloomy although glowing imagination” (AGP 57). At 
first, this statement casts Augustus, like Dupin, in the role of mind reader, able to “ente[r] into” 
another person's mind. The following sentence expands this ability to include Pym, however: the 
two men participate in an “interchange,” suggesting that both of their minds are permeable. 
Although Poe characterizes Dupin and his companion as sharing the same melancholy 
temperament as Pym and Augustus—“the rather fantastic gloom of our common temper” 
(“Murders” 337)—the Dupin tales never suggest that the narrator's presence has altered Dupin in 
any way. Rather, Dupin's powerful presence overwhelms and seduces the narrator, “enkindl[ing] 
his soul” and convincing him that “the society of such a man would be to me a treasure beyond 
price” (“Murders” 337). The narrator rejects all his “former associates” and adapts himself to 
Dupin's lifestyle, while the only change that their relationship effects on Dupin is an elevation in 
his material comforts thanks to the narrator's wealth. Dupin's lack of transformation and his 
ability to restrict access to his interiority highlights the unilateralism in his penetration of minds. 
 The similarity between two scenes in which Augustus and Dupin approximate death or 
unconsciousness in order to restrict access to their minds indicates the importance of keeping 
one's mind opaque in order to be a successful detective. A scene of drunkenness in Pym 
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ironically illuminates the oft-repeated description of Dupin's face as he engages in analysis: 
Dupin’s “manner at these moments was frigid and abstract; his eyes were vacant in expression; 
while his voice, usually a rich tenor, rose into a treble which would have sounded petulant but 
for the deliberateness and entire distinctness of this enunciation” (“Murders” 338). Similarly, 
when Augustus persuades Pym to go sailing with him, he uncharacteristically prevents Pym from 
entering into his mind, as he demonstrates when he “talk[s] very coolly” and convinces Pym that 
“he knew [Pym] supposed him intoxicated, but that he was never more sober in his life” (AGP 
48). Augustus's appearance when he impersonates sobriety resembles Dupin's when he is deeply 
engaged in reasoning: Augustus's face is “paler than any marble,” with eyes “perfectly glazed” 
(AGP 49, 50). Comparing Augustus's face to pale marble suggests the cool white slab of a 
gravestone, which resonates with the “frigidity” of Dupin's mental abstraction. Ironically, 
Augustus is only counterfeiting rationality; he was in such “a highly concentrated state of 
intoxication—a state which, like madness, frequently enables the victim to imitate the outward 
demeanor of one in perfect possession of his senses” (AGP 50). Yet Augustus's success at 
keeping his mind opaque allows him to “convince” Pym of his story: that is, Augustus's version 
of reality becomes the controlling story that shapes subsequent events. Although Augustus 
prevents Pym from detecting him in this instance, he spends the bulk of their relationship in 
mental “communion” with Pym, leaving his mind transparent to Pym.  
In comparing Augustus’s and Dupin’s mental opacity, we can see Poe working through 
the power dynamics at play in intersubjective relationships. In a relationship based on mental 
communion, or intersubjectivity, each participant has access to the total store of raw materials 
that can be reworked into a narrative; each person can draw on the experiences and thoughts of 
the other in crafting a story. There is thus no basis on which to establish the ascendancy of one 
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story over another. The detective tale is the story of one person’s gaining access to the 
experiences and thoughts of any number of other people and reworking them into his master 
narrative, which he presents as the truth. In order to establish authority, then, the detective must 
have access to other minds, but he must also prevent others (including the reader) from accessing 
his own mind and subsuming his mental property into their narratives—otherwise there would be 
a mass of equally valid narratives. The opacity of the detective's mind, figured thematically by 
the descriptions of abstraction and narratologically by the intermediary narrator who screens the 
detective's mind from the reader, ensures that the detective's narrative is the most complete 
narrative because he always has access to one more mind (his own) than any other character or 
reader.   
 This distance between the detective and the other characters in the story, particularly the 
narrator, increases from “Murders” to “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” to “Purloined.” The 
narrator's emphasis on his intimate isolation with Dupin decreases in the latter two stories, and 
the narrator's involvement with the solution of the crime changes drastically, so that in 
“Purloined” he has no part whatsoever in the act of solving the mystery. I will focus on three 
major changes that Poe makes to the narrator and Dupin’s relationship over the course of the 
three stories: changes to the narrator’s physical presence during the investigation, to the 
narrator’s voice, and to the narrator’s comprehension of Dupin’s ratiocinative process. Over the 
course of writing the three Dupin tales, Poe reconceived the narrator’s role, reducing him from a 
desiring companion, who could witness and affirm Dupin’s methods, to a rhetorical function, 
who merely allows Dupin to polish his storytelling skills.  
The narrator is present during the investigation in both “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
and “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” but not in “The Purloined Letter.” The first two tales unfold 
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in a similar sequence: a crime is committed and brought to Dupin and the narrator’s attention, the 
two men investigate the crime together, Dupin explains his solution at length, and the narrator 
affirms it. In “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” two women have been brutally killed and the 
Parisian police have no leads. The narrator and Dupin learn of the crime from a newspaper 
report, which they read and discuss together—indeed, Dupin solicits the narrator’s opinion about 
the murders. The narrator then accompanies Dupin to the scene of the crime to corroborate the 
theory Dupin has developed from reading the newspaper reports. Although the narrator cannot 
fathom Dupin’s actions while they are visiting the Rue Morgue, he nevertheless has access to the 
same information and evidence that Dupin examines. That the narrator shares this experience 
with Dupin proves important for the structure of the story, as the narrator is thus enabled to 
follow along with Dupin when Dupin explains how he realized that the orangutan was the killer.  
 The investigation in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” another case involving a murdered 
young woman, is primarily textual. Dupin and the narrator read dozens of affidavits and 
newspaper reports about the crime and Dupin develops a hypothesis based these sources. The 
narrator is present during the entire investigative stage and has access to all of the textual 
evidence that Dupin uses to solve the crime. His physical presence during the investigation 
enables him to engage in a conversation with Dupin about the evidence and participate in the 
ratiocinative process, albeit always a step behind behind Dupin. However, the narrator's role in 
“The Mystery of Marie Rôget” is circumscribed and the homosocial intimacy of his relationship 
with Dupin is diminished. The narrator's menial role in this story is immediately established 
when the Prefect of Police visits and the narrator keeps him company “as the night wore 
drowsily away” (383); Dupin mimics attention behind a pair of green glasses while sleeping 
through the majority of the conversation. Repeatedly, the narrator performs unpleasant or 
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unimportant tasks like entertaining the Prefect for Dupin. He also collects and summarizes all the 
newspaper reports on the Marie Roget case “at the suggestion of Dupin” (393) and checks the 
validity of the affidavits (413) while Dupin is working on more mentally demanding activities—
making him more like Dupin's secretary than his companion.  
“The Purloined Letter” follows a different sequence than the first two stories: it consists 
of two dialogues, one in which the Prefect explains the crime to Dupin and the narrator, and a 
second in which Dupin debriefs the narrator after Dupin solves the crime; the investigation is the 
missing middle to which the only witnesses are Dupin and the criminal, Minister D, who is 
denied a voice in the story. The narrator no longer performs any menial tasks in support of the 
investigation; Dupin hires others to create a disturbance in the street below Minister D’s 
apartment. Since the narrator was not present when Dupin solved the crime, the reader gets 
Dupin’s retrospective summary of his investigation, rather than the narrator’s first-hand 
experience of it. Poe makes an important structural change from “Murders” to “Purloined Letter” 
by hiding Dupin’s investigative process from the narrator, and thus from the reader. This 
narrative strategy increases the drama of the moment of revelation, at the cost of the narrator’s 
involvement. The narrator is astonished, like the Prefect, when Dupin theatrically reveals the 
letter, but, unlike the Prefect, who storms out of the apartment without speaking, the narrator 
provides an appropriately admiring audience for Dupin’s narrative.  
Poe’s second major change in the three stories is to favor dialogue over narration, a 
change that diminishes the narrator’s control over the story. Corresponding with the narrator’s 
greater involvement in solving the crime, the narrator’s voice controls much more of the first two 
Dupin tales than of “The Purloined Letter.” “Murders” begins with the narrator’s lengthy 
discourse on analysis, followed by his history of his relationship with Dupin. It concludes with 
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the narrator’s paraphrase of the sailor’s confession. Similarly, “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” 
begins with the narrator’s summary of Marie Rôget’s history and ends with his comments on 
probability. “The Purloined Letter,” on the other hand, is almost entirely dialogue; Poe no longer 
includes the narrator’s commentaries and summaries.  
In all three stories, the solution is presented as a dialogue between Dupin and the 
narrator, but the narrator’s participation in that dialogue varies. In “Murders” and, particularly, 
“The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” Dupin expounds his solution to a mostly mute narrator. In 
“Murders” Dupin speaks for nearly seven pages without interruption; in “The Mystery of Marie 
Rôget” one of Dupin’s speeches runs to fifteen pages and another to twenty-one pages. Indeed, 
Dupin's monologues in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” including one in which he theorizes 
about the “tenacity of some putrescent portions of the cellular tissue” of a corpse (402), sound 
remarkably like Pym's bombastic digressions, illustrating the difficulty of depicting an expert 
without allowing him to slip into tedious verbosity. Aside from a couple of brief allusions to 
their isolation from the outside world, the narrator quickly focuses on the apparent murder 
without any of the prefatory material that began “Murders.” The few questions that the narrator 
does interject to break up Dupin's long speeches are perfunctory, serving merely to advance 
Dupin's exposition rather than to engage with him on an idea: for example, “'And what,' I here 
demanded, 'do you think of the opinions of Le Commerciel?'” (409). The narrator is reduced, in 
“The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” to a mere sounding board for Dupin; he relays Dupin's critique 
of the previous newspaper accounts and his solution to the reader. Indeed, in this second story, in 
the place that the paean to their isolated friendship occupied at the beginning of “Murders” 
stands instead a proclamation of Dupin's fame: “It may be readily supposed that the part played 
by my friend, in the drama at the Rue Morgue, had not failed of its impression upon the fancies 
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of the Parisian police. With its emissaries, the name of Dupin had grown into a household word” 
(378). This celebrity is singular—the narrator's name is not a household word; it is never given in 
the stories. The shift between “Murders” and “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” continues that 
between Pym and the first Dupin tale in further separating the detective figure from his sidekick, 
conferring more power and superiority onto the detective figure, and effacing more of the traces 
of collaboration.  
In “The Purloined Letter,” however, Dupin’s longest speech is only four pages. Even 
though the narrator’s control over the story has diminished with the exclusion of his 
commentaries and summaries, his voice is much more integrated into Dupin’s explanation of the 
solution, as he asks numerous questions and asserts propositions that Dupin then corrects. The 
narrator’s naïve but eager interlocution mitigates the problem in the earlier stories of Dupin’s 
solution becoming a tedious monologue, making Dupin’s performance rhetorically more 
engaging.  
The third major change that Poe makes is the narrator’s declining comprehension of 
Dupin’s reasoning process. In “Murders,” as Dupin tells the narrator how he solved the crime, 
the narrator has a brief moment of clarity: “a vague and half-formed conception of the meaning 
of Dupin flitted over my mind. I seemed to be upon the verge of comprehension, without power 
to comprehend” (363). While this tantalizing moment underscores the narrator's mental 
inferiority to Dupin, as the narrator lacks Dupin's mental “power,” it is also unique in the Dupin 
tales as a moment in which the narrator nearly reaches Dupin's level—or, at least, nearly solves 
the crime before having the entire thing explained to him. The narrator's description of this 
feeling of near-comprehension likens the narrator to a medium, as his language emphasizes his 
passivity, his lack of “power,” and the externality of the “conception,” which “flits over [his] 
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mind” without taking hold. This passage is a miniature of the narrator's relationship to Dupin 
throughout the story, as the narrator conveys Dupin's narrated solution and publicizes Dupin's 
triumphs. The tension in the suggestion of mediumship as a model for the narrator's relationship 
with Dupin consolidates the formal problems that Poe was working through in “Murders,” as a 
medium was both a transmitter and a collaborator. Although telling the story from the point of 
view of the narrator-companion solved several problems, it created others, such as the degree to 
which the narrator should participate in the act of solving the crime. A greater degree of 
participation would suggest that the narrator should share in the detective's success, and thus the 
detective would not receive sole credit.  
To further underscore the distance between the narrator and Dupin, and make sure that 
none of Dupin's credit is deflected onto the narrator, Poe depicts the narrator as increasingly 
incapable of comprehending the case at hand. No longer is the narrator close to even a “vague 
and half-formed conception” of Dupin's reasoning; in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” he dutifully 
reads all the clues that Dupin has extracted from the newspapers and admits, “I could perceive no 
mode in which any one of them could be brought to bear upon the matter in hand. I waited for 
some explanation from Dupin” (416). The narrator's passivity is complete as he waits patiently to 
be astonished by Dupin's ability to bring these seemingly irrelevant articles to bear on the case. 
Poe has shifted the narrator from a medium in the spiritualist sense to a simple medium for 
Dupin's ideas: no longer a collaborator, the narrator is now just a secretary who transcribes and 
reproduces Dupin's words for the public.  
This sense of the narrator's merely parroting Dupin is underscored in the final paragraphs 
of the story, when the narrator briefly and erroneously describes the “Calculus of Probabilities” 
that “proves” that one is much less likely to roll another six after  
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sixes having been thrown twice in succession....The chance for 
throwing sixes seems to be precisely as it was at any ordinary 
time....And this is a reflection which appears so exceedingly obvious 
that attempts to controvert it are received more frequently with a 
derisive smile than with anything like respectful attention. The error 
here involved—a gross error redolent of mischief—I cannot pretend 
to expose within the limits assigned me at present. (438) 
 
As Irwin has noted, Poe knew very well that “the chance for throwing sixes” in these 
circumstances is “precisely as it was at any ordinary time” and thus the narrator is exactly wrong. 
Irwin speculates that the narrator's comments are intended to emphasize the distinction between 
the two orders of intellect, that of the resolvent, or merely mathematical, versus that of the 
creative, or philosophical (Mystery 328-9), but I want to suggest instead that Poe is highlighting 
the narrator's imprecise grasp of Dupin's fields of mastery. Whereas in “Murders” the narrator's 
introductory remarks on analytical abilities are in keeping with the rest of the story, thus 
establishing the narrator as a qualified authority on the subject—even if he's not quite as 
authoritative as Dupin—in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” Poe deliberately includes a scene of 
the narrator’s parroting Dupin's discourse—analysis, probabilities, and reasoning—but making a 
glaring, elementary error. This mistake consolidates the other changes to the narrator's role and 
command of the narrative to establish Dupin's superiority more firmly and deny any 
collaboration between them. “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” was not as well-received as “The 
Murders in the Rue Morgue,” and Poe's enthusiastic predictions of renown for his novel 
approach to solving in fiction a real-life crime turned out to be misguided, as his solution was 
invalidated before the final installment of his three-part serial was published. Although he 
reworked the third section to reflect the new information, Dupin's solution had been pointing to a 
different explanation, and the dissonance between the third installment and the remainder of the 
story undermined Dupin's position as unchallenged authority.  
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In addressing this problem in “The Purloined Letter,” Poe reasserted the narrator as a full-
fledged character, suggesting that he recognized that Dupin's lengthy monologues were tedious 
and unappealing to readers. The narrator's lack of involvement in solving the crime in “The 
Purloined Letter” is even more drastic, and yet it is mitigated by a return of his voice to the 
narrative. Instead of merely prompting Dupin's speeches, the narrator plays the role in which 
modern detective fiction readers know him best—the slightly obtuse, admiring sidekick, always 
ready to set up Dupin's snide one liners at the Prefect's expense. The conversation between the 
Prefect, the narrator, and Dupin that begins “The Purloined Letter” is a game of witty bantering, 
on Dupin's part, with the narrator barely following along and the Prefect utterly unaware that he 
is being mocked. For example, after the Prefect brags that the Queen has “committed the matter 
to me,” Dupin dryly observes, “'Than whom,' said Dupin, amid a perfect whirlwind of smoke, 'no 
more sagacious agent could, I suppose, be desired, or even imagined.'” The Prefect happily 
replies, “You flatter me,” but the narrator defuses any more pointed comments from Dupin and 
gets the explication of the crime moving again by summarizing what the Prefect has already told 
them (443). Although not acting as Dupin's partner, the narrator has regained some standing in 
the text as a foil for Dupin's brilliance and wit rather than merely as a transmitter.  
 In searching for an effective balance between a narrator who is involved enough in the 
detective's life to be able to publicize the detective's achievements in an enthralling story and yet 
is far enough removed from the act of solving the crime not to pose a threat to the detective's 
credit for solving the crime, Poe in “The Purloined Letter” modifies the format of the story from 
“Murders” and “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” so that the narrator is completely absent when 
Dupin solves the crime. “The Purloined Letter” consists of two dialogues, one setting up the 
crime and one debriefing after Dupin solves the crime; the act of solving the crime is the missing 
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middle to which Dupin and the criminal, Minister D, who is denied a voice in the story, are the 
only witnesses. The narrator can then be suitably astonished, like the Prefect, when Dupin 
theatrically reveals the letter, but, unlike the Prefect, the narrator provides an appropriately 
admiring audience for Dupin's narrative. The narrator asks naïve questions, allowing Dupin to 
clarify the finer points of his achievement in guise of tutoring the narrator, but the narrator does 
not press Dupin or challenge obvious holes in his story, such as Dupin's assertion that “the letter 
had been turned, as a glove, inside out, re-directed, and re-sealed” (460) despite its already 
having been written on. Since the narrator was not present when Dupin solved the crime, Dupin's 
controlling story is the only available narrative to account for the missing middle of the story. 
Furthermore, unlike the sailor's appearance in “Murders,” Minister D never appears in the 
story, he is only described retroactively by the Prefect and Dupin. Dupin's account of the 
Minister's thoughts is thus unchallenged by any alternative narrative. Without the assent of the 
criminal (as when the sailor confesses to the crime), however, there is nothing to corroborate 
Dupin's version of events except his possession of the purloined letter. His authority ultimately 
rests on the letter, whose description and contents are kept carefully hidden from the reader and 
which Barbara Johnson has argued “only functions as a division” (242). This replacement of the 
speaking sailor with a pure signifier, devoid of content, that divides rather than integrates, leaves 
Dupin with a hollow victory. In “The Purloined Letter,” Poe developed a form that established 
Dupin's story as the only available solution, suppressing the narrator or any one else who might 
compromise his sole authority, but this formal solution comes at the cost of content, making 
Dupin the master of circulation rather than storytelling.  
The narrative structure that Poe develops parallels Dupin’s ability to restrict access to his 
interiority, as the intermediary narrator shields the detective’s mind and processes of detection 
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from the reader, allowing Dupin to present a satisfying, comprehensive solution without 
revealing the loose ends and inconsistencies that would undermine his master narrative.6 In “The 
Purloined Letter,” we are presented with the full solution, composed and edited by Dupin, after 
the fact rather than accompanying him as he solves the case. The enthusiastically approving 
narrator thus acts as a “prophylaxis,” to use Lauren Berlant’s term (110),7 protecting the 
detective by abstracting him from the vulnerabilities of embodiment and confirming Dupin’s 
singularity as the only person who possesses the ability to detect without being detected. Jacques 
Lacan describes this intermediary narration as an “act of delegation” whereby Dupin’s “would-
be disciple” “blinds” the reader to “all criticism of his testimony” (36). The narrator then 
circulates Dupin’s story, modeling the appropriate reader reaction in his own admiration for 
Dupin.  
The model of interpretation figured in the relationship between Dupin and the narrator (as 
well as the Prefect) insists upon a division between extraordinary minds, like Dupin’s, and 
ordinary minds, that can only register astonishment at the abilities they lack. The stories do not 
ask, indeed will not permit, readers to solve them for themselves before Dupin can: too much 
                                                        
6This function of the intermediary narrator becomes clearest in “The Purloined Letter,” in which 
the narrator takes no part in solving the case and thus all of the reader’s information about the 
denouement to the case comes directly from Dupin, without any eyewitness to contradict him. 
When the narrator is more involved in solving the case, as in “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue,” for example, the second view point on the case provides a greater latitude for 
readerly doubt and contradiction of Dupin’s solution, since the reader has more evidence on 
which to base her own reading. 
7In “The Master’s House Divided: Exposure and Concealment in Narratives of Slavery,” Milette 
Shamir reads The Heroic Slave through the lens of Berlant’s and Michael Warner’s work on 
“prosthetic embodiment” or “the principle of negativity” in the public sphere, arguing that 
Douglass attempts to “stak[e] for the black man a right to a vital private region beyond social 
identity, exposure, and narrativization” (104-5). Shamir’s reading of Douglass has informed 
my reading of Poe. 
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information is missing. Thus, Poe positions his readers as passive consumers and admirers of 
Dupin and, by extension, Poe. Or, perhaps more precisely, Poe models a strategy of 
manufacturing consent for the benefit of certain readers—those who can, like Dupin, draw on the 
resources of white privilege to buttress their projection.8 This model of dominant detection 
conserves power in one individual, who wields it to maintain the status quo and preserve white 
privilege.  
 
II. The Individual Genius 
Poe conceives of Dupin, his analytical genius figure, who is retrospectively viewed as the 
exemplary literary detective, as an individual who acts defensively in reaction to the threat posed 
by subordinated groups. In The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, as I have shown, Pym 
successfully detects the plot of a group of piratical mutineers—who are a motley assortment of 
people of different races loosely allied by a desire for profit—but he fails to detect a collective 
comprised of “jet black savages” who are strongly united around a common goal. Pym's failure 
to defeat this threatening coalition and his escape to a solitary white genius figure illustrates 
Poe's recognition that a collective mind is a powerful mode of problem-solving that triumphs 
over the individual.  
While Pym is a story of the failure of an individual confronted with a collective, the 
Dupin tales present a fantasy of the individual's triumph over the collective. As the narrator of 
the Dupin tales notes in “Murders,” “the analyst [glories] in that moral activity which                                                         
8This claim that Poe is modeling strategies for his readers’ benefit is related to Shawn 
Rosenheim’s notion of the “analytical sublime” in Poe’s detective fiction, although our 
arguments work toward different ends. Rosenheim focuses on the bodily effects that Poe’s 
detective stories produce in his readers, the way in which the “text discloses in the reader’s 
body the nature of the interpretive desires that initiate his reading” (71).  
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disentangles” (“Murders” 333). The figure of an entangled, or interwoven, network represents 
the most dangerous opposition to the solitary analyst. Imaging “the analyst” as separating 
knotted strands, the narrator attempts to cast the collective figure against whom the analyst 
deploys his “moral activity” in the negative light of a tangled mess, but his textile metaphor 
betrays an unspoken anxiety, since weaving or knotting increases the strength of a string. By 
“disentangling” an interwoven network, the analyst severs the links of a collective mind, 
terminating the exchange enabled by intersubjectivity. This is exactly what Dupin proceeds to do 
over the course of the three tales: imaginatively and rhetorically dismantle every collective 
within the confines of the story, and even distance himself from the narrator, who figures much 
more prominently in the first tale than in the last. Yet by reducing various collectives to 
individuals rather than confronting the collectives en masse, Dupin, like the narrator, implicitly 
acknowledges the power of the many.  
In writing the first two Dupin tales, Poe tries out different ways of eliminating the 
heterogeneity of the social from his texts, thus leveling the playing field so that his individual 
genius figure, Dupin, can triumph. Finally, in “The Purloined Letter,” Poe purges both race and 
the collective, so that the text is entirely self-enclosed. However, this insularity comes at the cost 
of sociohistorical specificity, so that Dupin is reading only a reflection of his own mind. 
Elaborating what he calls “the theoretical ubiquity of ‘The Purloined Letter’” (69), Shawn 
Rosenheim observes,  
Although [‘The Purloined Letter”] is unquestionably a great achievement, 
Poe purchases the analytic force of his narrative only by purging the text 
of any attempt at realist representation….[Poe] refus[es] to engage in the 
difficult project of representing the texture of social experience. In sharp 
contrast to the outdoor settings of ‘Marie Rôget,’ or even to the street 
scenes in ‘Rue Morgue,’ ‘The Purloined Letter’ retreats from the 
boulevards, parks, and waterways of the teeming city, with their social and 
sexual ambiguities, into the enclosed and private spaces of Minister D---'s 
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chambers....The tale's theoretical richness arises because ‘The Purloined 
Letter’ is already supremely two-dimensional, already overtly concerned 
with allegorizing the operations of the signifier. (69) 
 
“The Purloined Letter” has garnered a great deal of critical attention—including Rosenheim’s 
excellent reading—while “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” remains understudied. After briefly 
examining Poe’s racialized allusions in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” I will therefore focus 
on how Dupin disaggregates collectives into individuals in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget.” My 
analysis will demonstrate a missing link in the chain of Poe’s experiments with representing 
detection.   
Whereas in Pym, Poe relocated the racial conflict to a South Pacific island but maintained 
the black/white dichotomy, in “Murders” he effaces the explicit signifiers of race, instead 
including numerous racialized allusions that encourage a reading of the orangutan as a figure of 
“foreignness,” or, more specifically, “blackness,” as the racist taxonomies of antebellum natural 
history blurred the line between the “lower” orders of humans and the higher orders of simians. 
Ed White has observed that the story is “a response to American slave rebellions” (88), noting 
that this relationship becomes clear when one summarizes the plot:  
here we have a humanoid captured in a distant land by sailors; brought to 
a metropolitan center for sale, but sequestered until healed of an injury in 
transit; holed up in a 'closet' from which it spies upon the master shaving, 
thus learning the use of a razor; frightened by the master's whip into 
fleeing into the streets, where it finds two white women who are killed 
with brutal ferocity; ineptly hiding the bodies before fleeing again; and 
upon recapture, being sold once again. (95) 
 
Given the relatively recent turn to this critical position on “Murders,” it would appear 
that Poe managed to make his racial allusions oblique enough to deflect attention from 
 133 
them, although the historical arguments made by White, Elise Lemire, and others 
suggests that the allusions might have been less covert for an antebellum audience.9    
 Not only has Poe submerged the racial referentiality that prompts the defensive reaction 
of detection on the part of a white male, but he subjugates the threat of racial others by placing 
the figure that obliquely represents them in the story under the ownership of another white male. 
Dupin never confronts the ostensible murderer; he only confronts another white male individual, 
the owner of the orangutan. “Murders” thus establishes Dupin's habit of reconfiguring the 
parameters of a case to ensure that his rival is more or less identical to himself. The sailor in 
“Murders” still differs from Dupin, particularly in the implied racial residue of his connection 
with the transatlantic slave trade. The sailor's experience on an imperial voyage to the interior of 
Borneo, where he captured the orangutan identifies him as a participant in the activities that                                                         
9Several scholars have observed that Poe displaces racial anxiety onto the anthropomorphized 
“Ourang-Outang” in “Murders.” See, for example, Lindon Barrett, who notes, “in both the 
learned and popular mind, the wild primitive state of the orangutan remains an important 
analogue for the natural condition of Africans and their descendents” (167). Romancing the 
Shadow, the collection in which Barrett’s essay appears, contains several useful studies of 
race in the Dupin tales. White’s excellent article focuses on pedagogical strategies for 
“address[ing] ‘historical context’ in the teaching of literature” (88). Three studies that have 
especially influenced my thinking about race and the Dupin tales are John Carlos Rowe’s 
“Poe, Antebellum Slavery, and Modern Criticism,” Nancy A. Harrowitz’s “Criminality and 
Poe’s Orangutan: The Question of Race in Detection,” and Colin Dayan’s “Poe, Persons, and 
Property.” Rowe argues that “Poe’s own repressed fears regarding slave rebellions in the 
South and the deeper fear that Southern aristocratic life itself might be passing are the psychic 
contents that provoke the poetic narrative” (127). Harrowitz attends closely to the “jumps in 
Dupin’s logic” in order to reveal the “cultural, as opposed to ‘natural,’ identity of the 
monster” (184), concluding that the repressed story in “Murders” concerns colonization and 
racial others: for Dupin “homicidal orangutans, Asiatics, and Africans are in some way 
interchangeable” (192). Although Dayan does not specifically address the Dupin tales, she 
does provide a theoretical framework that encompasses all of Poe’s fiction: “Poe’s obsession 
with possession, personal identity, and the will…is no empty philosophizing or haunting but 
an appeal to the paradoxes necessary to sustain slavery, to its specific forms of degradation 
and figurative death” (13). 
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undergird the slave trade. His “greatly sunburnt” skin, like the “swarthy complexion” of the 
sailor in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” visibly marks his proximity to this trade, symbolically 
“blackening” his skin. Vampirish Dupin, who rarely leaves his apartment in the sunlight and 
enforces a separation between himself and the rest of the world, is presumably unmarked by such 
a connection. His solution to the case, then, rests on his ability to read the mind of another white 
male individual, who is marked by his connection to racial trafficking.  
“The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” the second of the Dupin tales, still displays traces of the 
collective before they are entirely purged in the final Dupin tale. “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” 
is frequently overlooked in Poe criticism, even among those who write on the Dupin tales. One 
reason for this relative lack of critical attention, I would argue, is that the strange sense of failure 
inscribed onto the pages of the story makes it difficult to fit into a study that embraces Dupin as a 
transcendent genius. “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” based on the real-life murder of Mary 
Rogers, was published serially in Snowden's Ladies Companion, in three installments from 
November 1842 to February 1843, while the case was still unsolved. Poe described his 
motivation for writing the story in a letter soliciting publication in The Baltimore Saturday 
Visiter: “I have handled the design in a very singular and entirely novel manner. I imagine a 
series of nearly exact coincidences occurring in Paris….Thus under pretence of showing how 
Dupin…unraveled the mystery of Marie’s assassination, I, in fact, enter into a very rigorous 
analysis of the real tragedy in New-York” (qtd. in A. Quinn 356). Poe recognized that solving a 
real-life crime would cement his growing reputation for “powers of mind equal to any living 
writer” (as a reviewer of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” put it in May 1842) (qtd. in Thomas 
and Jackson 365). “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” is Poe's attempt to bring the heterogeneity of 
the real world into a story and thereby subjugate it to the mind of an individual genius. 
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Unfortunately for Poe, however, news of a different solution to the Mary Rogers case broke just 
as the second installment of “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” was going to press. New evidence 
suggested that Rogers was the victim of a botched abortion, not a murder. Poe hastily revised the 
third section, delaying its publication from January to February 1842, but he could not retract the 
earlier sections; all he could do was qualify his statements and add some obfuscatory notes that 
insisted that the police had acted on his solution and captured the guilty party. While Dupin, and 
ultimately Poe, failed to unravel a web that was not of his own making, the story did alter the 
public perception of the case by dismantling the prevalent theory that Mary Rogers was killed by 
a “gang of ruffians.” As Thomas Dunn English noted in his review of “The Mystery of Marie 
Rôget,” “At all events, [Poe] has dissipated in our mind all belief that the murder was perpetrated 
by more than one” (qtd. in Stashower 249). This is not the only instance of Dupin’s breaking 
down a collective noun—the gang—into an individual, however; he repeats this process several 
times in the story. 
 Four significant groups are discussed in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget”: three on the side 
of law—the mass media, the public, and the police—and one on the side of crime, the gang 
alleged to have murdered Marie. Dupin never confronts these groups as groups; instead he 
disaggregates each of these groups into individuals and then shows how easily he can defeat 
them one-on-one. While initially the narrator despairingly refers to the “mass of information” 
(“Mystery” 383) published in the papers, Dupin spends a significant amount of time segregating 
this mass into individual newspapers—L'Etoile, Le Commerciel, Le Soleil—and further 
atomizing these corporate texts into individual editors at each of the major papers. In contrast to 
the narrator, who is overwhelmed by this undifferentiated “mass” and can speak only of “the 
general impression” (“Mystery” 390) found in the media, Dupin proves his analytical superiority 
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not only by “disentangling” this conglomeration into individual strands, but by refuting—at 
length—each point made by each editor.  
 Again, Dupin reduces the public from a group united by an idea or a feeling to an 
unconnected mass of individuals. The public, like the mass media, at first seems a faceless 
abstraction—indeed the two are consolidated earlier in the story in the phrase “the public papers” 
(“Mystery” 380). Larger than any particularized group of citizens, it is figured in the story as 
bodiless emotion or thought in phrases such as “popular excitement” or “the public mind” 
(“Mystery” 381, 382). Dupin tells the narrator that “the popular opinion, under certain 
conditions, is not to be disregarded. When arising of itself—when manifesting itself in a strictly 
spontaneous manner—we should look upon it as analogous with that intuition which is the 
idiosyncrasy of the individual man of genius....But it is important that we find no palpable traces 
of suggestion. The opinion must be rigorously the public's own” (419). While Dupin admits that 
public opinion can occasionally be right, by insisting that public opinion must arise 
spontaneously without direction from any source, he essentially disaggregates the “public” into a 
mass of individuals, each of whom independently intuits the same thing. Correct public opinion, 
on Dupin's argument, does not arise from a cooperative process of conversing or sharing 
information to puzzle out the most likely or most reasonable answer; rather, Dupin's description 
implies simply an accumulation of individual, independent affirmations. Dupin continually 
denies that cooperation or interaction among people adds value—that the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts. Furthermore, in the case of Marie Roget, Dupin asserts, the public has been 
directed by the media to the incorrect opinion that Marie was murdered by a gang. His refutation 
of the media's argument for this supposition, which I will discuss in a moment, encompasses the 
public as well, establishing Dupin's superiority over both of these groups. 
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 The police provide perhaps the clearest example of Dupin's reductive process. Dupin has 
already established the basis of his critique of the police in “Murders”—rather than a team, the 
Parisian police are a dysfunctional hierarchy headed by a fool, Prefect G. This line of description 
continues in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” as Dupin and the narrator become involved in the 
case at the direct personal request of the Prefect. Dupin, famously, sleeps through the majority of 
the Prefect's visit hidden behind a pair of green glasses; the ease with which he dupes the Prefect 
establishes Dupin's superiority over this rival at the outset of the story. Having thus humiliated 
the Prefect without his knowledge, Dupin later dismisses the rest of the police as mere 
sycophants in the Prefect's entourage. Referring to the police as “the myrmidons of G---” 
(“Mystery” 394), Dupin employs a familiar nineteenth-century derogatory term for law 
enforcement. Although this usage of “myrmidon” is now archaic, according to the OED it 
evolved from the older definition, which denoted “a member of a gang or army adhering to a 
particular leader,” “a sycophant.” Thus while the police force is made up of multiple people, 
Poe's word choice indicates that they do not exercise their own will or cooperate but instead 
mindlessly follow their leader. In contrast to the multitude of independent individuals who 
comprise the mass media, the police are consolidated into one bumbling fool and his lackeys.  
 Once Dupin has dismantled his rival groups, cutting them down to individual size and 
establishing his superiority over them, he turns to their solution to the mystery. Numerous 
scholars have pointed out that Dupin solidifies his ability to read minds by demonstrating his 
ability to read texts. He proceeds according to this paradigm in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” 
assigning his narrator-sidekick to prepare a précis of the newspaper coverage of Marie's 
disappearance. The narrator reports that “The general impression, so far as we were enabled to 
glean it from the newspapers, seemed to be, that Marie had been the victim of a gang of 
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desperadoes” (“Mystery” 390). Dupin then spends the latter portion of the story deconstructing 
this argument in tedious, painstaking detail, pointing out, for example, that the “traces of a 
struggle” noted by the editor of Le Soleil as proof of a gang actually “demonstrates the absence 
of a gang” since a gang would have easily overpowered a “weak and defenceless girl” 
(“Mystery” 427). Not only does Dupin reject the theory of a gang, he argues that the individual 
who murdered Marie was a sailor of “dark complexion” (“Mystery” 433), who anonymously fed 
a false story inculpating a gang to the press in order to divert attention away from himself. This 
hypothetical sailor replicates Dupin's own methodology in “Murders.” In that earlier story, 
Dupin caught the sailor who owned the orangutan by placing a false ad in the paper claiming that 
he had found an orangutan. The symmetry between Dupin and the criminal established in 
“Murders” thus becomes even starker in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” elevating the sailor-
murderer closer to the status of mastermind and making him the most important rival Dupin has 
in the story.  
 Dupin's individual genius in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” depends upon his dissolving 
the potential for collective, cooperative genius by any of the groups of his rivals. Since these 
groups could draw on the power and experience of multiple minds, they threaten to be more 
effective than the product of an isolated mind, however brilliant. After neutralizing these groups 
by reconstituting them as unconnected individuals, Dupin reconfigures the mystery itself to 
become a question of one shrewd, manipulative genius facing off against another, thus 
anticipating his refinement of this situation in “The Purloined Letter.” The problem is that while 
Dupin has disarmed the threat to the individual within the text, the threat itself is extratextual. 
While Poe creates a compelling figure of individual genius in response to anxiety about the 
power of the collective, his imaginative textual resolution cannot extend outside of the text. In 
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“The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” the traces of the larger sociohistorical situation in which the 
individual is enmeshed are still visible within the story and available for analysis by the reader. 
Each iteration of Poe's writing on detection further obscures those traces, pushing them out of 
sight below the surface of the text, so that the only material available for analysis is the 
individual genius's mind. Although Poe critics and scholars of detective fiction more broadly 
have read “The Purloined Letter” as one of Poe's crowning achievements, the text itself offers a 
commentary on Poe's failure to create a “man of genius” who could achieve any real insight. 
This failure is intricately embedded in “The Mystery of Marie Rôget,” as two thirds of the way 
through its serialization, the real-life “mystery” of Mary Rogers was solved. While Poe altered 
the final installment of the story to make the best of the situation, he could not entirely amend the 
text to make Dupin's solution match the known facts. His grand dream of achieving something 
“singular and entirely novel” (qtd. in A. Quinn 355) was dashed and he returned in his final 
Dupin tale to the disappointing game of “unravelling a web which you yourself…have woven.” 
  
 
Chapter 5: The Race for Detection in Douglass and Poe 
 
While Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” (1841) is widely cited as the 
first detective story, this origin myth obscures the widespread imaginative engagement with 
detection in the antebellum period. Detection preoccupied many antebellum authors from 
Nathaniel Hawthorne to Harriet Jacobs.1 Critics, however, have not read Poe’s story in 
conversation with other antebellum fictions concerned with detection. The context for Poe’s 
story has thus dropped out of the critical history of detective fiction, making it difficult to see 
that Poe’s was just one among multiple modes of detection in the antebellum United States.2 In 
this essay, I examine the dialectic between two of these modes, which I call dominant and 
subordinate detection. Reading Poe’s “Murders” in isolation acknowledges only one half of the 
dialectic of detection that emerges from the dynamics of surveillance and deception in the US 
slave system. 
“Murders” is a primary example of dominant detection. In this mode, a detective figure 
restricts the scope of the investigation and resolution to the individual level, suppressing 
                                                        
1See, for example, Heather Worthington, The Rise of the Detective in Early Nineteenth-century 
Popular Fiction, and Sara Crosby, “Early American Crime Writing,” for examinations of 
literary detection before Poe. See also John Gruesser, “Poe’s Progeny: Varieties of Detection 
in Key American Literary Texts 1841-1861.” 
2We might think of these modes retrospectively as subgenres of what came to be delineated as 
detective fiction. In the antebellum period detective fiction did not exist as a conceptual 
framework, however, and thus I have used the term “modes” rather than “subgenres.”   
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alternative accounts that identify the effects of systemic violence and oppression. Poe’s detective 
Dupin produces a coherent, satisfying story that reestablishes the status quo, maintaining 
rhetorical mastery. Yet in examining the mechanisms by which the dominant group constructs 
that story, “Murders” reveals how precarious that mastery is. “Murders” is antislavery in the 
Jeffersonian sense: rather than opposing slavery for moral reasons, it recognizes that slavery is a 
slumbering volcano and expresses fear of violent retribution against those who perpetuate the 
system. The term dominant detection not only indicates this mode’s investment in maintaining 
the dominant group’s power, it also suggests the trajectory of scholarship on detective fiction. By 
the turn of the twentieth century, as authors and critics began to codify the detective fiction 
genre, Poe’s mode so dominated the field that it suppressed the possibility of recognizing 
subordinate detection as formally related.  
Subordinate detection, exemplified by Frederick Douglass’s The Heroic Slave (1853), 
draws on lived lessons of oppression to perform acts of detection and concealment that challenge 
domination.3 In contrast to the ambivalence about slavery expressed in Poe’s story, Douglass’ 
The Heroic Slave communicates a clear antislavery message appropriate to its original 
publication in Autographs for Freedom, a volume sold to raise money for the Rochester Ladies’ 
Anti-Slavery Society. Douglass’s text not only attacks slavery thematically, but also formally, as 
Douglass critiques the mode of detection practiced by the dominant group—the Dupinian 
mode—demonstrating its flaws. Whereas dominant detection eliminates threats to the status quo,                                                         
3Douglass’s conflation of detective, criminal, and victim speaks to a very particular and 
historically contingent set of circumstances that governed the identity of the enslaved: that is, 
the fact that slave rebellion or resistance is criminalized in the antebellum period makes 
African American detectives criminals as well. In an article on contemporary African-
American detective fiction, Daylanne K. English remarks, “From its very origins and on into 
the present, African-American fiction has articulated and analyzed the intersection of crime 
and color in the US” (781). 
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subordinate detection deconstructs the dominant group’s master narrative to promote acts of 
resistance. Douglass’s subordinate detection can be taught to white allies who have never 
experienced domination, fostering cross-racial activism.  
Unaccustomed as we are to thinking of Poe and Douglass as contemporaries—let alone 
neighbors—it is jarring to note that from 1831 to 1833, they both lived in Baltimore, separated 
by only a few blocks.4 While Poe was raised within the master class as the foster son of a well-
to-do Virginia family, he was excluded from the resources of power after John Allan cut him off 
financially and socially in the late 1820s. Poe’s liminal position in relation to the dominant group 
inverts Douglass’s position in relation to the subordinate group after he freed himself from 
enslavement in 1838. Despite the American Anti-Slavery Society’s efforts to cast Douglass as a 
representative African American, Douglass’s extraordinary life makes him non-representative. 
Although they occupied radically different social positions, as knowledgeable outsiders Poe and 
Douglass understood the dynamics of surveillance and detection that maintained the slave 
system.  
The power asymmetry intrinsic to relations of domination such as the US slave system 
obliges the enslaved to disguise their resistance. Saidiya Hartman elaborates on the methods 
available to oppressed groups: “Within the confines of surveillance and nonautonomy, the                                                         
4Poe spent much of his young life in Richmond, Virginia, although he also lived abroad in 
Scotland and England. Douglass was approximately 30 years old when he escaped from Hugh 
Auld’s home in Baltimore to New York. The standard biographies on Poe and Douglass are 
Arthur Hobson Quinn’s Edgar Allan Poe: A Critical Biography (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998) and William S. McFeely’s Frederick Douglass (New York: 
Norton, 1991). See J. Gerald Kennedy’s illuminating article, “‘Trust No Man’: Poe, Douglass, 
and the Culture of Slavery,” for a map of Poe’s and Douglass’s residences in Baltimore. 
Kennedy compares the intersecting paths of Poe and Douglass and describes The Narrative of 
Arthur Gordon Pym and Douglass’s 1845 Narrative as two books sharing “the imprint of a 
common culture” (226). 
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resistance to subjugation proceeded by stealth: one acted furtively, secretly, and imperceptibly, 
and the enslaved seized any and every opportunity to slip off the yoke” (50). This imperative to 
conceal has “typically won [subordinate groups] a reputation for subtlety—a subtlety their 
superiors often regard as cunning and deception” (Scott 136). This covert “day to day 
resistance,” including work slowdowns, sabotage and truancy, pushed back against the totalizing 
force of domination without risking one’s survival (Franklin and Schweniger 2).5 Occasionally, 
however, enslaved men and women engaged in open opposition, sometimes even violent 
rebellion, that explicitly challenged the premises of the slave system. Poe and Douglass draw on 
their firsthand experience with the antebellum slave system to dramatize moments of rupture—
moments that reveal the illusory nature of the dominant group’s stability and security. At these 
moments, the dominant group must generate a story to account for actions that are crimes from 
their perspective, but resistance from the subordinate group’s.  
In his influential study, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James C. Scott uses the 
terms “public transcript” and “hidden transcript” to describe the disconnect between the master 
narrative of a sustainable, smoothly-running slave system and the concealed narratives of both 
the varied acts of resistance engaged in by enslaved men and women and the violent 
machinations required to keep men and women enslaved. While “the theatrical imperatives that 
normally prevail in situations of domination produce a public transcript in close conformity with 
how the dominant group would wish to have things appear,” Scott explains, “every subordinate                                                         
5Earlier historians of slavery “order[ed] seemingly random acts from absconding and breaking 
tools to murder and rebellion along a spectrum from accommodation to resistance. Recent 
work on ‘everyday resistance’ upends this mechanistic structure, giving due weight to the 
power of rumor, clandestine socializing, and other forms of supposedly accommodationist 
transgressions” (Kaye 8). See also Stephanie M.H. Camp, Closer to Freedom: Enslaved 
Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South, for a careful study of slave 
women’s everyday resistance. 
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group creates, out of its ordeal, a ‘hidden transcript’ that represents a critique of power spoken 
behind the back of the dominant…The powerful, for their part, also develop a hidden transcript 
representing the practices and claims of their rule that cannot be openly avowed” (4 and xii). 
Scott’s language emphasizes the double narrative of the slave system: the public transcript that 
claims to present a coherent account of control and the hidden transcripts that trouble the public 
transcript’s assurance.   
The relationship between the public transcript’s “official” story and the hidden 
transcripts’ counter histories, which exist only in fragments and must be pieced together 
retrospectively, mirrors the structure of detection fiction. Like Scott’s language of dual 
transcripts, Tzvetan Todorov’s influential essay, “The Typology of Detective Fiction,” posits that 
detective tales tell two stories: the story of an investigation and the story of a crime. The former 
story—discovering the crime, gathering evidence, analyzing information—unfolds as we read 
and culminates with the detective’s narrative recreation of the second story: the story of the 
crime. Explaining Todorov’s “double narrative” formulation, Catherine Ross Nickerson states 
that this second story “is a narrative of secrecy….While the criminals want desperately to keep 
their story fragmented and illegible, the detective is working just as hard to put the pieces back 
together into a coherent narrative” (30). Nickerson’s summation emphasizes the countervailing 
forces at work in a detective story. The story of the crime is centrifugal; Nickerson’s diction 
highlights the scattered pieces that seem to have exploded outward at the moment of 
transgression. The story of the investigation, on the other hand, is centripetal; the investigator 
claims to be reassembling pieces that were once unified, bringing them back together to form a 
coherent whole. The secret, fragmentary story of the crime corresponds to the hidden transcript, 
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while the detective’s narrative, which purports to explain the crime, corresponds to the public 
transcript. 
Classic detective fiction (also known as analytic detective fiction or the whodunit) has 
traditionally been evaluated according to Todorov’s rubric. On Todorov’s reading, the successful 
detective story depicts a mastermind who discovers the “correct” solution—the one that “tells 
‘what really happened’” (45). While Todorov’s insights into detective fiction’s double narrative 
structure are valuable, this language of accuracy obfuscates the more important concern with 
power in Poe’s “Murders,” a concern that Douglass develops in The Heroic Slave. At stake in 
“Murders” and The Heroic Slave is not the accuracy of the detective’s solution, but the 
mechanisms that authorize one narrative over another. “Murders” and The Heroic Slave both 
dramatize the contest over rhetorical mastery: the struggle to determine whose version of events 
the public transcript will record. The framework of dominant and subordinate detection, which 
foregrounds issues of power, therefore provides a better way of understanding detective fiction’s 
double narrative structure. This double narrative that Todorov identifies at the intratextual level 
also structures the field of detective fiction at the generic level, as dominant and subordinate 
detection comprise two halves of a dialectic. 
******** 
Rhetorical mastery, like physical mastery, depends on detecting one’s opponents—
reading their real intentions behind their disguises. Following Nat Turner’s 1831 revolt, state 
legislatures in the Upper South, where Poe and Douglass spent a large portion of their lives, 
increased constraints on African Americans. This revolt dramatically exposed the system of 
surveillance and countersurveillance normally veiled by the public transcript, which claimed that 
slaves were content and masters secure. Describing the “dialectic of disguise and surveillance” 
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that pervades relations of domination and resistance, Scott notes, “Subordinates offer a 
performance of deference and consent while attempting to discern, to read, the real intentions 
and mood of the potentially threatening powerholder….The power figure, in turn, produces a 
performance of mastery and command while attempting to peer behind the mask of subordinates 
and read their real intentions” (3-4). The gap between the public and hidden transcripts produces 
a system shot through with subterfuge and deception. This structure makes detection an essential 
skill for both masters and enslaved.  
While proslavery propaganda depicted slaves as intellectually inferior, in private 
slaveowners acknowledged that enslaved men and women strategically performed ignorance. 
One Virginia slaveowner complained, for example, “under the cloak of great stupidity, [slaves 
make] dupes [of their masters]…The most general defect in the character of the negro, is 
hypocrisy; and this hypocrisy frequently makes him pretend to more ignorance than he 
possesses; and if his master treats him as a fool, he will be sure to act the fool’s part” (qtd. in 
Stampp 99). In order to strip away this cloak, the master class constructed an elaborate 
surveillance system encompassing passes, night watches, unannounced cabin inspections, and 
constant supervision in the fields.6 Slaveowners instructed overseers to watch “with an eye that 
never slumbers” (qtd. in Stampp 100). Masters evaluated the information gained from external 
surveillance to produce psychological interpretations; as Douglass observed in My Bondage and 
My Freedom, slaveowners “watch…with skilled and practiced eyes, and have learned to read, 
with great accuracy, the state of mind and heart of the slave, through his sable face” (159). 
Reading the “state of mind and heart of the slave” would, slaveholders hoped, warn of                                                         
6See Sally Hadden’s excellent study, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the 
Carolinas, for more on the policing of enslaved people in the Upper South. 
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impending revolt or escape. Constant surveillance was necessary to maintain the system of 
domination and protect the master class from harm.  
This surveillance system was not infallible, of course. Slave narratives are filled with 
examples of enslaved men and women who deceived their masters. Henry Bibb, author of 
Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb, An American Slave (1849), explains that he 
brought a bridle along when he ran away from his owner as a “calculation to avoid detection” 
(17). This prop enabled Bibb to tell a plausible story explaining his presence: “If any body 
should see me in the woods, as they have, and asked ‘what are you doing here sir? you are a 
runaway?’--I said, ‘no, sir, I am looking for our old mare;’…For such excuses I was let pass” 
(17). His only “weapon of self defence,” Bibb declares, “was that of deception. It is useless for a 
poor helpless slave, to resist a white man in a slaveholding State. Public opinion and the law is 
against him; and resistance in many cases is death to the slave” (17). Bibb’s deception was 
protective, but it also created a space for him to resist enslavement by temporarily running away. 
Accounts such as Bibb’s support Scott’s and Hartman’s contention that subordinated people 
become particularly skilled at anticipating the dominant group’s actions in order to avoid 
detection. As a survival tactic, members of this oppressed class learned to assess situations 
quickly, “read” others’ motives and character, and communicate that information to facilitate 
resistance.  
Enslaved people “managed” their master or overseer by “prob[ing] for his weaknesses, 
match[ing] their wits against his, and constantly contriv[ing] to disrupt the work routine….They 
could share the results of their experiments as they put him to the test;…Doubtless slaves always 
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knew their master better than he knew them” (Stampp 378 and 105).7 Leon Litwack describes 
enslaved people’s ingenuity in transmitting information the information thus gained:  
Extensive black communication networks, feeding on a variety of sources, sped 
information from plantation to plantation…often with remarkable secrecy and 
accuracy….[T]he ‘grapevine telegraph’ frequently employed code words that 
enabled them to carry on conversations about forbidden subjects in the very 
presence of their masters and mistresses. Although whites often failed to grasp the 
mechanics or vocabulary of slave communication, they did come to suspect that 
their slaves knew more than they revealed. (23)  
 
The need for the grapevine telegraph increased in the antebellum decades, as families were torn 
apart during the forced migration that Ira Berlin has called the Second Middle Passage.8 Faced 
with the extremities of human suffering, enslaved people became correspondingly more bold in 
their resistance. Day to day resistance was widespread. Moreover, acts of open rebellion 
increased, as Berlin notes: “Although planters rarely mused on the sources of slave rebellions—
except to blame inherent African savagery and meddling outsiders—few could fail to appreciate 
the coincidence between these threats to order and the massive forced deportation” (217). This 
resistance depended on ties that were often established during the transcontinental migration 
(Berlin 173).  
As Southerners, Poe and Douglass drew on their experience of this culture of detection in 
their fiction. While The Heroic Slave’s connection to slavery is clear from the title alone, 
                                                        
7See also Leslie H. Owens, This Species of Property: Slave Life and Culture in the Old South. 
8The slave South underwent a dramatic transformation between the War of 1812 and the Civil 
War. While the United States closed the African slave trade in 1808, “the illegal importation 
of Africans continued to be a problem until 1820, when the slave trade was declared piracy 
and made punishable by death” (Steven Deyle, Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in 
American Life [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 20). The supply reduction that 
followed coincided with the increased demand for slave labor as planters moved south and 
west to settle the cotton belt. Slaveowners in the Upper South exported enslaved men and 
women to the interior to meet this demand.  
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“Murders” requires some unpacking to demonstrate its metaphoric representation of US slavery. 
Poe’s numerous racialized allusions encourage a reading of the orangutan as a figure of 
“foreignness,” or, more specifically, “blackness,” as the racist taxonomies of antebellum natural 
history blurred the line between the “lower” orders of humans and the higher orders of simians. 
Explaining the association of Africans with apes, Winthrop Jordan notes, 
If Negroes were likened to beasts, there was in Africa a beast which was 
likened to men. It was a strange and eventually tragic happenstance of 
nature that the Negro’s homeland was the habitat of the animal which in 
appearance most resembles man. The animal called “orang-outang” by 
contemporaries (actually the chimpanzee) was native to those parts of 
western Africa where the early slave trade was heavily concentrated 
….Englishmen were introduced to anthropoid apes and to Negroes at the 
same time and in the same place….Given…the coincidence of contact, it 
was virtually inevitable that Englishmen should discern similarity between 
the man-like beasts and the beast-like men of Africa. (28-30) 
 
Nineteenth-century naturalists, such as the influential Georges Cuvier, to whom Dupin refers in 
“Murders,” reinforced this association. Cuvier’s taxonomy elevated the white race and claimed 
that “the Negro race[’s]” physiognomy “evidently approximates it to the monkey tribe” (43). 
Knowing that Poe’s readers would have associated “orang-outangs” with people of 
African descent, we can see that the Poe had the slave system in mind as he wrote “Murders.” 
The sailor, whom the narrator continually refers to as the orangutan’s “master,” originally 
captured the orangutan on an imperialist voyage, intending to sell it in the metropolis, but he had 
to keep the “captive…secluded, until such time as it should recover from a wound in the foot, 
received from a splinter on board ship” (564). This description of the orangutan’s kidnapping 
suggests the African slave trade, including the captives’ suffering during the Middle Passage. 
Describing the murders, the narrator figures the orangutan as a runaway slave. The sailor uses “a 
whip” “to quiet the creature,” but the orangutan escapes. The “fugitive” is eventually 
recaptured—“caught by the owner himself, who obtained for it a very large sum”—and 
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imprisoned in the zoo at the Jardin des Plantes (565-68). If, as Ed White argues persuasively, the 
story is “a response to American slave rebellions,”9 what was the connection between detection 
and slavery? Violent uprisings such as slave rebellions, figured in the story as the orangutan’s 
“murders,” rupture the public transcript, exposing the hidden transcripts: both the subordinate 
group’s critique and the dominant group’s violence suppressed in the public transcript. To 
maintain the system of domination, it is imperative for the dominant group to detect and defuse 
the subordinate group’s critique before it explodes into revolt. A detective who monitors the 
hidden transcript thus works to preserve the status quo and protect the system of domination by 
quashing resistance and eliminating threats to order.  
Dupin performs this dominant detection in “Murders.” The brutality of the killings has 
caused “the greatest excitement” among the public and “struck every one present not less with 
horror than with astonishment” (544 and 537), inciting a state of confusion and fear among the 
populace. Dupin cooperates with the police (even as he mocks their incompetence) to explain the 
killings and thus calm the public’s terror. According to Dupin’s solution, the orangutan’s 
kidnapper and “master” is “innocent of the atrocities in the Rue Morgue….You have done 
nothing which you could have avoided—nothing, certainly, which renders you culpable” (563-
64). This explanation ignores the sailor’s responsibility for capturing the orangutan in the first 
place, for imprisoning it in his apartment, for whipping it, and for providing the murder 
weapon—a razor that the orangutan has watched the sailor use to shave. By placing the blame 
entirely on the orangutan’s “intractable ferocity” (564), Dupin exonerates the sailor for his guilt                                                         
9White’s excellent article is primarily pedagogical and thus does not elaborate on the 
implications of the relationship between “Murders” and slave rebellions. See also Lindon 
Barrett, “Presence of Mind” and Elise Lemire, “‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’: 
Amalgamation Discourses and the Race Riots of 1838 in Poe’s Philadelphia.” 
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in the system of exploitation that the animal mimics in killing the women. Dupin’s solution not 
only protects the sailor from penalty, but releases the bank clerk—a symbol of capitalism—who 
has been imprisoned as a suspect in the murders. At the end of the story, the three individuals 
implicated in the murders have returned to their original positions—the kidnapped orangutan is 
recaptured, while the sailor and bank clerk are free to continue profiting from the exploitation of 
marginalized groups. Dupin’s solution denies the possibility that something larger than one 
individual might be responsible for the violence, averting the search for explanations from the 
system of domination within which captive, master, and victims are located. By defending the 
interests of the dominant class against the threat represented by the Africanist presence, Dupin 
has not only assuaged the public’s fears but augmented his own reputation. 
The Dupinian mode of detection presents a tidy narrative that wraps everything up, 
sweeping inconsistencies and loose ends under the rug. One inconsistency in particular has 
troubled generations of resisting readers. After drawing the narrator’s attention to the unusual 
voice that all the witnesses heard, Dupin dismisses the hypothesis that it could have been “the 
voice of an Asiatic—of an African. Neither Asiatics nor Africans abound in Paris; but, without 
denying the inference, I will now merely call your attention to three points” (550). Without ever 
disproving or even elaborating on this “inference,” Dupin proceeds with his explanation. Yet this 
lacuna around the issue of race remains in the middle of Poe’s story, troubling Dupin’s claim to 
unassailable logic.  
The logical inconsistencies in Dupin’s solution indicate that accurately piecing together 
the evidence is less important than persuading an audience that one’s narrative is correct. The 
final two paragraphs of “Murders” demonstrate that Dupin’s persuasive “discourse” (568)—not 
material evidence—resolves the murder mystery. The narrator states that the bank clerk “was 
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instantly released, upon our narration of the circumstances” (568). The story that Dupin has 
crafted is so compelling that it obviates the need for evidentiary corroboration. Dupin further 
underscores the preeminence of narration in the last line of the story, when he mocks the Police 
Prefect for “the way he has ‘de nier ce qui est, et d’expliquer ce qui n’est pas’” (568), that is, the 
Prefect’s way of denying what is and explaining what is not. Dupin’s derision indicates that his 
power lies in his explanatory abilities, which enable him to provide a satisfying narrative 
resolution, unlike the Prefect.  
Turning our attention to the prefatory sections of “Murders,” rather than focusing on the 
murder mystery proper, reveals the way in which Dupin achieves rhetorical mastery. The story 
relies on the power of suggestion to encourage the reader to transfer Dupin’s accurate reading of 
the narrator in the opening to Dupin’s supposition about the sailor in the latter section. After 
detailing his “intimate” (533) relationship with Dupin, the narrator reports an instance when 
Dupin was able to predict his train of thought and “fathom [his] soul” (534). While the narrator 
confirms that Dupin indeed knew the person the narrator was thinking of (534), the chain of 
assumptions that Dupin makes to arrive at this conclusion depends on his intimate knowledge of 
the narrator rather than on universal logical principles or even material evidence. Dupin, states, 
for example, “I knew that you could not say to yourself ‘stereotomy’ without being brought to 
think of atomies, and thus of the theories of Epicurus” (536). This association would not hold 
true for everyone, however, and only the narrator’s close companion could predict the 
stereotomy – atomie – Epicurus links.  
When Dupin later claims to understand the sailor’s thought process (“He will reason 
thus” [561]), the narrator encourages the reader to believe that Dupin is again correct in his 
reasoning, but the story does not provide any verification of Dupin’s assertion. Dupin has never 
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met the sailor, and thus he cannot rely on special knowledge of mental quirks and habits as he 
did with the narrator. The sailor agrees to Dupin’s narrative only after Dupin has assured him 
that he “know[s]…you are innocent” (563). The sailor is therefore motivated to corroborate 
Dupin’s version of events since Dupin has promised that “[w]e mean you no harm” (563). Poe 
suggests that the sailor authorizes Dupin’s story because it serves the sailor’s interests, regardless 
of its mimetic validity. The sailor never voices his own narrative; instead, the narrator 
appropriates his voice, declaring, “What [the sailor] stated was, in substance, this” (564). This 
narrative sleight of hand, combined with the narrator’s awe-struck admiration of Dupin, 
encourages the reader to accept Dupin’s narrative as true and ignore the inconsistencies.  
Dupin’s genius, we might say, exemplifies Pierre Bourdieu’s realm of symbolic 
production, “the production…of belief in the value of the work” (37). This rhetorical ability to 
convince others is a valuable skill, one essential to maintaining power in a democracy. Poe 
models a strategy of manufacturing consent for the benefit of certain readers: those who can, like 
Dupin, draw on the resources of white privilege to buttress their account. On this view, truth and 
accuracy—a logical relationship between the facts and the solution—are beside the point; what 
matters is the power to produce or coerce confidence in one’s account of reality.10 This rhetorical 
mastery conserves power in one individual, who wields it to maintain the status quo and preserve 
white privilege. Dupin’s dominant detection has become the standard against which all detective 
fiction is measured. But Douglass—Poe’s contemporary—and indeed Poe himself recognized 
that this was only one side of the story.                                                         
10This claim that Poe is modeling strategies for his readers’ benefit is indebted to Shawn 
Rosenheim’s notion of the “analytical sublime” in Poe’s detective fiction, although our 
arguments work toward different ends. Rosenheim focuses on the bodily effects that Poe’s 
detective stories produce in his readers, the way in which the “text discloses in the reader’s 
body the nature of the interpretive desires that initiate his reading” (71). 
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In an 1846 letter to Philip P. Cooke, Poe complained, “people think [the Dupin tales] 
more ingenious than they are—on account of their method and air of method. In the ‘Murders in 
the Rue Morgue,’ for instance, where is the ingenuity of unravelling a web which you yourself 
(the author) have woven for the express purpose of unravelling?” (Letters 328). Poe disparages 
the Dupin tales’ “ingenuity” because their mysteries are self-contained, made to be unraveled. 
Doubling his personal pronouns and then adding a parenthetical for good measure, Poe 
emphasizes the origin of the “web” in his own mind. As Stephen Rachman notes, Poe understood 
writing detective fiction not as “an act of imaginative expression, explanation, clarification, or, 
perhaps, even genuine analysis, but a program of deception that is eventually explained” (18). In 
contrast to the complex social problems, including slavery, that Poe alludes to in the story and 
that originate outside the author’s mind, the web that Poe weaves for Dupin is limited in scope 
and value. Poe highlights this limitation in the epigraph, taken from Thomas Browne: “What 
song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among women, 
although puzzling questions are not beyond all conjecture” (527, italics added). Poe’s story 
provides an intriguing answer to the “what” question, but its answer to the “why” question is 
disappointingly tautological. The organgutan’s “motive” is its natural ferocity. Furthermore, the 
sailor, according to Dupin, had no responsibility and thus no motive. These unsatisfying answers 
might prompt the reader to reexamine the case in search of a better explanation, one that 
acknowledges the effects of the system of domination rather than isolating individual moments 
of “natural” violence. Dupin’s dominant detection punishes individuals while protecting the 
system. Poe’s frustration with his readers’ admiration for the story’s “ingenuity” suggests that he 
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expected a different response from his readers, one that recognized the limitations of Dupin’s 
“solution” and engaged with the unanswered questions that the facile ending provokes.11  
Douglass, on the other hand, is primarily interested in “why.” He understands the tension 
that Poe described in his letter to Cooke: the tidier and thus more satisfying the narrative 
resolution, the less relevance it has to the messy, complex extratextual world. Douglass argues 
that the political and social oppression of enslaved people has trained them in the skills necessary 
for successful detection, but that those skills are shared among communities and can be taught to 
others rather than conserved for use by a singular individual. While Poe’s dominant detection 
preserves the status quo by consolidating power in the hands of one mastermind who exercises 
control over social deviants, Douglass’s detectives seek to destroy the social order and replace it 
with a new, egalitarian order: to break the law in order to uphold a higher law. Both Poe’s and 
Douglass’s stories depict a dominant detective reducing the scope of a crime to an individual 
scale. Whereas Poe’s story ends there, however, Douglass’s takes this as its starting point, then 
proceeds to deconstruct dominant detection and offer, in its place, subordinate detection. 
Douglass’s subordinate formulation disrupts the hierarchy by creating a protected space for 
                                                        
11Poe continued to develop his approach to detection in two more Dupin tales. The second, “The 
Mystery of Marie Rogêt,” which today is generally considered a flawed story, is the only 
Dupin tale that is based, like Douglass’s novella, on actual events and that aims to intervene 
in the material world. Instead of unraveling a web which he himself had created, Poe 
attempted to solve an actual murder, the case of Mary Rogers (see Daniel Stashower, The 
Beautiful Cigar Girl, for a book-length analysis of Poe’s story and the historical events upon 
which it was based). Poe’s solution was invalidated before the final installment of his three-
part serial was published, however. Although he reworked the third section to reflect the new 
information, Dupin’s solution had been pointing to a different explanation, and the dissonance 
between the third installment and the remainder of the story undermined Dupin’s position as 
unchallenged authority. Poe’s final Dupin tale takes a different tack: rather than moving 
outside the author’s own mind and solving a real-life mystery, Poe amplified the 
interiorization and dislocation from the social that he first presented in “Murders.” 
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covert insurgent action. Placing Poe and Douglass in relation reminds us that detection can 
expose or protect, reinforce or challenge social order.  
The Heroic Slave has recently enjoyed a surge of critical interest, but the mode of 
detection has hitherto remained unrecognized as a crucial constituent of its form. Yet Douglass, 
writing twelve years after the publication of “Murders,” foregrounds the unsolved mystery that 
has prompted his foray into fiction. In the introductory paragraphs, the narrator delineates the 
rhetorical field of the novella: “Speaking of marks, traces, possibles, and probabilities, we come 
before our reader” (132). For the modern reader, the narrator’s statement evokes the vocabulary 
of detective fiction: the “traces” of evidence that point to a suspect, the “possibles” that must be 
eliminated before the correct solution can be obtained. Because Douglass’s model is so different 
from Poe’s, and thus—given Poe’s centrality to the development of detective fiction—from 
readers’ expectations, however, we have not recognized modes of detection in The Heroic Slave.  
The novella is based on the historical Madison Washington, the leader of a mutiny on the 
slave ship Creole that occurred in November 1841.12 Washington had escaped from enslavement 
in Virginia and was living in Canada, but decided to return to Virginia in the hopes of freeing his 
wife. His rescue attempt failed; he was recaptured and sold to a slave trader, who intended to sell 
Washington in New Orleans. En route from Richmond, Virginia, to New Orleans, nineteen 
enslaved men, including Washington, seized control of the Creole, killing one of the white slave 
traders. The mutineers forced the white crew to land the ship at Nassau, in the British colony of                                                         
12For more on the historical Creole mutiny, see Edward D. Jervey and C. Harold Huber, “The 
Creole Affair,” Howard Jones, “The Peculiar Institution and National Honor: The Case of the 
Creole Slave Revolt,” and George Hendrick and Willene Hendrick, “Introduction” to Two 
Slave Rebellions at Sea. Maggie Montesinos Sale’s treatment of the case in The Slumbering 
Volcano: American Slave Ship Revolts and the Production of Rebellious Masculinity deftly 
weaves readings of political, legal, and historical documents with an analysis of The Heroic 
Slave.  
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the Bahamas, where the British governor detained the nineteen leaders but allowed the 116 other 
enslaved passengers to leave the ship, effectively emancipating them. The leaders were 
imprisoned for several months but were finally freed in April 1842. There are no further records 
of any of the formerly enslaved passengers, including Washington, after that date. 
In fictionalizing Washington’s story, Douglass makes a significant departure from the 
historical record.13 While the dramatic events of the Creole mutiny seem tailor-made for a 
gripping adventure story, Douglass chooses to devote three quarters of his novella to a fictional 
prehistory of the Creole mutiny. Indeed, the mutiny is not depicted first-hand in the story, only 
narrated retrospectively by the fictional first mate of the slave ship. Instead, Douglass imagines 
Washington’s life in the six years preceding the mutiny, inventing a white character named 
Listwell, who plays an important role in Washington’s bid for freedom.14 The first three sections                                                         
13Before he fictionalized Washington’s life in The Heroic Slave, Douglass drew on the Creole 
mutiny in several lectures, most notably “Slavery: The Slumbering Volcano.” In this address, 
delivered in New York on April 23, 1849, Douglass gave a sketch of Washington’s life based 
on articles in the National Anti-Slavery Standard and the Liberator, as well as on Douglass’s 
conversations with friends who had met Washington when he was in Canada. Unlike the 
National Anti-Slavery Standard and Liberator articles, or William Wells Brown’s and Lydia 
Maria Child’s later biographies of Washington, Douglass downplays the romantic aspect of 
Washington’s returning for his wife. Instead, he emphasizes the political dimension of 
Washington’s revolt, which caused a diplomatic controversy between the US and Britain, 
capitalizing on the irony of the “free, democratic republic” of the United States appealing to 
the crown for remuneration for the slave owners’ lost “property.” William Wells Brown wrote 
about Washington in The Black Man: His Antecedents, His Genius, and His Achievements 
(1863) and The Negro in the American Rebellion: His Heroism and His Fidelity (1867). Lydia 
Maria Child included a biography of Washington in The Freedmen’s Book (1865). Pauline 
Hopkins also wrote a short story about Washington, “A Dash for Liberty,” in 1903. All three 
writers drew on Douglass’s novella as a source. See Ivy Wilson, “On Native Ground: 
Transnationalism, Frederick Douglass, and ‘The Heroic Slave,’” for an analysis of Douglass’s 
sources and his “inventions.” See also Robert S. Levine, Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, 
and the Politics of Representative Identity, and William L. Andrews, “The Novelization of 
Voice in Early African American Narrative.” 
14One line of criticism on The Heroic Slave has focused on the possibilities for interracial 
cooperation suggested by Washington and Listwell’s relationship. See, for example, John 
 158 
of The Heroic Slave are structured as a triptych depicting Listwell’s transformation from 
dominant to subordinate detection. The same scene of detection is reiterated three times. First, 
Douglass stages a scene that Listwell, the Dupinian figure, takes to be private and unmediated, 
but is in fact thoroughly circumscribed by performativity and preconceptions. Douglass thus 
indicates that dominant detection is illusory, based on projecting onto a surface rather than 
penetrating that surface to the “mysterious depths” below. Both Listwell and the narrator of the 
Dupin stories use depth imagery to represent interiority, figuring the detective as “sound[ing]” 
(HS 134) or “fathom[ing]” (“Murders” 534) the depths of another soul to access the bedrock, 
unchanging truth. This imagery indicates that the solution to the mystery lies within a person: if 
you can access a person’s soul, you can solve the crime. Douglass critiques this mode of 
detection in the second section, when Washington retells essentially the same story that Listwell 
enacted in part 1, substituting himself for Listwell. Washington’s story retrains Listwell in 
subordinate detection, a pragmatic mode in which the practitioner reads one’s situation carefully 
in order to protect oneself and create opportunities to undermine the system of slavery. This 
instruction transforms Listwell from a clueless and passive white observer to a black-identified 
radical abolitionist. In part 3, Listwell re-enacts his initial scene of detection, but instead of 
spying on an enslaved man, he occupies the enslaved man’s position and detects the plot of white 
proslavery Southerners. This subordinate detective work enables him actively to abet 
Washington’s rebellion by secretly equipping Washington with files to remove his manacles. 
In his prefatory remarks, Douglass briefly engages in the type of theorization about 
analysis and deduction that makes up a significant portion of Poe’s Dupin tales. The first 
                                                        
Stauffer, “Interracial Friendship and the Aesthetics of Freedom.” 
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paragraph proffers an enigma, as Douglass ponders how an individual as singularly heroic as 
Washington could be a missing person in American history: 
Let those account for it who can, but there stands the fact, that a man 
who loved liberty as well as did Patrick Henry—who deserved it as much 
as Thomas Jefferson—and who fought for it with a valor as high, an arm 
as strong, and against odds as great as he who led all the armies of the 
American colonies through the great war for freedom and independence, 
lives now only in the chattel records of his native state. (132) 
 
Within this enigma Douglass inserts another “delightfully artful riddle” (Stepto, “Storytelling,” 
361). Douglass names Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, but withholds the name of the third 
patriot, the leader of the “armies of the American colonies.” As Robert Stepto notes, the solution 
to the riddle is elementary:  
as any school boy or girl knows, the mystery man is Washington. And that is the 
answer—and point—to Douglass’ funny-sad joke...: his mystery man is also a 
hero named Washington. Thus, Douglass advances his comparison of heroic 
statesmen and heroic chattel, and does so quite ingeniously by both naming and 
not naming them in such as way that we are led to discover that statesmen and 
slaves may share the same name and be heroes and Virginians alike. (Stepto, 
“Storytelling,” 362) 
 
Like the elaborate digressions on strategies of chess, whist, and evens and odds that preface 
Poe’s Dupin tales, the riddle inside an enigma that opens Douglass’s novella situates readers 
within a world of ratiocination and deduction. Whereas Poe’s analogues for these mental 
processes are all games, disconnected from the story’s plot and lacking stakes in the real world, 
however, Douglass’s riddle comments specifically on the matter of the story, and its solution 
nudges the reader toward an abolitionist political position.  Further, Douglass’s riddle and the 
mystery of the dramatically different treatment of two men—one white, one black—who equally 
deserve honor, are readily solved, as Stepto indicates, by “any school boy or girl”; their solution 
points outside the text of the story to the legal status and political situation of enslaved people. In 
contrast to Poe’s insoluble mysteries, in which information is withheld from the reader in order 
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to magnify Dupin’s distinction, the solubility of Douglass’s riddle corresponds to his 
pedagogical goal: to instruct readers in the skills of detection and interpretation in order to incite 
radical abolitionist activism. Douglass gestures toward the mind games that dominant detection 
plays only in order to deflate them and turn his readers’ attention to the “why” question, the 
sociopolitical circumstances that structure detection. 
In part 1, Listwell hears a mellifluous voice soliloquizing in the woods and, intrigued, 
“stealthily drew near the solitary speaker...concealing himself by the side of a huge fallen tree” 
(133). Washington, “the solitary speaker,” makes a dramatic and eloquent case for running away 
from his owner, thrilling Listwell, who “had long desired to sound the mysterious depths of the 
thoughts and feelings of a slave” (134). Believing that he has concealed himself from “the 
unsuspecting speaker” (134), Listwell rates this ostensibly secret information he has obtained as 
more genuine and more valuable than testimony by a speaker who knows he has an audience. 
Listwell, to use Scott’s terms, believes he has accessed the hidden transcript of slavery by 
eavesdropping on Washington. Presumed contact with these “mysterious depths” converts 
Listwell to abolitionism on the spot, despite his having never conversed with Washington. 
Unlike the narrator of the Dupin tales, who believes that Dupin possesses an 
extraordinary ability to penetrate another person’s interiority, Douglass’s narrator undercuts 
Listwell’s claim to secret knowledge. Instead, the narrator implies that Listwell has simply 
identified with a product of his own imagination—a white stereotype of a black man. In a 
passage of free indirect discourse, the narrator describes Washington from Listwell’s 
perspective:  
Madison was of manly form....His face was ‘black, but comely.’...yet there 
was nothing savage or forbidding in his aspect. A child might play in his 
arms, or dance on his shoulders. A giant’s strength, but not a giant’s heart 
was in him. His broad mouth and nose spoke only of good nature and 
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kindness. But his voice, that unfailing index of the soul, had that in it 
which could terrify as well as charm. (134) 
 
Many critics have taken this passage as a reliable portrait of Washington.15 Yet this description 
indulges in romanticized, clichéd imagery of African Americans, from the Uncle Tom-like 
“gentle giant” to the “broad mouth and nose.” In the North Star, Douglass had chastised white 
artists for exaggerating these stereotypes, complaining that  
negroes can never have impartial portraits, at the hands of white 
artists.…Artists, like all other white persons have adopted a theory 
respecting the distinctive features of negro physiognomy. We have heard 
many white persons say, that ‘negroes look all alike’…They associate 
with the negro face, high cheek bones, distended nostril, depressed nose, 
thick lips, and retreating foreheads….The temptation to make the likeness 
of the negro, rather than of the man, is very strong. (April 7, 1849) 
 
I read the stereotyped imagery of the passage in The Heroic Slave as representing Listwell’s 
“romantic racialist” view, to use George Frederickson’s term (101), a view that prides itself on 
seeing African Americans as “comely” in spite of their “black[ness].” Listwell’s portrait of 
Washington as a “noble slave” takes “the likeness of the negro, rather than the man” and ends up 
denying Washington’s individuality even as Listwell claims to have accessed Washington’s soul: 
it makes Washington an object onto which Listwell projects. Indeed, this reduction of individual 
to stereotype is present in Listwell’s desire for unmediated contact with “a slave[’s]” mysterious                                                         
15Marianne Noble remarks that Washington’s “voice leads [Listwell] into the speaker’s interior, 
inviting speculation upon the full range of emotional and intellectual experiences of the 
speaker. It is because it communicates interior experiences that Douglass calls the ‘voice, that 
unfailing index of the soul’” (60-61). Richard Yarborough points out that in previous 
speeches about Washington, Douglass had exaggerated his description of Washington’s 
physiognomy—calling him “a black man, with wooly head, high cheek bones, protruding lip, 
distended nostril, and retreating forehead”—to ironically contrast “the racist connotation of 
certain black physical attributes with the fact Washington has just taken control of both the 
Creole and his fate” (173). Yarborough reads the description of Washington in The Heroic 
Slave, however, as “fall[ing] in line with conventional Anglo-American conceptions of ideal 
masculinity” (173) and expresses disappointment that Douglass “forgoes the sarcastic thrust” 
of his earlier speeches.  
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depths, implying that, since all slaves are alike, any slave will do. Listwell’s white privilege, like 
Dupin’s, protects him and provides him with the power to impose his interpretation onto 
Washington.  
 In addition to undermining Listwell’s claim to have detected “a slave[’s]” interiority, 
Douglass more radically collapses the distinction between public and private, suggesting that the 
conditions of the slave system demand that enslaved people’s lives are always already public and 
performative. When Washington finishes speaking, he “cast around a searching glance, as if the 
thought of being overheard had flashed across his mind” (135). Whether this is merely a cautious 
reflex on Washington’s part or a mark of his awareness that he was not alone in the forest is left 
ambiguous, but Washington’s vigilance foregrounds the hypervisibility in which he lives and to 
which he must be ever alert. What Listwell takes to be the hidden transcript is still a 
performance—a philosophical speech about the nature of freedom that conforms to the 
conventions of Enlightenment rationality like the speeches Douglass read in The Columbian 
Orator. Washington’s speech exemplifies the “surveillant discipline” that Christopher Castiglia 
describes, “in which the black sufferer had to imagine himself or herself always in the eyes of 
whites, becoming a body shaped by an idea of a body” (124).16 While Castiglia expounds the 
workings of sympathy as a “surveillant discipline” in Garrison’s abolitionist speeches and 
writings, Douglass reminds us that surveillant discipline is no mere metaphor under the slave 
system. Indeed, it is precisely Washington’s survival under the literal surveillance of the slave 
system that has trained him to detect successfully.                                                          
16 Milette Shamir similarly notes that Washington’s speech is “pure surface, public and 
performative in character, as if he is conscious of an audience that he has to persuade of his 
safe inner constitution” (139), but she fails to identify this performativity as a characteristic of 
the slave system in general, rather than simply the singular performance of Washington.  
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Rejecting dominant detection’s penetrative mode, Douglass depicts a mode of detection 
that is more adaptive, and pragmatic. This subordinate detection acknowledges that context and 
circumstances shape truth and thus the solution to a mystery is found in the interactions among 
people in a particular environment, not within an individual’s soul. When Listwell actually 
interacts with Washington in part 2, he initially persists in his Dupin-like behavior, projecting 
onto Washington an interiority that he can read perfectly because it is his own construction. 
Washington’s didactic tale restages Listwell’s original scene of detection, revealing in the 
process that Listwell’s claim to have accessed another person’s interiority is ultimately empty 
rhetoric. After Listwell listens well to Washington’s parable, he begins to transform from 
passively sympathizing with an enslaved man to actively engaging in abolitionist activities. 
Douglass thus turns the reader’s attention to the system, rather than circumscribing our view to 
the individual as Poe does.  
Douglass undermines Listwell’s self-satisfied certainty that concluded part 1. Part 2 
opens with a passage that evokes the Gothic setting of Dupin and the narrator’s intimate isolation 
in Poe’s tales. Mr. and Mrs. Listwell sit alone in independent “reverie” by their fireside on a 
“night for strange noises and for strange fancies. A whole wilderness of thought might pass 
through one’s mind during such an evening” (136). By coincidence, Washington knocks on 
Listwell's door, intruding a physical African American presence into the “reverie” in which the 
Listwells have been indulging. In the ironic juxtaposition between the “wilderness of thought” 
that passes through Listwell’s mind and the literal wilderness through which Washington has 
“journey[ed]” to reach Ohio, braving “the piercing cold, and the frowning darkness” (137), 
Douglass once again figures Listwell as absorbed in self-generated “fancies” rather than 
observant of material reality. Indeed, Listwell proves incorrect in his surmises, as he assures his 
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wife upon hearing their watchdog growl that “the wind has deceived the dog”; no one would on 
“such a night…expose themselves to this biting frost” (136). Only a few minutes later 
Washington appears at their door, proving Listwell wrong and highlighting his incomprehension 
of what would motivate someone to “expose themselves.” 
Listwell, recognizing Washington immediately, tries to assert his rhetorical mastery: “I 
know not your name, but I have seen your face, and heard your voice before....I know all” (137). 
Listwell’s enthusiasm backfires when his brash claim that he “know[s] all” frightens the fugitive 
Washington with and “awaken[s]” Washington’s “timidity and suspicion” (137). Listwell’s 
declaration of omniscience reinstates the power dynamic between slaveholder and enslaved from 
which Washington is fleeing. The culture of slavery has trained Washington to assume he is 
being surveilled, and he quickly resumes the defensive pose of the submissive, “timid” slave. 
Unlike proslavery whites, however, Listwell abandons his attempts at rhetorical mastery and 
indicates a willingness to learn from Washington. Seeing his mistake, Listwell “assumed a more 
quiet and inquiring aspect” (137), which eventually induces Washington to accept Listwell as a 
potential ally and to train him in a more effective model of detection, one that aims to disrupt, 
rather than maintain, the social order.  
 Washington trains Listwell by telling a parable of detection, in which he occupies the 
same position that Listwell did in part 1: concealed and spying on another man’s soliloquy 
regarding his enslavement. Washington projects the conventions of Romantic selfhood onto the 
man, characterizing him, as Listwell did Washington, as a “noble slave” yearning for 
“deliverance from bondage” (143). Washington attests to the “deep pathos” of the man’s prayer 
and tells the Listwells that, although he had “given but little attention to religion, and had but 
little faith in it,” the man’s speech moves him to the point of conversion: “I felt almost like 
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coming down and kneel[ing] by his side, and mingl[ing] my broken complaint with his” (143, 
emendations in original). Like Listwell’s proclaimed “conversion” to abolitionism instantly after 
hearing Washington’s soliloquy in part 1, Washington’s conversion experience is just talk: he 
takes no action. 
The conclusion of Washington’s story, however, diverges sharply from Listwell’s initial 
scene of spying and repudiates Listwell’s belief that he had accessed a hidden transcript. 
Believing that the man is reliable, Washington reveals himself, but, just as Listwell’s overbearing 
assertion that he “knows all” initially scared Washington, Washington frightens the man: “He 
seemed a little alarmed at first, but I told him my story, and the good man embraced me in his 
arms, and assured me of his sympathy” (144). This use of a key word in abolitionist discourse, 
sympathy—the first appearance in the text—alerts the reader to the scene’s subtext, a criticism of 
sympathy’s inefficacy. Washington gives the man his last dollar and trusts him to return with 
food. Instead, the man returns with a band of slave catchers. Whereas Listwell’s white privilege 
provides him the power to impose his projection onto the world, even if it does not in fact match 
up with reality, Washington’s marginalized position forces him to prepare for the contingency 
that the man’s private speech does not reflect his authentic core, or, more precisely, that given 
the conditions of slavery under which the man is living, his interiority is beside the point. 
Determining an individual’s sympathies is not enough; to survive one must expand one’s 
analysis to the system-level, as Washington indicates when he rejects Mrs. Listwell’s suggestion 
that the man betrayed him and speculates that the mere fact of an enslaved man having money 
“doubtless, excited suspicion, and gave rise to inquiry” (144). Tutoring Listwell in the 
hypervigilance and skepticism required to survive in the slave system, Washington explains that 
he had taken action; he prudently moved to a different location than the one in which he had 
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conversed with the man, so that when the man returns with the slave catchers they cannot find 
him. Washington’s quick reflexes and “suspicion,” which he demonstrates also in his 
“hesitat[ion]” and “scrutinizing glance” before entering Listwell’s home (137), mark him as 
more competent at detecting than Listwell.  
Washington’s story restages the trope of the white listener—like Listwell in part 1 or the 
white abolitionists who attended Douglass’s orations—who believes that it is enough to 
sympathize with the victims of slavery. Despite the bond of “sympathy” between the suffering  
man and Washington, his sympathetic listener, when the slave catchers decide the man was lying 
and whip him for stealing the money, Washington “disobey[s] his impulse” to “rush[] out in the 
midst of them” and rescue the man, rationalizing his decision to stay put by reminding himself 
that the man “would be whipped the more for having aided a fugitive slave” (144). Washington 
depicts himself as outnumbered and powerless to act, forced to witness a horrifying scene and 
remain silent, though “my own flesh crept at every blow” (144). Without sacrificing the moral 
complexity of the situation, as Washington really is outnumbered, and his pragmatic justification 
for remaining hidden does make sense, Douglass indicates the futility of mere sympathy. 
Remaining a sympathetic but passive witness to violence protects Washington, enabling him to 
flee to the North, but the disturbing scene undercuts a triumphal reading of Washington’s escape, 
suggesting that one individual’s freedom is not a satisfying conclusion. Indeed, Douglass pursues 
this implication when Washington chooses to leave Canada and return to Virginia to free his 
wife, reminding readers that crossing the border into a free territory does not redress the larger 
problem of slavery. This lesson in the inefficacy of sympathy, combined with the training in 
detection, teaches Listwell that radical action is required to abolish slavery.  
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In part 3, Douglass depicts subordinate detection. Those who practice this mode aim not 
to reestablish the status quo—as in the Dupinian mode—but to subvert the operation of the slave 
system and assist covert abolitionist action. Indeed, Listwell detects, deceives, and manipulates a 
group of proslavery white Southerners, just as Washington evaded the slave catchers in part 2. 
Listwell disguises his identity when he visits a Virginia tavern even though there is no apparent 
reason to do so. He then conceals himself in “his private room, private to the eye, but not to the 
ear” (150). Hidden from view, as he and Washington were in parts 1 and 2, respectively, Listwell 
eavesdrops on the opinions and plans of the white Southerners in the bar below. Whereas 
Listwell, in his Dupinian mode of detection, presumed he could penetrate another person’s 
interiority, here he gathers intelligence that is pure exteriority. Rather than a soliloquy, Listwell 
overhears a conversation among white men who trade in and profit from information: “Money 
they seldom have; yet they always have capital the most reliable. They make their way with a 
succeeding traveler by intelligence gained from a preceding one....He must be a shrewd man, and 
well skilled in the art of evasion, who gets out of the hands of these fellows” (148). Although 
these men are poor “loafers,” not slaveholders, they too operate within the culture of surveillance 
that characterizes the slave system, as they collect “intelligence” from sources and then trade that 
information for profit. The customers’ performative Southern masculinity and information 
trading contains no reference to any private interiority; it is ritualized and profiteering, not 
individualistic or expressive. No longer eavesdropping on an enslaved man, Listwell now 
occupies the position of the enslaved, which requires him to be suspicious of whites and to 
practice deception to avoid their surveillance. Washington taught Listwell “the art of evasion” 
well, as Listwell is now “shrewd” enough to “get out of the hands of these fellows.” It is through 
this experience—not by eavesdropping on Washington’s speech, but by undergoing a mitigated 
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version of what Washington was describing—that Listwell learns what it is like to be someone 
with no power. Rather than being able to rely on his privilege as a free white man to assert that 
he “knows all,” he must practice the covert methods in which Washington has tutored him.  
Listwell initially had no ostensible purpose for going undercover, suggesting that 
Washington’s lesson has transformed him so thoroughly that he has internalized the performative 
demands placed on the enslaved and instinctively adopts the “timidity and suspicion of persons 
escaping from slavery” (137) when he encounters proslavery whites. He has, that is, become 
radically black-identified. Listwell’s spying pays off when he finds Washington, whom Listwell 
believed to be living safely in Canada, among “a slave-gang on their way to market” (152). 
Listwell frames Washington’s unexpected presence as a mystery to be solved, although Listwell 
is now more self-reflective about his culpability for the crime of slavery: “This is a puzzle not 
easily solved. How came he here? what can I do for him? may I not even now be in some way 
compromised in this affair? were thoughts that troubled Mr. Listwell” (153). Rather than 
precipitously asserting his own omniscience, as Listwell did when Washington appeared at his 
front door in part 2, Listwell’s questions demonstrate that he has become more skeptical and 
attentive to the specific circumstances of his situation. Moreover, he is not satisfied with 
discovering “what” happened, he also wants to know “how” Washington came to be at the 
tavern, and he immediately begins to consider what action he might take to assist Washington. 
Running three questions together into one sentence grammatically emphasizes their simultaneity, 
placing explanation, action, and self-reflection on an equal footing, as opposed to the Dupinian 
model in which explanation—rhetorical mastery—alone matters. Listwell’s pragmatic reaction to 
the “puzzle” indicates that a satisfactory solution will not simply confirm his preconceptions nor 
recruit his sympathy, but will help him take appropriate and effective action. 
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Whereas dominant detection tries to monitor the subordinate group’s hidden transcript to 
suppress action, subordinate detection probes the dominant group’s hidden transcript to discover 
weaknesses and thus create opportunities for resistance. Washington and Listwell draw on the 
information Listwell has gained by spying and cooperate to exploit such a weakness, revealing 
the hidden transcript in a dramatic mutiny that must be accounted for in the public transcript. 
Once all the other white men at the tavern are occupied with breakfast, Listwell sneaks out to 
talk to Washington and discovers that Washington had been recaptured when he returned to 
Virginia to rescue his wife. After ascertaining that there is no way for Listwell to buy 
Washington's freedom, Listwell offers Washington not merely his sympathy and admiration, but 
ten dollars, and cautions him, “I shall see you at [the slave-market in] Richmond, but don’t 
recognize me” (155). In Richmond, Listwell uses the protected space he has created for himself 
by disguising his identity and gathering information—as well as the mobility afforded him by his 
white skin—to slip three files into Washington’s pocket, thus enabling Washington to free 
himself from his irons and lead the mutiny on the Creole that occurs in the space between parts 3 
and 4 of The Heroic Slave.  
Washington has gradually disappeared from the novella as Listwell has become more 
adept at employing the strategies of deception and detection that Washington taught him. 
Washington was the central figure in part 1, with Listwell a hidden observer. In part 2, the 
narrative was shared between Washington and Listwell, as the men, with Mrs. Listwell 
occasionally interjecting, held a long conversation, but the setting was Listwell’s home rather 
than a space associated with Washington. In part 3, in a space that is not associated with either of 
the men, Washington appears only briefly. Washington has again lost his individuality in the 
image that concludes part 3, albeit in a different way than when Listwell projected onto 
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Washington in part 1: as Listwell watches the Creole leave the wharf, Washington is 
indistinguishable on the “long, low, black slaver, with her cargo of human flesh” (156). This 
final image ironically restages the memorable Chesapeake ships scene from Douglass’s 1845 
Narrative, in which Douglass declares, “I have often, in the deep stillness of a summer’s 
Sabbath, stood all alone upon the lofty banks of that noble bay, and traced, with saddened heart 
and tearful eye, the countless number of sails moving off to the mighty ocean” (64). Whereas in 
the Narrative, the contrast between the “purest white” sails of “freedom’s swift-winged angels” 
and Douglass’s “confine[ment] in bands of iron” “torment[s]” Douglass (64), in The Heroic 
Slave rewriting, Listwell, a free white man, stands on the shore, watching a “black” ship of 
enslaved men and women. This inversion underscores the way in which Listwell has come to 
occupy the position of an enslaved man by locating Listwell in the spot Douglass occupied in the 
Narrative: “Mr. Listwell stood on the shore and watched the slaver till the last speck of her upper 
sails faded from sight, and announced the limit of human vision. ‘Farewell! farewell! brave and 
true man! God grant that brighter skies may smile upon your future than have yet looked down 
upon your thorny pathway” (156). Indeed, Washington’s speech in the forest in part 1 is 
markedly similar to Douglass’s apostrophe to the Chesapeake ships in the Narrative, suggesting 
that Listwell has come full circle, and is now standing in for Washington, who is also a figure for 
Douglass.  
This complex image indicates both Listwell’s dramatic transformation, as he has traded 
his privileged position of white surveiller for the marginalized position of radical abolitionist, as 
well as the circularity of the first three sections of the narrative, as part 3 ends exactly where part 
1 began, with Washington enslaved and Listwell watching him. Yet the shift in perspective that 
Washington’s training in detection has occasioned in Listwell, in addition to Washington’s 
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intellectual exertions and careful cultivation of allies, has laid the groundwork for a different 
outcome: not just one individual’s escape to freedom, but emancipation for 119 men and women, 
a major strike against the political and moral justifications for the slave system, and the 
emergence of a legendary figure whose story became valuable currency in abolitionist circles.   
As Washington’s lesson and Listwell’s experience reveals, subordinate detection doesn’t 
bring acclaim and thus attention to oneself, but rather protects one from scrutiny. The protected 
space this undetectable detection creates enables one to act covertly to alter the status quo. 
Unlike Poe’s dominant detection, Douglass’s model stems directly from and acts immediately 
upon specific material circumstances: Washington’s enslavement and Listwell’s unauthorized 
aid to a fugitive slave and rebel. Detection, that is, has a sociopolitical function, and Douglass’s 
purpose in writing the story is not simply to play mind games with his reader, but to expose the 
racialized power dynamics that structure different models of detection.  
These contrasting aims are manifested also in the ways the authors imagine their 
detectives’ public legacies. The unnamed narrator of Poe’s Dupin tales functions as a publicist 
for Dupin’s brilliance, ensuring that the credit for solving the mystery accrues to and benefits one 
individual—Dupin. Poe deliberately effaces as many specific historical and cultural referents as 
possible, so that the story’s circulation promotes Dupin as a universal, transcendent genius. Poe’s 
strain of detective fiction to a large extent wrote its own reception, elevating Dupin, and by 
proxy, Poe. In Douglass’s novella, on the other hand, the hero gradually disappears from the text. 
Washington is completely absent from the final section, his presence and voice replaced by a 
white, Southern narrator. This vanishing makes sense when one considers that the aim of a 
fugitive from slavery, for whom successful detection is a matter of life and death, is to escape 
notice, rather than to garner acclaim. Douglass ties his story to a specific time and place and 
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demonstrates the efficacy, indeed the necessity, of a model of detection that is intended to remain 
inconspicuous. 
Yet in the concluding section of The Heroic Slave, Douglass imagines how Washington’s 
story might circulate within the United States and, more radically, in the South. In part 4, the 
reader eavesdrops on a conversation among white sailors in the “Marine Coffee-House” in 
Richmond, Virginia, two months after the Creole mutiny. Tom Grant, the fictional first mate of 
the Creole, offers a complicated defense of himself and his conquered shipmates that veers 
between acknowledging the impressive strength and intelligence of the mutineers, particularly 
Washington, and clasping at cherished Southern prejudices about African American inferiority. 
The reader witnesses Grant grope haltingly toward a more egalitarian view of African 
Americans, his inconsistency indicating that his experience on board the Creole has irrevocably 
altered him but that he has not yet synthesized this new and challenging worldview. While 
Listwell, predisposed to romantic sympathy rather than pragmatic action, had to participate in the 
survival strategies of deception and concealment to begin to appreciate the perspective of an 
enslaved person, Grant, used to being the master on board ship, had to experience being 
overpowered, threatened with violence, and dominated in order to appreciate the heroism of an 
African American revolutionary. Significantly, the effects of Grant’s experiences are not just 
politically transformative, but they also transform the structure of the narrative. Grant becomes 
“something of a white Southern storyteller of a tale of black freedom” (Stepto, “Storytelling,” 
364). Although Washington has disappeared bodily from the text to a transnational space of 
freedom, he has created his own narrator, like Dupin’s companion or Holmes’s Dr. Watson.  
Although this storyteller circulates an account of Washington’s courage, his narrative 
makes an abrupt generic shift to adventure story—the type of story about a dramatic slave 
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rebellion at sea one might have expected Douglass to tell in the first place. The back-story to the 
Creole revolution, the very story that Douglass has just imagined in such detail, becomes again 
“a mystery” (160). Washington’s detection drops out of Grant’s tale. Washington achieves fame, 
at least in Douglass’s fantasy of the South, but he achieves it as a revolutionary, not as a 
detective figure. Unlike Poe’s Dupin, who—despite his scorn for the police—maintains the 
power of the dominant group, Washington and Listwell disrupt and undermine the rule of law in 
order to initiate a new social order. Because their detection threatens that order, it must remain 
inconspicuous to be effective. While Douglass describes subordinate detection in the sections of 
the novella intended for an anti-slavery readership, he eliminates it when he imagines how 
Washington’s story might circulate among a non-sympathetic audience—much as he chose to 
omit the details of his own escape in his Narrative.  
Grant’s account of Washington’s heroic performance aboard the Creole, which portrays 
Washington as a mythic figure equal in leadership, eloquence, and dignity to the founding 
fathers, answers the sardonic question asked in the novella’s opening paragraphs: how a man as 
great as Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, or George Washington could “liv[e] now only in the 
chattel records of his native state” (132). As Ivy Wilson explains, “The effect created in this last 
section is the removal of the black physical presence from the United States. Only Grant and 
Williams are left, preoccupied with the project of national history” (466). Through Grant’s 
testimony, Madison Washington has been elevated to his deserved place among these luminaries; 
he lives outside the chattel records. Yet, like these mythic heroes, the Madison Washington of 
Grant’s story is an icon, not a physical presence. 
By expunging Washington’s detection—the three-quarters of the novella that Douglass 
imagined as an explanation of how Washington came to lead the Creole mutiny—from his 
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legacy, Douglass ends up in the same place he began, with a man whose “name” may now be 
“record[ed]” and whose “deeds” may now be “blazon[ed],” but whose interiority is still “covered 
with mystery,” “enveloped in darkness” (132). Douglass underscores the enclosure of the 
narrative by repeating the tempest imagery of the opening paragraphs in the closing paragraphs. 
As the narrator opened the novella by comparing Madison Washington to “a guiding star of a 
stormy night…seen though the parted clouds and howling tempests…seen by the quivering flash 
of angry lightning” (132), Grant describes a storm that set upon the Creole just before she lands 
at Nassau: “The wind howled furiously….we could see only by the quick flashes of lightning 
that darted occasionally from the angry sky….During all the storm, Madison stood firmly at the 
helm,--his keen eye fixed upon the binnacle” (162). While the story of Washington’s detection 
remains within the bounded circularity of the narrative, the final paragraph, proclaiming the 
jubilant procession of the newly-emancipated passengers, “under the triumphant leadership of 
their heroic chief and deliverer, MADISON WASHINGTON” (163) stages another liberation. The 
typographic distinction of Washington’s name, reminiscent of a newspaper headline, and its 
place of honor as the final words of the story suggest that, like the men and women marching 
away from their white owners, Washington’s name is different from the rest of the text and can 
circulate freely. Douglass’s fiction of detection has created a discursive construct—“MADISON 
WASHINGTON”—that can circulate apart from his body (which is safely outside the national 
space) and perform cultural abolitionist work. 
  
 
Chapter 6: “This Day’s Experience Shall Be a Good Lesson”: Learning How to 
Detect in Melville’s Benito Cereno 
The opening words of Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno (1855) alert us to the significant 
role time will play in the novella. The first paragraph begins with a date, “In the year 1799,” and 
the second paragraph continues this temporal line of description: “On the second day, not long 
after dawn” (52). Adding information about the day and time to the year, these opening lines 
establish a pattern that will continue throughout the novel: the more information the reader 
receives, the less clear the text becomes. While the year is definite (1799), the day is designated 
only by an ordinal number rather than a precise date. Since the first day is unspecified, we cannot 
be sure when the “second day” falls. The hour is reported even more vaguely as some 
indeterminate time “after dawn.” Thus, supplementary description that at first seems to clarify 
proves instead to obfuscate. While these opening passages leave the reader unclear about the 
hour and day, they do indicate time’s importance to the novella’s structure.  
Benito Cereno presents three orientations to time: prospection, retrospection, and a 
combination of the two. In each section, the reader’s work of interpretation matches the 
orientation of the main character. The first and longest section is told in the third-person by an 
unnamed narrator.1 The first section concentrates on the experiences of an American captain,                                                         
1The narrator does not specify the year in which he is telling the story, but he repeatedly draws a 
distinction between the setting of the story (in 1799) and his present: for example, in the second 
paragraph, he remarks, “Ships were then not so plenty in those waters as now” (52). From these 
asides to the reader, we can assume that the narrator’s “now” matches that of Melville’s 
contemporary readership in 1855. 
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Amasa Delano, who is oriented toward the future. Like Delano, the reader in this first section 
attempts to understand events as they occur in order to predict the outcome and comprehend the 
mystery. The second, shorter section comprises the deposition of the Spanish captain, Benito 
Cereno, who will only look back. In this retrospective section, the reader must reconstruct a 
narrative about the events on board Cereno’s ship based on the raw material of Cereno’s 
deposition—a jumbled mess of independent clauses lacking the hierarchical structure and 
sequential markers of a story. Traumatized by the past and thus unable to impose a controlling 
story onto his experiences, Cereno is radically retrospective. In its disorder and redundancy, his 
deposition shows evidence of a repetition compulsion. The unnamed editor reinforces this 
neurosis by noting several times that he has excised long portions of the original deposition and 
commenting that what follows are “various random disclosures referring to various periods of 
time” (100). Because Cereno is still traumatically re-experiencing the past, the reader must 
engage in dominant detection to impose a coherent story onto the disorder of Cereno’s 
deposition.  
The brief concluding section points up the limits of each of these temporal orientations in 
isolation from one another and initiates a new reading practice that combines both. While 
retrospective thinking, by reconstructing events that have already occurred, provides the basis of 
knowledge, it cannot change things. Prospection, on the other hand, is viable; it can affect the 
future. If it is not grounded in retrospection, however, it will quickly become circular, like 
Delano’s quandary on board the San Dominick in which he swings from one explanation to 
another so violently that he begins to feel “sea-sick” (78). Because Melville is interested in 
changing readers’ minds and affecting their behavior,2 in writing a detection fiction he combines                                                         
2H. Bruce Franklin argues that Melville’s short fiction written after 1853 reveals the terror “of 
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proleptic and analeptic reasoning.3 In the novella’s tripartite structure, the primarily prospective 
section cancels out the primarily retrospective section, yet gives the reader the experience of 
                                                        
the society that Melville sees developing, a society based on the enslavement of human beings, 
who are imprisoned in factories, ships, plantations, and offices, forced to expend their human 
creativity to enrich those who convert everything of human value into money. And the 
beneficiary of this ruthless oppression is the social class that includes his polite audience” (240-
41). This fiction includes not only Benito Cereno, but also “The Paradise of Bachelors and The 
Tartarus of Maids,” which “depends on a narrator who cannot comprehend what he sees, but 
who unwittingly reveals its significance to a few perceptive readers” (Franklin 241). 
3Because I will use several pairs of terms to describe characters’ and readers’ reasoning 
processes, it will be helpful briefly to define these terms at the outset. On the one hand are the 
terms that describe past-oriented reasoning: analepsis, retrospection, and (for Holmes, but not 
Poe) analytic reasoning; on the other hand are the terms that describe future-oriented reasoning: 
prolepsis, prospection, and (for Holmes) synthetic reasoning. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines analepsis as “the narration of an event at a point later than its chronological place in a 
story;…a flashback”; prolepsis is the opposite: “ the narration of an event at a point earlier than 
its chronological place in a story.” Retrospection is “the action of looking back on past time or 
events; contemplation of the past,” while prospection is “The action of looking forward mentally; 
anticipation; consideration of the future; foresight, planning.”  
As I will discuss later in this essay, Sherlock Holmes uses the terms “analytic” and 
“synthetic” reasoning to mark nearly the same distinction. Describing the rare faculty of 
reasoning analytically, Holmes tells Watson, “There are few people…who, if you told them a 
result, would be able to evolve from their own inner consciousness what the steps were which 
led up to that result”; whereas most people can reason synthetically: “If you describe a train of 
events to them will tell you what the result would be. They can put those events together in their 
minds, and argue from them that something will come to pass” (197). Holmes’ definitions of 
analysis as reasoning from effects to causes and synthesis as reasoning from causes to effects 
correspond to the commonly accepted definitions of the terms. The OED defines analysis as 
“The action or method of proceeding from effects to causes, or of inferring general laws or 
principles from particular instances; the tracing back of knowledge to its original or fundamental 
principles” and synthesis as “The action of proceeding in thought from causes to effects, or from 
laws or principles to their consequences.” Poe uses the term “analysis” and its related forms 
idiosyncratically, developing his own definition at length in various essays and stories. 
The terms most commonly used in reference to mental reasoning, induction and 
deduction, do not indicate a temporal orientation. These reasoning processes do not depend on a 
“train of events” unfolding in time, but rather on classes of knowledge: “general laws” or 
“particular instances.” Deduction is “the process of…drawing a conclusion from a principle 
already known or assumed;…inference by reasoning from generals to particulars.” Induction is 
“the process of inferring a general law or principle from the observation of particular instances.” 
Outside of their strict application in logic, their definitions are too loose and overlapping to be 
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thinking in each mode. The reader then brings this experience to the third section, which—
instead of providing closure—reopens, pushing the reader to return to the beginning and reread. 
In Maurice Lee’s apt formulation, “The story anticipates our reactions. It is sensitive to the 
psychology of Otherness. It is proleptic, highly satiric, preternaturally self-deconstructive—
which displeases some readers, who feel tricked, usurped, or unsure of Melville’s commitments. 
And yet despite all the implications of quietism, a wonderful irony remains: that a story about the 
failure of speech from so supposedly alienated an author is remarkably engaging for students and 
teachers” (512).  
This final section also draws our attention to a character who thinks proleptically and 
analeptically throughout the novella, but whose intelligence is not accessible to the reader. 
Melville prompts the reader to reread the novella in search of Babo’s consciousness, which 
cannot be read directly but rather must be inferred and imagined on the basis of the traces he 
leaves in the novella. The reader, that is, must detect Babo, as Frederick Douglass detected 
Madison Washington from “marks, traces, possibles, and probabilities.” This reading practice, 
like subordinate detection, must embrace the multiplicity of narratives instead of subordinating 
variety in favor of one master narrative. Ultimately, however, Melville’s novella maps the limits 
of detection as a mode of interpretation, since Benito Cereno is a mystery that cannot be solved. 
No matter how carefully we read and analyze, Babo, in the end, remains “voiceless.” As Tim 
Marr has argued, “Melville ultimately chooses not to affirm a successful subjectivity for Babo 
but rather leaves his agency on the margin of his ‘black-letter text’” (27). 
Melville’s dramatization of the limits of detection, symbolized in the novella by the 
Gordian knot that ends up overboard, still impossibly entangled, mirrors the mystical scene at the                                                         
beneficial; I have therefore avoided them. 
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end of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym. As Pym and his companion, Dirk Peters, are 
hurtling toward a chasm, an enormous “shrouded human figure,” whose “skin was of the perfect 
whiteness of the snow,” arises in front of Pym. In Benito Cereno, however, this white figure has 
been replaced by “the negro,” whose giant “shadow” looms over Cereno in the final scene. Both 
Poe and Melville recognized the limitations of detection as a mode of intelligence and conveyed 
a warning about the dangers of relying on the illusion of power that detection confers. Poe, I 
argue, turned to formal precision after the commercial and critical failure of Pym, transforming 
the superhuman white figure who looms up over Pym and Peters into the extraordinary 
mastermind of the Dupin tales. Stripping away social context, Poe crafted an elegant formal 
jewel, “The Purloined Letter,” whose minimalism and abstraction invite theoretical readings. As 
opposed to “The Purloined Letter”’s enclosure, Benito Cereno’s open indeterminacy seems 
uncannily prescient—deeply relevant to the political crises of Melville’s time, and ours. 
Melville, as Marr asserts, “revives Babo from his burial in the political unconscious and 
empowers him to live on as an active sign of the creative capacity of artistic performance to 
undermine textual certainty” (28). Babo’s “active” viability, combined with the reader’s 
interpretive labor, which as Dana Luciano notes, must remain “provisional and subject to 
change,” makes the “narrative so useful to think with” (Luciano 54).    
Melville owned The Works of the Late Edgar Allan Poe, which included the Dupin tales 
and The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym. Though this was a later edition that Melville acquired 
in 1860 and presented to his wife the following year (Sealts 89), critics have found evidence of 
Melville’s familiarity with Poe’s writing throughout Melville’s corpus from Typee to Moby-Dick 
to Israel Potter.4 Poe scholar Patrick Quinn remarks, “If Melville did not long and seriously                                                         
4For parallels between Typee, Omoo, and Pym, see Iola Haverstick. For Poe’s influence on 
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ponder the essential drift of Arthur Gordon Pym then the similarities that exist between that book 
and Moby Dick must be accounted one of the most extraordinary accidents in literature” (214). 
Furthermore, Melville directly satirizes Poe in The Confidence-Man as a “derelict…outcast of 
the universe” (Frank and Long 271).5 Benito Cereno is Melville’s most extended engagement 
with the theme of black resistance to white oppression that Poe treats in the Tsalal section of 
Pym. Arthur Gordon Pym in Poe’s novella and Amasa Delano in Melville’s story, both white 
American men—both from Massachusetts, in fact—sail to the Southern hemisphere and there 
encounter a group of black people that Pym and Delano regard as racially inferior. 
In this chapter I will first outline a blindspot in detective fiction criticism, which has 
focused on the importance of retrospection to the exclusion of prospection. I will then analyze 
the parallels between the main characters’ temporal orientations and the reader’s work in each 
section of the novella on one’s first reading. Finally, I will discuss how the reader’s work 
changes on subsequent readings, in which the reader attempts to detect Babo’s unnarrated 
intelligence. While these reading experiences teach the reader how to be a better interpreter by 
attending to subtle signs, such as the soundscape that the mutineers create to communicate 
covertly, they stop short of providing direct access to the consciousness of Babo and the other 
mutineers. Melville thus both improves readers’ detection and marks the limits of this mode of 
thought.  
                                                        
Moby-Dick, see Grace Farrell Lee,  “Pym and Moby Dick: Essential Connections,” and Appendix 
C of Frederick S. Frank and Diane Long Hoeveler’s edition of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon 
Pym. Charles N. Watson, Jr. compares Pym’s premature burial in the Grampus to Israel Potter’s 
confinement in Squire Woodcock’s closet. In the appendix to his 1975 edition of The Narrative 
of Arthur Gordon Pym, Harold Beaver includes a detailed comparison of Pym’s and Ishmael’s 
views on whiteness. 
5See also Harrison Hayford, “Poe in The Confidence-Man.”  
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***** 
While there are almost as many definitions of detective fiction as there are fictional 
detectives, most critics emphasize the importance of retrospective narration to the genre. Since 
the crime has already occurred when the story begins, critics posit that the “action” of the story is 
the detective’s reconstruction of events. For example, Todorov explains detective fiction as 
consisting of two stories—the story of the crime and the story of the investigation—that, in their 
purest form, do not overlap in time (58-9). The story of the investigation proceeds in the order of 
occurrence until the detective is able to narrate the story of the crime retrospectively, at which 
point the detective fiction concludes. A more recent detective fiction scholar, Peter Thoms, notes 
that the detective’s “solution belongs to the past, to the time when the detective is no longer 
contained by the puzzling events authored by the criminal but has moved outside them to a 
position of retrospective understanding” (68). Readers follow the story of the investigation6 and 
tend to engage in this reconstructive mental work along with (or in competition with) the 
detective. The “puzzle element” of detective fiction, as Charles Rzepka puts it, “enable[s] readers 
not to solve the crime but to exercise their retrospective imaginations. As we read forward, we 
imagine backward, analeptically” (3). On these accounts, both detective and reader are thinking 
“analeptically,” moving backward in time to establish a narrative from the traces left behind. 
While we tend to think of reading as a passive activity, detective fiction criticism reminds us that 
reading is a form of narration, as both reader and detective attempt to reconstruct a story of the 
past.                                                         
6Todorov’s terminology in “The Typology of Detective Fiction” distinguishes between the story 
of the investigation and the story of the crime. He notes that while the detective tries to 
reconstruct the sequence of events and present an accurate account of the crime, the criminal 
wants to keep the story of the crime fragmented so that his the sequence cannot be traced back to 
the point at which his identity will be revealed. 
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Retrospective imagination is a crucial part of detection, but it is not the only part. I want 
to emphasize that detective figures think analeptically and proleptically. Usually, their proleptic 
work tests the hypothetical retrospective narrative they have assembled, verifying or invalidating 
their suspicion. Historian Carlo Ginzberg comes closest to this observation when he states that a 
detective has “the ability to forecast retrospectively” (117). His formulation highlights the bi-
directional temporal axis of detection along which the detective must move forward and 
backward in order to solve the crime. 
A few examples of prospective reasoning from familiar detective stories will demonstrate 
that prolepsis is as much a part of detection as analepsis. In Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue,” Dupin surmises the sailor’s identity based on a bit of ribbon found at the crime scene. 
He then develops a plan designed to “bring him to our residence” (368): Dupin places an 
advertisement about a found orangutan in “a paper devoted to the shipping interest, and much 
sought by sailors” (368). In his advertisement, Dupin parlays his speculations based on evidence 
into an enticement to lure the sailor into his trap: “The owner, (who is ascertained to be a sailor, 
belonging to a Maltese vessel) may have the animal again, upon identifying it satisfactorily” 
(368). As Dupin explains to the narrator, “if…I am wrong in my induction from this 
ribbon…still I can have done no harm in saying what I did in the advertisement. If I am in error, 
he will merely suppose that I have been misled by some circumstance into which he will not take 
the trouble to inquire. But if I am right, a great point is gained” (369). Dupin reasons 
analeptically from the piece of ribbon back to the sailor’s presence at the scene of the crime, but 
he does not stop there. He thinks proleptically to formulate a plan that will test his hypothesis, 
choosing a paper that a sailor is likely to read and carefully wording the advertisement to 
maximize the chances of the sailor presenting himself at Dupin and the narrator’s apartment.  
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The repeated references to games in the Dupin tales also highlight the importance of 
prospection. The narrator of the Dupin tales uses games, including draughts, whist, and even and 
odd, to explain the “reflective intellect,” arguing that “proficiency in [these games] implies 
capacity for success in all these more important undertakings where mind struggles with mind” 
(334). The narrator uses “reflective” not in the sense of ruminating—thinking back on 
something—but in the sense of mirroring someone in the present moment. These games require 
the skilful player to read their opponent’s psychological makeup and habits so as to anticipate 
their next move; the reasoning process is proleptic. To extend the narrator’s game analogies: the 
difference between analeptic and proleptic reasoning is the difference between reconstructing all 
the moves that led to the arrangement of pieces on a completed chess board and looking at a 
game in progress to anticipate an opponent’s next move. We typically think of literary detectives 
as being posterior to the “game” that was played between criminal and victim. In the Dupin tales, 
however, Poe emphasizes that the analyst participates in the game. Unlike a crime (or a finished 
game) that occurred in the past and leaves traces that persist in the present, the games that the 
narrator values unfold in the present tense and can be affected by the analyst’s actions.7                                                         
7Many critics have remarked that Babo deploys psychological terror to dominate his opponents. I 
want to add that Babo structures this scene of terror like the games that Poe describes, where 
“mind struggles with mind” (334). Indeed, Poe’s portrayal of a simplified version of draughts, in 
which each player has four kings, is an apt account of the mutineers’ situation: “Deprived of 
ordinary resources, the analyst throw himself into the spirit of his opponent, identifies himself 
therewith, and not unfrequently sees thus, at a glance, the sole methods (sometimes indeed 
absurdly simple ones) by which he may seduce into error or hurry into miscalculation” (334). 
Babo confronts each of his enemies individually, observing their reaction. Cereno attempts to 
outwit Babo, promising Babo to go to the coast to take in water for the voyage to Senegal that 
the mutineers demand, but then steering the ship in the direction of other ports in the hope of 
meeting a ship that could rescue them. Babo recognizes Cereno’s duplicity, however, and devises 
a powerful symbolic ritual to subjugate Cereno and the other white sailors. Babo and Atufal 
conferred, Cereno states in his deposition, to decide “what was necessary for their design of 
returning to Senegal, whether they were to kill all the Spaniards….[Babo] told [Cereno] that he 
had determined to kill his master Don Alexandro Aranda…to prepare a warning…but, that what 
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In contrast to detective fiction critics’ emphasis on retrospection, Dupin and the narrator 
repeatedly insist that this proleptic identification with an opponent’s mind is what characterizes 
Dupin’s extraordinary analytic abilities. Indeed, the scene in which Dupin predicts the narrator’s 
train of thought and “fathom[s his] soul” (340) follows this pattern. Strolling the Rue C-------, 
Dupin and the narrator pass a fruiterer. Without speaking, Dupin observes his companion’s 
outward reactions to various events and reads his lips as he murmurs words such as “stereotomy” 
(341). Knowing the narrator intimately, Dupin uses these external signs to follow the narrator’s 
internal chain of thought. Dupin states, for example, “I knew that you could not say to yourself 
‘stereotomy’ without being brought to think of atomies, and thus of the theories of Epicurus” 
(536). Thus Dupin moves forward in time to predict where the narrator’s mind will arrive: at the 
name of an actor who is unfitted for tragic roles. When Dupin reconstructs his reasoning process 
for the narrator’s benefit, he is narrating retrospectively, but he was able to predict what the 
narrator was thinking because he reasoned proleptically—from causes (stereotomy) to effects 
                                                        
this last meant, the deponent did not at the time comprehend” (103). One of the Africans kills 
Aranda, but Cereno later discovers that Aranda’s death was not the main object. Rather, Babo 
has one of his men prepare Aranda’s skeleton so that he can “substitut[e] it for the ship’s proper 
figure-head” and then interview each sailor individually, asking him, “whose skeleton that was, 
and whether, from its whiteness, he should not think it a white’s” (104). After each conference, 
Babo tells the sailor, “‘Keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal, or you shall in spirit, as 
now in body, follow your leader,’ pointing to the prow” where those words were chalked (104). 
While the murder of Aranda is a matter of brute force, Babo’s ritual is more complex. Instead of 
killing multiple sailors, he chooses the one who has the most symbolic value—the former owner 
of the enslaved men and women on the San Dominick. Aranda’s murder is also pragmatic in that 
it eliminates the person “who continues to hold a property right in the blacks” (DeLombard 46), 
as Babo notes when he tells Cereno that “he and his companions could not otherwise be sure of 
their liberty” (103). More important, though, Babo makes a performance out of the death, 
interacting face to face with each of the white sailors and watching as they confront this 
gruesome image. He later draws on that knowledge when the San Dominick sights Delano’s ship 
and Babo swiftly generates a plan to disguise the rebellion as a tragedy of disease and disorder.  
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(the actor’s name). Reasoning analeptically would mean that given the actor’s name Dupin could 
have deduced the chain of thoughts that led the narrator to arrive at that name. 
Dupin’s proleptic reasoning is based not on universal logical principles, but on his 
intimacy with the narrator. The associations that Dupin successfully predicts the narrator will 
make would not hold true for everyone; only the narrator’s close companion would know the 
individual mental quirks and previous experiences that connect could stereotomy to atomie to 
Epicurus in the narrator’s mind. The narrator’s phrase for Dupin’s impressive demonstration, 
“fathom[ing] my soul,” is thus indeed more apt than the phrase that most critics use to describe 
this scene: reading his mind. It is Dupin’s deep knowledge of the narrator’s soul, gained through 
their intimate relationship, that enables him to predict future behavior. While Poe never 
explicitly acknowledges the preconditions for this kind of proleptic speculation, his lengthy 
description of Dupin’s relationship with the narrator, which is not otherwise necessary for the 
murder plot, suggests that he expected his readers to recognize that there must be some shared 
basis for identification. Poe makes this requisite common ground more explicit in “The Purloined 
Letter,” in which Minister D----- is Dupin’s criminal double.  
“The Purloined Letter” provides a more striking example of proleptic reasoning, since in 
that story the crime is in a state of potentiality rather than a fait d’accompli. This ur-text of 
detective fiction inverts what we would now expect based on the conventions of the genre. Since 
the criminal, method, and motive are known from the outset, Poe eliminates all of the 
retrospective detective work that, for structuralists such as Todorov, constitutes one of the two 
narratives of a detective story. The story instead focuses on locating the evidence—the letter—
which is normally the clue or trace that initiates the story of investigation. Minister D-----, while 
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in the royal boudoir with the queen and king,8 steals a letter from the queen by taking advantage 
of the fact the queen cannot call attention to the theft in front of the king without also exposing 
the incriminating details of the letter. Minister D has acquired the power to expose the queen, 
“and the power thus attained has, for some months past, been wielded, for political purposes, to a 
very dangerous extent” (437). Instead of starting with an effect and reasoning back to the cause 
to solve this case, Dupin reasons from the cause (Minister D-----) to the effect (the letter). Dupin 
needs to imagine prospectively how a person like Minister D----- would hide an important letter. 
His description of retrieving the letter is retrospectively narrated, but his explanation of his 
methods emphasizes his prospection: Dupin “prepare[s] myself with a pair of green spectacles” 
and visits the Minister to scope out his apartment, leaving his snuff-box behind as an excuse to 
call again the next day. He then crafts a perfect facsimile of the letter and arranges a disturbance 
outside the Minister’s window to distract him while Dupin replaces the original letter with his 
forgery.  
In the best-known readings of “The Purloined Letter,” such as those by Lacan, Derrida, 
Barbara Johnson, and John T. Irwin, Dupin’s planning is typically cited as evidence of his 
cleverness, which identifies him as the Minister’s appropriate opponent. The fact that, in a prime 
example of a genre so strongly associated with retrospection, the detective figure actually spends 
most of his energy developing and enacting a plot—that is, actively changing the course of 
events rather than reconstructing events that have already occurred, in effect creating another 
detective story—is not mentioned. Indeed, the story’s ending is emphatically proleptic, as Dupin 
smugly envisions the Minister’s “curiosity”—a typical Dupinian understatement—about his                                                         
8The victim is never named in the story; readers are told only that the letter was stolen from a 
royal personage. Critics conventionally have referred to the woman in the story as the queen. 
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vanquisher when, sometime in the future, he discovers the forged letter and reads Dupin’s veiled 
insult, a quotation from Crébillon’s revenge tragedy, Atrée. 
The most renowned literary detective, Sherlock Holmes, also thinks prospectively to test 
his hypothesis and trap the criminal. Like most detective fiction critics, however, Holmes 
denigrates what he calls “reason[ing] synthetically,” or reasoning forward from causes to effects, 
in favor of “reasoning analytically” from results to causes. In the first Holmes story, A Study in 
Scarlet, Holmes tells Watson, “In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able to 
reason backward. That is a very useful accomplishment, and a very easy one, but people do not 
practise it much. In the everyday affairs of life it is more useful to reason forward, and so the 
other comes to be neglected. There are fifty who can reason synthetically for one who can reason 
analytically” (197). Yet in Holmes’s explanation of “the different steps in my reasoning” (198), 
he notes that he telegraphed the police in Cleveland to inquire about the victim’s marriage, and 
that he “organized my street Arab detective corps, and sent them systematically to every cab 
proprietor in London” (200). Like Dupin, Holmes is not simply reasoning backward in a 
vacuum; he is using the conclusions he draws from reasoning analytically to conceive actions, 
such as telegraphing the Cleveland police or hiring children to canvass cab companies, that 
advance his comprehension of the case. Holmes’s examination of the physical evidence at the 
crime scene enables him to ask the right questions, unlike the London police, who telegraphed 
the Cleveland police but could not formulate an inquiry that would provide the information 
necessary to move forward in the investigation. Although Holmes’s statement to Watson 
devalues synthetic reasoning, or prospection, the story indicates that both retrospection and 
prospection are crucial and that Holmes moves back and forth between the two modes of thought 
as needed.   
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Despite what detective fiction criticism might lead one to believe, then, most detectives 
are not retrospectively piecing together a narrative purely out of theoretical interest; they are 
deducing in order to make something happen. The blind spot in detective fiction criticism, which 
has focused on retrospection to the exclusion of prospection, maps onto larger exclusionary 
patterns in the genre’s formation. When critics abstract the detective’s retrospective processes to 
address issues of form and narration, as well as to draw parallels between detectives and authors, 
what gets lost is the specificity of why a particular detective reconstructs a narrative of the past. 
The why question is directly linked to prospection: Dupin, for example, advertises in the 
newspaper without alerting the police because he wants to speak to the sailor privately and make 
sure that the sailor will corroborate Dupin’s account of the L’Espanayes’ killings before he goes 
public with his theory. By thinking ahead, Dupin protects his reputation as an infallible genius.  
As I have been arguing, the why question—what motivates people to detect under 
specific circumstances—is central to the mode of subordinate detection. When Madison 
Washington retrains Listwell to become a subordinate detective figure, Listwell thinks 
proleptically. He disguises his identity at the Virginia tavern and uses the information he gains to 
formulate a plot in which he secretly slips Washington resources that aid the mutiny. Listwell’s 
prospection changes the circumstances in which he detects. Subordinate detection explicitly aims 
to affect the future, by eradicating the slave system. While dominant detectives also think 
proleptically, as I have demonstrated, detective fiction criticism has ignored their prospection in 
favor of their retrospection. Because detective fiction criticism concentrates on the reconstructive 
work that the detective performs, it has excluded texts that emphasize the ways that detection 
underwrites action, enabling detectives to change the future. This critical blindspot, which 
orients readers to the past, has resulted in a genre that has been dismissed as self-enclosed and 
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solipsistic—most petulantly by Edmund Wilson in 1945, who called readers of detective fiction 
readers “addicts” who “rea[d] not to find anything out but merely to get the mild stimulation of 
the succession of unexpected incidents” (682). This view has been developed more recently by 
Lisa Zunshine, who compares reading detective fiction to lifting weights in that both activities 
are “decoupled from reality”: “just as overdeveloping one’s [muscles]…generally does not give 
the bodybuilder any particular advantage in her everyday activities,…so keeping on a steady diet 
of detectives stories does not make one a particularly discerning social player” (125). I argue that 
this stance is self-fulfilling: critics have defined the genre in such a way as to exclude fictions of 
detection that do not hide the evidence of their social engagement. Instead, I propose opening 
detective fiction up to encompass future-oriented modes of detection such as those depicted in 
Douglass’s and Melville’s writing. 
***** 
Melville’s story sets up a structural contrast between two figures, Cereno and Delano, 
who can each operate in only one mode—analepsis and prolepsis, respectively. On a first 
reading, the reader’s work matches the main character’s fundamental disposition to time. Delano 
and the reader are both concerned with prospection in the first section, and Cereno and the reader 
are both focused on retrospection in the second section.9 Melville imagines two types of readers 
for Benito Cereno. One type will read quickly and glean little from the text. Melville described 
this type of reader in his 1850 review of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Mosses from an Old Manse, in                                                         
9In an astute reading of Benito Cereno, Dana Luciano distinguishes between the failure of the 
two captains’ temporal orientations, “Delano’s monumental amnesia and Cereno’s anti-
monumental melancholy,” and the “counter-monumentalism” of the entire novella, which 
“disorients its audience, disallowing the self-consolidating security of standing outside a 
completed history…and emphasizing the observer’s implication in an historical narrative that 
remains unresolved” (37). I am indebted to Luciano’s essay in my own reading of Benito 
Cereno. 
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which Melville complimented Hawthorne for stories that are “directly calculated to deceive—
egregiously deceive—the superficial skimmer of pages” (“Hawthorne” 251). In contrast to this 
“superficial skimmer of pages,” the other type of reader will read carefully and will reread to 
compare the partial truths presented in each section. We might designate this latter type of reader 
“the wise” reader. Melville uses this phrase in the fourth paragraph of the first section, when the 
narrator describes Captain Delano’s “good nature,” remarking, “Whether, in view of what 
humanity is capable, such a trait implies, along with a benevolent heart, more than ordinary 
quickness and accuracy of intellectual perception, may be left to the wise to determine” (BC 52). 
On first reading this paragraph, the superficial skimmer might be inclined to accept the initial 
characterization of Delano as good natured—a description that is repeated throughout the 
novella. The narrator’s full comment pertains to the knowledge one gains after finishing the 
novella and recognizing not only the violent mutiny on the San Dominick but also the 
reciprocated violence of the Bachelor’s Delight sailors in trying to recapture the San Dominick 
and the grisly mutilation of Babo’s body at the hands of the Lima court. These events represent 
the spectrum of violence of which “humanity is capable,” so that by the end of the novella the 
“wise” reader can return to this initial description and “determine” Delano’s intellectual 
perception. 
Within the novella, there are two chronologies, which intersect at the island of St. Maria 
(off the coast of Chile), where the San Dominick encounters Delano’s ship, the Bachelor’s 
Delight. One chronology is the invention that the mutineers generate and that Cereno tells 
Delano in the first section of the novella. In this fictional chronology, the San Dominick “sailed 
from Buenos Ayres bound to Lima” but was nearly destroyed “off Cape Horn [by] heavy gales” 
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and then suffered a litany of disasters including scurvy, a long calm, and fever (58). The blacks10 
generate and tell this chronology as a “common tale of suffering” “in one language, and as with 
one voice” (55) when Delano boards the San Dominick. In the other chronology, which the 
reader learns from Cereno’s deposition in the second section of the novella, the San Dominick 
sets sail from Valparaiso, Chile, but the blacks mutiny “on the seventh day after leaving port” 
(101) and try to force Cereno to take them to Senegal. Cereno stalls for time by sailing along the 
coast of Chile, hoping to encounter a Spanish or foreign vessel that will rescue him, and 
eventually the San Dominick meets the Bachelor’s Delight at St. Maria. 
Extending our view outside the text adds more chronological layers. First of all, Melville 
changes the story’s setting to 1799 from 1805, the date of the events in his source text, A 
Narrative of Voyages and Travels by Amasa Delano (1817). This alteration, as H. Bruce 
Franklin remarks, “mak[es] Babo’s rule on the San Dominick contemporaneous with Toussaint 
L’Ouverture’s rule on San Domingo” (471), a link that Melville further underscores by changing 
the name of Cereno’s ship from the Tryal (in Delano’s 1817 Narrative) to the San Dominick.11 
Additionally, for Melville’s original readers, there is the layer of the Fugitive Slave Act 
controversy that was agitating American minds in 1855 when the novella was serialized in 
Putnam’s Monthly. The wealth of scholarship that has tracked these multiple layers of historical 
                                                        
10I will use the novellas’ term, “the blacks,” to designate all of the formerly enslaved men and 
women on board the San Dominick, as opposed to the smaller number who organized and 
effected the mutiny. I will also use the term “the black” (singular) to refer to the character called 
Babo; as I will explain, the novella asks us to distinguish between Babo, a character that the 
black performs for Delano, and “the black,” the person behind the mask, who remains 
incompletely accessible to the reader. 
11Carolyn Karcher and Maggie Montesinos Sale, among other critics, have examined the 
connections between Benito Cereno and the Amistad case, the Turner rebellion, and the Creole 
mutiny, adding several more points to our already dense timeline. 
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allusion indicates that Benito Cereno is a dense archive of time. Melville places a great demand 
on his readers by asking them to hold all of these overlapping histories in mind as they read—as 
Melville did while he wrote. 
The complicated relationship between these multiple chronologies is at the crux of 
Melville’s unusual narrative structure in Benito Cereno. Many critics have called Benito Cereno 
a “mystery story” or referred to Amasa Delano as a “proto-detective.”12 Indeed, a contemporary 
reviewer noted in the September 1856 issue of The Knickerbocker that “‘Benito Cereno,’ is most 
painfully interesting, and in reading it we became nervously anxious for the solution of the 
mystery it involves” (20). The reviewer’s language here is telling, not only because he identifies 
Melville’s tale as a mystery story, but also because he focuses on the bodily agitation that 
reading Benito Cereno provokes. The story affects the reader—his desire for illumination causes 
him physical pain. More recently, James Fulcher has traced the detective motifs in Benito 
Cereno, arguing that American mystery stories such as Poe’s and Melville’s figure the detective 
as a romantic hero embodying “the popular romantic values about freedom, naturalness, 
individualism, and success” (117). Most of these critical treatments of Benito Cereno 
characterize Captain Amasa Delano as a failed or inept detective, since he is unable to solve the 
mystery of the San Dominick crew’s strange behavior.13 
                                                        
12Ann Douglas, for example, states, “Increasingly over the course of Melville’s career, his 
protagonists—Ishmael, Pierre, Captain Amasa Delano, the lawyer in ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ 
come to mind—become proto-detectives, and Melville’s own undoubtedly hostile conception of 
the American writer’s task becomes exactly that of imagining his society’s crime without 
enacting it” (293-94). 
13See, for example, Helen Lock’s essay, “The Paradox of Slave Mutiny in Herman Melville, 
Charles Johnson, and Frederick Douglass,” in which she states that Delano “obtusely fails to 
recognize [the slave mutiny] until the very end, because the slaves are forcing the captain, Benito 
Cereno, and the remaining Spanish crew to behave as if they are still in charge” (56).
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While there are numerous parallels between detective fiction and Melville’s novella, it is 
important to remember that Delano does not actually know that a crime has been committed. 
This fact differentiates Delano from the classic detective, as Charles Swann points out: 
To claim that [Delano] should have seen through the production that Babo 
has mounted is to get very close to saying that Babo’s was somehow a 
flawed drama, that it wasn’t really good enough to fool an acute white 
(which is to allow racism in through the back door)….Delano has to detect 
that there is something to detect. The detective usually only starts acting 
after the originating event…has been discovered. Delano enters after that 
origin but without knowing what the beginnings of that narrative are and 
faced by a plausible cover story. (226-27) 
 
The mystery, from Delano’s perspective, and from our perspective on our first reading, is what is 
currently happening on the San Dominick. Melville heightens Delano’s and the reader’s 
suspicions by creating a sinister air of suspense that deepens and becomes more pervasive over 
the course of the novella. The infamous line in the third paragraph, “Shadows present, 
foreshadowing deeper shadows to come” (52) is not subtle—the narrator explicitly tells us at the 
outset to expect something dark. But the very notion of “foreshadowing” indicates that the action 
will be in the future; it is yet “to come.” This is how Delano processes the strange incidents and 
scenes on board the San Dominick. He notices many odd things and tries to form explanations 
that make sense of them, but he is forecasting—thinking proleptically rather than analeptically.  
Indeed, Delano is correct in his assessments at times, but he does not use his observations 
to understand the past; rather, he tries to determine how to behave in the future. Delano at first 
treats the Spanish captain with pity and condescension, judging his “incompetence” and 
imagining him a “paper captain…who by policy wink[s] at what by power they cannot put 
dow[n.] I know no sadder sight than a commander who has little of command but the name” 
(63). While this statement turns out to be accurate, as Cereno has only the name and costume of a 
captain, but lacks the power to “put down” the Africans’ mutiny, Delano does not imagine that a 
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mutiny had already occurred. Rather, he sees the present examples of disorder and 
insubordination and understands Cereno to be weak. This reading of Cereno encourages 
Delano’s paternalism: he gives Cereno advice and promises to help him. These actions, in 
Delano’s view, will address the problems that attend “paper captains” and return order to the 
ship. Delano is thinking ahead, trying to prevent the consequences of the personality defect he 
has identified in Cereno. 
Later, Delano accurately describes Cereno as an “imposter.” When Cereno continues to 
respond icily to Delano’s overtures, however, Delano’s wounded pride pushes him away from a 
reading of Cereno as weak and pitiable. Instead, he advances for Cereno’s behavior “two 
suppositions—innocent lunacy, or wicked imposture” (67). Ruling out the former because 
Cereno’s conduct suggested “an intentional affront” and intention is incompatible with lunacy, 
Delano deems Cereno “an imposter. Some low-born adventurer, masquerading as an oceanic 
grandee….That strange ceremoniousness, too, at other times evinced, seemed not 
uncharacteristic of one playing a part above his real level” (67). This reading also turns out to be 
accurate. Cereno is an imposter; he is an overthrown captain masquerading as a captain who has 
control of his ship. For the moment, Delano dismisses these suspicions, but for several more 
pages he swings back and forth from his assessment of Cereno as weak, pitiable, and in need of 
paternalistic care, to his condemnation of Cereno as a wicked imposter plotting Delano’s demise. 
Because Delano is thinking proleptically, his main concern is how to act in response to his 
interpretation of events: as Delano says, “he would regulate his future actions according to future 
circumstances” (93). Even though he notices improbabilities and inconsistencies in the “tale of 
suffering” that Cereno narrates and that Babo embellishes, Delano is not particularly interested in 
unraveling that story and reconstructing a more accurate account of the San Dominick’s 
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misadventures. Whether Delano leans toward viewing Cereno as weak or wicked, he wants to 
understand Cereno in the present so that he can figure out how to pre-empt future threats. 
Delano, therefore, is more like the analyst that the narrator of the Dupin tales describes in the 
opening to “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” who “throws himself into the spirit of his 
opponent, [and] identifies himself therewith” (334) than he is like our familiar notion of a 
detective who works backward from evidence to reconstruct a crime.  
Delano’s prospection in the first section was doomed, then, because no matter how well 
he matched his intellect to his opponent’s, he had identified the wrong opponent. The narrator of 
the Dupin tales states, “the identification…of the reasoner’s intellect with that of his opponent, 
depends, if I understand you aright, upon the accuracy with which the opponent’s intellect is 
admeasured” (452). Because Delano’s prejudice circumscribes his view of blacks—he dismisses 
the idea that Cereno could “be any way in complicity with the blacks [because] they were too 
stupid” (77)—he does not accurately admeasure Babo’s, Atufal’s, or the other mutineers’ 
intellects and thus focuses all his attention on Cereno. Cereno is not an autonomous agent 
throughout most of the first section of the novella, and thus his behavior is unpredictable because 
he is being puppeted by another intellect that Delano is incapable of discerning. 
During the first reading, both the reader and Delano are thinking proleptically, trying to 
comprehend the San Dominick’s conflicting signs. Both the reader and Delano are unaware that a 
crime has already occurred on board the San Dominick, and so both are reasoning proleptically 
throughout the first section of the novella, reading signs as causes and trying to determine their 
likely effects in the future. The “flash of revelation” that sweeps across Delano’s (and, perhaps, 
the reader’s) mind when Babo jumps into Delano’s boat, intending to kill Cereno (97), may 
illuminate the mystery on board the San Dominick, but it also invalidates all the theories that 
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Delano (and perhaps the reader) had formulated, since they were all rooted in the assumption that 
the crime was yet to occur. At the end of the first section, therefore, the reader experiences a 
failure of proleptic imagination.  
The second section, Cereno’s deposition, at first seems to be the retrospective narration 
of the San Dominick’s history that will resolve the mystery, just as the detective’s retrospective 
narration typically resolves a detective story. Indeed, the narrator nods to these readerly 
expectations at the beginning of the third section, when he states, “If the Deposition have served 
as the key to fit into the lock of the complications which precede it, then, as a vault whose door 
has been flung back, the San Dominick’s hull lies open to-day” (110). This passage, like the 
novella as a whole, offers a slippery, quasi-explanation that raises more questions than it 
answers. As many critics have noted, the earlier instance of a key and lock in the text, the 
padlock that Atufal wears, undermines the narrator’s proposition. In the first section of the 
novella, Delano is shocked that Cereno has chained Atufal with “an iron collar…about his neck, 
from which depended a chain, thrice wound round his body; the terminating links padlocked 
together at a broad band of iron, his girdle” and forces him to ask Cereno’s pardon every two 
hours (65). After learning that Cereno wears around his neck the key to Atufal’s lock, Delano 
states, “So, Don Benito—padlock and key—significant symbols, truly” (66). Melville explicitly 
calls attention to the symbolic significance of Atufal’s wound chains, like the sailor’s Gordian 
knot, giving the reader nodes of meaning to return to on a second reading. For Cereno’s 
deposition reveals a very different interpretation of the lock and key. The deposition states that 
this display was one of the “expedients…uniting deceit and defense,” that Babo invented to dupe 
Delano into believing Cereno was in control of the ship: “that, among other devices, was the 
device of presenting Atufal, his right-hand man, as chained, though in a moment the chains could 
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be dropped” (105). What symbolized Cereno’s despotism for Delano in the first section thus 
transforms to signify the veiled threat of the Africans’ power in the second section. This 
destablization of symbolic meaning, as well as the contingency of the narrator’s “If…then” 
formulation, implies that the narrator’s comparison of the deposition to “the key to fit into the 
lock of the complications which precede it” (110) does not provide the definitive resolution that 
readers might have anticipated. Instead, the three layers of meaning remind us not only that signs 
mean differently depending on one’s perspective, but also that meaning evolves over time, as 
interpretations accumulate. This accretion process reflects the experience of rereading a complex 
narrative such as Benito Cereno—each reading interacts with the previous ones. 
While the reader expects the deposition to be the key that unlocks the mystery of the first 
section, then, the deposition frustrates these expectations. Cereno, in the second section, catalogs 
events without synthesizing them. Cereno’s deposition is not narrated: it is incompletely 
transcribed, with numerous sections excised. Furthermore, Cereno’s testimony has been 
transcribed in long, incomplete sentences, each beginning with “that,” yoked together simply by 
semi-colons rather than any linking words. Because Cereno’s deposition is more of an outline 
than a story, the reader must do the work of constructing a narrative from this raw material. 
Whereas the creative work in the first section was proleptic (imagining what the strange behavior 
of the San Dominick sailors might mean and thus might portend), the work here is analeptic 
(taking the raw material of Cereno’s deposition, combining it with the information the reader 
learned in the first section of the narrative, and generating a narrative that accounts for the events 
both before and after the mutiny).  
In addition to the narrator’s ironic lock and key image, the deposition announces its 
corruption and unreliability in various ways. The reader is never allowed to forget that this 
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retrospective account is highly mediated. For example, Melville uses typographic features, such 
as ellipses and bracketed commentary from an unknown editor, to draw attention to the 
incompleteness of the text.14 Cereno’s pattern of behavior also undermines the verity of the 
deposition. Cereno repeatedly breaks faith with the rebels, entering into three contracts with 
them and breaking each one, as Jeannine DeLombard has noted. As DeLombard asks, “How can 
the Lima court be sure that ‘the deponent’ will fulfill his ‘promis[e] to tell the truth of whatever 
he should know (BC, 104), especially given that much of the deposition documents his recent 
history of contract breaking and false testimony?” (50).15  
The deposition demonstrates that Cereno is incompetent at predicting the mutineers’ 
behavior. In keeping with his retrospective orientation, Cereno assumes that past behavior will 
accurately predict future behavior. The most dramatic example of Cereno’s failure to anticipate 
is the mutiny itself, which Cereno indirectly facilitates by allowing the enslaved men and women 
to go unfettered “because the owner, [Cereno’s] friend Aranda, told him that they were all 
tractable” (101). Since the enslaved men and women have been obedient while in captivity in 
Valparaiso, he believes they will continue to be so even though conditions have changed to favor 
                                                        
14For more on the deposition’s unreliability, see Shari Goldberg’s insightful essay, “Benito 
Cereno's Mute Testimony: On the Politics of Reading Melville's Silences.” The deposition, 
Goldberg states, “paradoxically foregrounds what cannot or will not be authored and what 
accordingly remains silent. But such an emphasis proves even more pressing as a commentary on 
what an individual’s official testimony to suffering induced by the slave trade actually 
comprises. If the reader obtains a sense of Cereno’s experience through his deposition, it is as 
much due to a surmising of what he never iterates as to the summary information he provides” 
(12). 
15In “Salvaging Legal Personhood: Melville’s Benito Cereno,” Jeanine DeLombard astutely 
argues that “Cereno’s compromised deposition articulates a legal personhood that, once lost, 
cannot be salvaged by escape, violence, or even contractualism. This possibility held unsettling 
implications for a nation that, originating in emigration and found in revolutionary violence, was 
now redefining individual autonomy in economic terms through liberal market capitalism” (57). 
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revolution. Cereno and the rest of the crew are taken by surprise because they cannot imagine 
that seemingly “tractable” men and women will rebel against oppression given the opportunity. 
Cereno remains stuck in the past and unable to adjust to changed circumstances following the 
mutiny. 
Following the mutiny, Cereno no longer has the power to enforce his authority, but he 
behaves as though he still commands the ship. He first “exhorted them to cease committing such 
atrocities, asking them, at the same time, what they wanted and intended to do, offering, himself, 
to obey their commands” (102). Cereno’s “exhortation” is hollow, since he has been defeated by 
the rebels and cannot enforce his demands. The second part of his discourse, his offer to obey the 
rebels’ commands, is also false, since he agrees to take them to Senegal providing they take in 
water for the voyage first, but instead sails around hoping to “meet some Spanish or foreign 
vessel that would save them” (102). Cereno acts as though the rebels are not learning from their 
interactions and thus purports astonishment each time the rebels ratchet up the threat and 
consequences in response to Cereno’s perfidy. The rebels’ decision to kill Aranda and display his 
skeleton as a warning demonstrates that they are learning and adapting based on Cereno’s 
behavior. Cereno’s static model of time, on the other hand, which cordons off events in the past 
from affecting the future, proves ineffectual until it is combined with Delano’s prospective 
model. While the two captains’ alliance, instantiated in Cereno’s leap into Delano’s boat, 
momentarily integrates retrospection and prospection in order to affect the present, this synthesis 
is fleeting. At the end of the deposition the reader sees the failure of a retrospective imagination 
in isolation, as Cereno escaped the San Dominick only to die “broken in body and mind” a few 
months later. 
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Delano and Cereno share some common ground—both are white male ship captains—
but, as Melville constructs the story, they embody several binary oppositions: North and South, 
New World and Old World, Protestantism and Catholicism. Throughout Delano’s narrative, each 
can read some of the other’s behavior, but the full significance lies beyond either’s grasp. Delano 
recognizes that Cereno is weak and an imposter, but he cannot see how those two are related, and 
what that might suggest beyond Cereno’s bad breeding. On Cereno’s side, although we do not 
have access to his thoughts, his behavior suggests that he knows his rudeness will raise Delano’s 
suspicions.16 Cereno does what he can, within the confines of Babo’s wary surveillance, to treat 
Delano impolitely. Yet Cereno cannot find the right signals to communicate with Delano, and 
their long day of waiting on board a motionless ship symbolizes their stalemate, neither able to 
identify with the other completely enough to predict their behavior. Charles Swann argues, 
however, that “the binary oppositions [between Delano and Cereno] are more apparent than real, 
[and] are elided with the entry of the story of rebellion and revolt” (222). Once the mutiny on the 
San Dominick is revealed, Swann continues, “we see a consequent explicit alliance between 
Delano and Cereno….But that alliance between the two captains we realize on re-reading has 
always been latent….It is Cereno’s belief in this alliance which permits his leap of faith” (222). 
Throughout this first section of the novella, it seemed that Delano and Cereno were matching 
wits and arriving at a draw, but Cereno’s leap reveals that their common ground trumps the other 
oppositions. The alliance that Swann describes, a shared commitment to white male control over                                                         
16Melville leaves Cereno’s wishes ambiguous in the text. While Cereno later claims that had he 
“dropped the least hint, made the least advance towards an understanding between us, death, 
explosive death—yours as mine—would have ended the scene” (111), there are suggestions in 
Delano’s section that Cereno was colluding with Babo to some degree. Whether Cereno wanted 
Delano to recognize that Cereno was being held captive and rescue him, or to leave the San 
Dominick so that Babo and Cereno could seize the Bachelor’s Delight, however, Cereno cannot 
influence Delano either way. 
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Africans, enables Cereno to predict that Delano will protect him when he jumps into the 
whaleboat. This fleeting moment, in which the two captains are united against the Africans, 
conjoins Delano’s prospection and Cereno’s retrospection to generate the “flash of revelation” 
for Delano and the reader, who recognize that the San Dominick has been in control of the 
formerly enslaved men and women it was transporting as cargo. 
Neither prospection in the first section nor retrospection in the second yields a definitive 
answer to the mystery on board the San Dominick. We might therefore expect to find resolution 
in the third section, the conversation between Delano and Cereno that occurs chronologically 
between the end of the first section (Delano’s section) and the beginning of Cereno’s deposition, 
yet appears after the deposition in the text. In this final section, in one of the novella’s most 
striking moments, Delano exhorts Cereno to forget the past: “See, yon bright sun has forgotten it 
all, and the blue sea, and the blue sky; these have turned over new leaves” (111). Dana Luciano 
points out that “the awkward twist of phrase in the middle of Delano’s sentence ironically 
highlights the artifice that underlies his….appeal to the “naturalness” of forgetting[;] that is, [it] 
conflates several distinct nature-based temporal modes [i.e., the sun rising and setting; the 
tides]…with the implicitly narrative structure of page-turning, imposing upon them a linear 
structure that enforces a clear separation between past and present” (44). Delano thus tortures 
language to efface the past, enabling him to tell a story that serves his own purposes but is 
unrooted in historical fact. Rather than analyzing the events, Delano chalks them up to 
“Providence” and his own “good nature, compassion, and charity” (111). While Delano’s willed 
amnesia prompts a generic explanation that flatters his self-image, Cereno’s melancholic 
retrospection results in paralysis. Delano asks Cereno, “What has cast such a shadow upon you,” 
and after Cereno replies, “the negro,” the narrator states, “There was silence, while the moody 
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man sat, slowly and unconsciously gathering his mantle about him, as if it were a pall. There was 
no more conversation that day” (111). The funereal imagery and the emphasis on silence indicate 
that Cereno cannot continue the story; he cannot proleptically imagine a future and so he 
becomes mute.  
The concluding section thus consolidates the two captains’ habitual orientations to time, 
contrasting Delano’s prospection with Cereno’s retrospection. Neither one in isolation provides a 
full solution to the mystery, but even in combination the two narratives do not fully resolve the 
mystery. While Delano’s section presents the effects of the mutineers’ masquerade and Cereno’s 
deposition catalogues some of the events leading up to that masquerade, neither Delano’s nor 
Cereno’s accounts provides a motive for the Africans’ actions besides “wickedness” (108). 
Neither account explicitly explains why the enslaved men and women revolted, nor why they 
decided to try to force the white crew to sail the ship to Senegal, nor why they stage an intricate 
masquerade when they encounter Delano’s ship. Though Cereno lived through these events, he 
was not privy to Babo, Atufal, and the other leaders’ conferences, and—unlike a detective—he 
does not imagine himself into their position in order to suppose what might have motivated them. 
Delano and Cereno, who have each in turn seemed central to the two sections of the narrative, 
effectively cancel each other out as possible protagonists, in the root words’ sense of “one who 
plays the first part, chief actor” (Greek: prōtos, first + agōnistēs, actor). Both characters have 
spent most of the story being manipulated, and, although Delano does take action at the end of 
the first section, it is treated very briefly compared to the pages and pages of time he has spent as 
a puppet on board the San Dominick. Instead of offering a resolution, Delano and Cereno’s 
conversation highlights the failures of each man’s orientation to time. By emphasizing this 
deficiency at the conclusion—the precise moment when a reader expects a full resolution—
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Melville prompts the reader to return to the text to revise her hypothesis with the knowledge that 
the San Dominick slaves had mutinied weeks before encountering the Bachelor’s Delight, plus 
the information gained from the experience of reading both Delano’s and Cereno’s accounts.  
The last two paragraphs initiate this rereading, as Melville redirects the reader’s attention 
toward a character who cannot be accessed directly through the depictions presented in Delano’s 
or Cereno’s accounts. These final two paragraphs in the novella focus on Babo, although 
Melville underscores the necessity of acknowledging our previous judgments regarding Babo 
and approaching him from a fresh angle. Melville does not name Babo directly in these 
paragraphs, instead referring to him as “the black.” On the voyage to Lima after the Bachelor’s 
Delight recaptures the San Dominick, as well as at the trial in Lima, “the black” “uttered no 
sound, and could not be forced to. His aspect seemed to say, since I cannot do deeds, I will not 
speak words” (112). Babo will not ratify the narrative that Cereno, Delano, and the other whites 
present to the court at Lima by identifying himself, even to deny the charges against him. Cereno 
will not identify “the black” either: “Before the tribunal he [Cereno] refused. When pressed by 
the judges he fainted. On the testimony of the sailors alone rested the legal identity of Babo” 
(112).  
Melville’s avoids naming “Babo” in this passage to underscore the fact that the character 
we have come to know as Babo is a fiction, a role that his brilliant, “schem[ing]” mind 
developed in anticipation of a white man’s prejudices. The traces of this distinction are evident 
even in Delano’s section: when Babo says his name for the first time in the text he negates it, 
saying, “Babo is nothing” (61). Cereno seems to know this, too, since he will not name Babo 
even when he responds to Delano’s question about what has cast a shadow on him, replying “the 
negro.” This term, like Melville’s use of “the black” in the last two paragraphs, deindividualizes 
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Babo, making him a representative of his race. Yet unlike Delano’s dehumanizing comparison 
between African Americans and Newfoundland dogs, which inscribes African Americans as 
bestial and thus inferior to whites, these deindividualizations emphasize the power of “the negro” 
and “the black.” As Roberta Jill Craven notes, Cereno’s response signifies that “no longer are the 
slaves subservient shadows, they are now agents who can actually cast shadows” (87). Melville’s 
substitution of “the black” for “Babo” allows the black to slip the yoke, as it were. “Babo”—the 
mask—is judged in the Lima court and executed, but “the black”—the man we have not been 
able to access through our normal reading practice—continues to act in the world after his death: 
“the head, that hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the Plaza, met, unabashed, the gaze of the 
whites; and…looked towards St. Bartholomew’s church, in whose vaults slept then, as now, the 
recovered bones of Aranda; and across the Rimac bridge looked towards the 
monastery…where…Benito Cereno, borne on the bier, did, indeed, follow his leader” (112). 
This complex sentence suggests both the black’s power and the limits of his agency. His 
decapitated head “met” the whites’ gaze—the passive language implying that the black’s head is 
barrier, beyond which the gaze cannot penetrate. The head looks on toward the churches where 
Aranda and Cereno are buried, indicating the lasting effects of the black’s intervention on the 
San Dominick, as Cereno tells Delano the “negro” will forever cast his shadow over Aranda and 
Cereno. The sentence’s passive diction—slept, borne, and follow—as well as its structure, which 
subordinates the remains of Aranda and Cereno grammatically to the churches that contain them, 
denies agency to the men. Furthermore, the novella’s final words, “follow his leader,” are a 
variant on Babo’s words, “follow [your] leader,” which he chalked on the stern of the San 
Dominick, giving Babo the last word. This limited form of agency—the power to “meet” the 
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gaze unabashed—marks the black as the equal of the whites, but its reflective properties prevents 
the reader from accessing the “hive of subtlety” hidden behind the termination point of the gaze.   
This last paragraph includes an image that collapses the multiple timelines of the novella 
into one point. The narrator states that Aranda’s bones “slept then, as now” in the vaults of St. 
Bartholomew’s, drawing the reader out of the text’s “then”—Delano and Cereno’s timeline, 
which the first words of the novella tell us is “In the year 1799” (52)—to the narrator’s 
unspecified “now” (112). While that “now” could refer to Melville’s own time—the story’s first 
publication in 1855—it also speaks to the reader’s own present. Maurice Lee argues that Benito 
Cereno has the “ability to, as it were, preconstruct itself in the eyes of future readers—to reflect 
on its narrative…and to extrapolate the gap of historical difference while at the same time 
speaking beyond it” (513). Lee’s language—“preconstruct,” “reflect,” “extrapolate,” “spea[k] 
beyond”—maps onto the modes of reasoning I have been discussing: proleptic and analeptic 
reasoning, which enables a reader-detective to reconstruct a narrative and imagine past the end of 
that narrative, into the future, in order to test the validity of that narrative. In the ideal reader’s 
mind, these modes operate simultaneously, so that timelines collapse and some limited 
understanding emerges.  
Each of the previous two sections has also ended with an image of timelines collapsing. 
Toward the end of the first section, as Babo jumps from the San Dominick into Delano’s 
whaleboat, the narrator states, “All this, with what preceded, and what followed, occurred with 
such involutions of rapidity, that past, present, and future seemed one” (96). Delano’s “flash of 
revelation” follows this moment of compression, suggesting that it is the ability to perceive 
multiple timelines (past, present, and future) simultaneously, that facilitates comprehension. In 
contrast to this image of comprehension, the final paragraph of the second section draws 
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attention to Cereno’s personal timeline—“He said that he is twenty-nine years of age”—only to 
emphasize his personal disintegration: “broken in body and mind” (110). Instead of holding 
multiple timelines in mind simultaneously, Cereno can only move back and forth along one 
timeline, repeating the past. The deposition states that “for the time, [he] departed as he came, in 
his litter, with the monk Infelez, to the Hospital de Sacerdotes” (110). The unusual sentence 
structure suggests not only that Cereno’s retreat from Lima to the Hospital is a perfect inversion 
of his earlier voyage from the Hospital to Lima (that is, he traveled the same route, in the same 
manner, and with the same companion), but also that Cereno’s time at the court has not changed 
him in any way. He has learned nothing; he “depart[s] as he came.” This ability to contain 
multiple timelines in one moment is the detective’s skill, a skill that Delano belatedly and 
temporarily achieves and Cereno never realizes.  
After the conversation between Delano and Cereno, in which they effectively cancel each 
other out as the protagonist, the final two paragraphs reintroduce the black as the protagonist, as 
the narrator tells us “As for the black—whose brain, not body, had schemed and led the revolt, 
with the plot” (112). The narrator’s language emphasizes that “the black” has been orchestrating 
not just the “revolt,” but the entire “plot” of the novella. As Michael Paul Rogin notes, “There is 
no action until the drama on the San Dominick is over, only acting” (210). This makes the black 
not only a “surrogate of the author,” as H. Bruce Franklin (243) and others have observed, but 
the only figure in the story who is capable of reasoning both analeptically and proleptically. The 
black is thus the only character who successfully detects. His detection, however, is unvoiced in 
the text. This final paragraph initiates the reader in the type of reading practice that she will need 
to make sense of the novella. At the beginning of the paragraph, the narrator states that “the 
black met his voiceless end” (112). This is true in a literal sense, as the black refused to speak 
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after his capture. It also implies the black’s admirable stoicism despite the gruesome torture of 
his death, in which he is first dragged through the streets by a mule, and then beheaded. 
However, the final words of the novella belie this statement, as the text ends with the black’s 
motto, “follow your leader.” Voiced by the narrator, rather than by the black, this echo 
nevertheless destabilizes the earlier statement that “the black[‘s]” end was voiceless, and 
prompts the reader to ask in what ways we might hear a voice that is not directly reported. To 
hear Babo’s voice, we must reread the novel and pay attention to traces rather than simply 
relying on direct narration. 
Critics have explicated some of the ways in which Melville communicates this alternative 
story. For example, Craven argues that Melville’s rhetorical devices such as metaphor and 
simile, which are normally thought of as ornaments to the semantic meaning of a text, are the 
primary vehicles of meaning in Benito Cereno. Matthew Rebhorn contends that Melville 
explores nonverbal, “embodied” communication, as Delano’s “body’s discourse offers a 
productive way of making sense of his surrounding” but Delano is unable to “pick up on what 
his own body is communicating” (159). The disciplinary soundscape that the hatchet-polishers 
and oakum-pickers create to monitor behavior and check outbursts is another example of the way 
the rebels communicate nonverbally. In contrast to the visual symbols with which the whites in 
the text try to communicate—for example, the sailor’s knot (77)—the blacks communicate 
covertly through the “cymballing” of hatchets (62) and a series of “queer cr[ies]” (72-73). The 
narrator compares this aural communication system to a “telegraph” (80), evoking the 
“grapevine telegraph” that enslaved men and women used to transmit information from one 
plantation to another: “as between the responsive posts of a telegraph, an unknown syllable ran 
from man to man among the perched oakum-pickers” (80). This contrast between visual and 
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aural symbolism ironically inverts Delano’s assertions that Africans are “sight-loving” (84) and 
“love…bright colors and fine shows” (84). In fact, the whites are both more likely to use visual 
symbols, and—as Delano demonstrates—more likely to be taken in by “shows” such as the one 
the black orchestrates on board the San Dominick. Delano is particularly entranced by the 
spectacle of a naked African woman nursing her child, which Delano celebrates as “a pleasant 
sort of sunny sight” (75). This scopic realm is associated with the surveillance of dominant 
detection. While the blacks prove quite capable of operating within this realm, they are 
additionally skilled at communicating through an aural soundscape that remains 
incomprehensible to their white listener (Delano). 
I want to focus here on the work that these alternate sign systems require of their readers. 
While we may not have been able to interpret them adequately on a first reading, on a second 
reading, the reader’s position changes in relation to Delano, Cereno, and the black. We can now 
reread and reinterpret, this time with knowledge of the end result—the knowledge that a 
detective has when she solves a case. The re-reader, unlike Delano, knows that the mutiny has 
already occurred, and so she can reason analeptically, reading the signs as effects of a prior 
cause—namely, the mutiny and the enslaved men and women’s efforts to avoid ceding control of 
the ship to Delano. H. Bruce Franklin explains that the second story of “the slaves’ revolt and 
ingenious masquerad[e] is narrated in the ponderous documents of the official deposition but is 
also revealed more deeply—at least on rereading—in the events that Delano misinterprets” 
(230). Our rereading asks us to examine the text for traces—evidence—and then reason 
backward and forward in time to understand the mystery. In addition to reconstructing the 
sequence of events, we must also project ourselves into the consciousness of the rebels, 
imagining proleptically how they planned and carried out the mutiny, as well as how they 
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responded to Cereno’s treachery and Delano’s exploitation. Moreover, once the reader 
experiences both modes of reasoning—analeptic and proleptic—she is prepared to recognize that 
the only other character in the story who demonstrates both modes of reasoning for any sustained 
period of time is the black. 
Upon rereading, the “wise” reader’s task is to hold all of the novella’s time frames in her 
mind at once, which—the reader comes to recognize—the blacks have been doing throughout 
Delano’s section. The black can reason both backward and forward, analytically and 
synthetically. When he realizes the San Dominick must encounter the Bachelor’s Delight, he 
quickly generates a fiction that retrospectively accounts for the present state of the ship. His 
successful mutiny demonstrates that he can plan ahead, anticipating possible obstacles and 
overcoming them. Indeed, the entire performance that he orchestrates for Delano requires him to 
move nimbly back and forth in time, keeping straight two chronologies and simultaneously 
remaining at least a step ahead of Cereno’s attempts to convey information and Delano’s efforts 
to give him the slip. The narrator states that Benito Cereno tells Delano the chronology that the 
blacks have invented, but the reader does not receive this narration in Cereno’s own voice. 
Instead, the narrator paraphrases it, beginning this summary with “Don Benito reviving, went on; 
but as this portion of the story was very brokenly delivered, the substance only will here be set 
down. It appeared…” (60). Delano questions Cereno for particulars about the ship’s troubles, and 
the narrator summarizes Cereno’s statement rather than reporting it as direct dialogue. Each time 
the fictional chronology is presented in Delano’s section, the narrative voice takes over and 
summarizes Cereno’s remarks: the reader never hears the story from Cereno. On a first reading 
this may not seem unusual. On a second reading, however, after the reader knows that this 
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chronology was invented by the blacks to deceive Delano, these narrative summaries are 
moments where the blacks’ voice echoes through the narrator’s.  
Although the reader never hears the blacks tell their story directly, these passages are 
reminders that the blacks are thinking analeptically and proleptically, keeping track of divergent 
chronologies in the present moment. This is also the rereader’s task, as she comes to these 
passages detailing the fictional chronology: knowing the ending, she has to reconcile the timeline 
presented in Cereno’s deposition with the timeline presented in Delano’s section. The narrator 
paraphrases this chronology two more times in the first section of the narrative. In the shaving 
scene, Delano presses Cereno to explain how the ship could be becalmed for two months—an 
occurrence Delano calls “unusual,” even “incredulous” (85). The narrator states, “Don Benito 
resumed [his story], rehearsing to Captain Delano, that not only were the calms of unusual 
duration, but the ship had fallen in with obstinate currents” (86). Again, during their lunch, 
Delano “reverted to parts of Don Benito’s story, begging further particulars here and there” and 
“inquir[ing] how it was that the scurvy and fever should have committed such wholesale havoc 
upon the whites, while destroying less than half of the blacks” (89). Once again, the narrator 
summarizes Cereno’s remarks, stating that Cereno “made random reference to the different 
constitution of races” (89). The narrator’s emphasis on Cereno’s “broken” and “random” speech 
indicates his inability to hold these multiple timelines in mind and tell the appropriate story 
smoothly. Of course, Cereno is only parroting the blacks’ story under duress—Babo monitors 
him to make sure he does not deviate from the story. Nevertheless, Cereno displays an inability 
to keep his story straight, forgetting that he said they had sailed around the Horn (82).  
Like Melville, who superimposes multiples timeframes on one narrative, the blacks share 
the work of inventing and maintaining this story. The other figure who performs this authorial 
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function in the story is the narrator of the first section, who frequently presents events as though 
they were happening sequentially, but then disrupts the chronology he has just delineated. For 
example, the narrator states, “But the good conduct of Babo, hardly more than the ill-behavior of 
others, seemed to withdraw the half-lunatic Don Benito from his cloudy languor. Not that such 
precisely was the impression made by the Spaniard on the mind of his visitor. The Spaniard’s 
individual unrest was, for the present, but noted as a conspicuous feature in the ship’s general 
affliction” (57). The narrator here, and repeatedly throughout the first section, collapses two time 
frames, then draws the reader’s attention to this gesture of consolidation by negating the previous 
statement: “Not that such precisely was the impression made.” Attuned to the irony of this 
testimony to Babo’s “good conduct” on a second reading, the reader notices this disjunction 
between what Delano noted “for the present” and the initial assessment. The narrator’s self-
consciously disjointed presentation contrasts with the blacks’ and Melville’s seamless overlay of 
timelines, allowing us to infer the kind of work that the blacks and Melville must be doing but 
not showing. The narrator thus gives us a glimpse behind the curtain, revealing the stagecraft that 
is hidden from the audience. 
All of this training in detecting the stagecraft enables the reader to peer behind the 
curtain. Returning to the scene in Delano’s section where the chained Atufal comes to Cereno 
ostensibly to ask his pardon, we can discover a second layer of meaning that suggests the 
consciousness of the black, who has orchestrated the spectacle. Upon rereading, we know that 
this scene replicates the ending, in which the black, when summoned by the Lima court refuses 
to “utte[r a] sound, and could not be forced to” (112). Despite the mutilation of his body, the 
black “met his voiceless end…unabashed” (112). While the novella concludes with this scene of 
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the black’s silence, the echoes of this conclusion in Atufal’s earlier scene offers a way to hear the 
black indirectly.  
In the scene with Atufal, the black, here referred to as “the servant,” is in the narrator’s 
position, commenting on the events in front of him: “‘How like a mute Atufal moves,’ murmured 
the servant. The black [here, Atufal] mounted the steps…and, like a brave prisoner, brought up 
to receive sentence, stood in unquailing muteness before Don Benito” (65). Repeating Atufal’s 
muteness, the description establishes a parallel between these two defiant rebels, both designated 
by the phrase “the black” at various points in the novella. The “servant” carefully stages this 
scene to remind Cereno of his impotence while simultaneously presenting Delano with a show of 
Cereno’s power. More significantly, though, this initial scene instructs the reader in how to read 
the silence at the end of the text, since Atufal’s silence is discussed by Cereno, Delano, and the 
servant in this scene. Delano asks, “this scene surprises me; what means it, pray?” (65). Cereno 
explains that Atufal has been appearing before him every two hours for sixty days, but will not 
ask his pardon. Delano exclaims, “he has a royal spirit in him, this fellow” (66), to which Cereno 
replies, “He may have some right to it….[H]e says he was king in his own land” (66). Delano’s 
admiration for Atufal’s “royal spirit” should carry over to the black in his defiance of the Lima 
court, although Delano does not make the connection. 
In response to Cereno, the servant “enter[s] a word” (66), giving a brief biographical 
statement: “those slits in Atufal’s ears once held wedges of gold; but poor Babo here, in his own 
land, was only a poor slave; a black man’s slave was Babo, who now is the white’s” (66). The 
servant’s comment emphasizes the circularity of oppression, as he has experienced enslavement 
under black and white masters. His experience as a slave, has taught him the arts of subterfuge 
and deception—the skills necessary for subordinate detection—which he employs to orchestrate 
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the masquerade on board the San Dominick. However, since he has always been enslaved, he has 
been denied the opportunity to gain the practical intelligence that would help him navigate the 
ship, for example. In their juxtaposition of a “royal spirit” with a “poor slave,” this conversation 
indicates the limits of the black’s agency—despite his indomitable will, his training in 
theatricality and deception cannot overcome the exigencies of systemic oppression. 
On rereading, with the knowledge that the San Dominick has been in a state of mutiny all 
the time Delano was on board, our reading of the “shadows” in the sentence “Shadows present, 
foreshadowing deeper shadows to come” shifts. Melville’s “shadow” imagery underscores the 
way in which the real agent—the person who casts the shadow—has been hidden from Delano 
and the reader throughout the first section of the novella. All we have seen is the shadow he cast, 
the performance of subservience that masks the black and the rest of the formerly enslaved men 
and women. The line is still meaningful—it means differently on each reading, just as does the 
novella as a whole. 
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